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Abstract 
This thesis analyses various legal issues surrounding the ongoing domestic trial of certain 
international crimes committed during the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971. The trial has been 
taking place under the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 (ICT-BD Act) before the 
International Crimes Tribunals since 2010. These tribunals, established by the Bangladeshi 
government pursuant to The ICT-BD Act, are special in nature, and exclusively domestic in 
composition and functional orientation. Thus far, the tribunals have handed down nearly 50 
judgments with convictions and punishments. This trial has both supporters and doubters, 
nationally and internationally. This thesis seeks to address and dispel some of the controversies 
arising from the legal issues relevant to the trial and tribunals. The thesis undertakes a systematic 
investigation of Bangladesh’s initiatives in establishing and conducting this trial, against national 
and international odds, and the significance and contributions of this trial in the context of 
international criminal law. 
The thesis analyses the judicial deliberations, interpretations and applications of various provisions 
of The ICT-BD Act by the tribunals. These include the definitions and constituent legal elements 
of the specific international crimes embodied in The ICT-BD Act; criminal responsibilities of the 
perpetrators of these designated crimes; jurisdiction of the tribunals; rules of procedures followed 
in the conduct of the trial; trials in absentia; trial, appeal and review proceedings with convictions 
and sentencing; and prosecutorial strategies in charge framing and discharging burden of proof 
and defence rebuttals. 
The analysis of these substantive legal issues is brought with the interpretation developed by the 
tribunals and the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh. Following this analysis, 
the thesis observes that the Bangladesh trial, despite its initial difficulties, has gathered pace and 
momentum in delivering justice to victims and ending the impunity of perpetrators of the crimes 
committed in 1971. 
The thesis also analyses the relationship of The ICT-BD Act with international criminal law; the 
former has clearly incorporated the latter for mandatory enforcement in domestic jurisdiction. The 
Act has drawn heavily from the Nuremberg Charter, precedents and principles of international 
vii 
criminal law adopted by the United Nations (UN) in 1950. The thesis argues that the Bangladesh 
tribunals have been administering criminal justice according to international criminal law and 
policy, as adopted in The ICT-BD Act, the substantive law of the trial. 
There is nothing in international criminal law and policy that prevents national trials of 
international crimes. Instead, The Rome Statute of the ICC repeatedly imposes a positive duty upon 
International Criminal Court (ICC) member states to establish such national trials to complement 
the international criminal justice system. The thesis appraises the Bangladesh trial in the context 
of The Rome Statute of the ICC, which has been ratified by Bangladesh (the only ratifying state in 
Asia). To this end, the domestic trial of international crimes in Bangladesh has been viewed as 
complementary to the international criminal justice under the ICC Statute. 
Given the ineffectiveness, non-universal jurisdiction and demonstrated limitations of the 
international criminal justice system, particularly the ICC and hybrid tribunals with UN 
involvement (East Timor and Cambodia), the role and success of national criminal jurisdiction in 
ending impunity for international crimes is praiseworthy. Since the very purpose of both national 
and international criminal justice is the same—ending the impunity of the perpetrators of 
international crimes—both systems must cooperate and complement each other to achieve their 
common goal. 
Finally, the thesis establishes that the effectiveness and success of the Bangladesh trial should not 
be assessed only by highlighting its limitations but also by its achievements in undertaking the 
challenge of the trials, which even the international community and the UN could not try for many 
decades. Without this trial, the cycle of impunity would have prevailed over the pursuit of justice. 
The legacy, significance and precedential effects of the Bangladesh experience are likely to 
influence future judicial decision-making should a parallel situation emerge in the same way. 
Bangladesh judges have relied on the precedents and principles of the Nuremberg trials and 
subsequent ad hoc international crimes tribunals, despite their inadequacies and limitations.  
viii 
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This research examines the prosecution, trials and punishment of international crimes committed 
during the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971. The trials are administered by specialised and 
exclusively domestic tribunals. In other words, international crimes are being tried and punished 
by the domestic tribunals of Bangladesh. For this trial, Bangladesh enacted special legislation in 
1973 that embodies the elements of international crimes and the criminal responsibility (individual 
and joint) of the alleged perpetrators. In the main, the thesis will cover the following aspects. 
First, the thesis provides a background account of the factors and events leading to the Bangladesh 
Liberation War of March 1971. It begins with a brief introduction of The International Crimes 
(Tribunals) Act (1973) (The ICT-BD Act), substantive law of trial, definitions and legal elements 
of the designated international crimes committed during the war and embodied in the substantive 
law and its subsequent amendments, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and ensuring criminal 
responsibilities for the crime. 
By virtue of its mandate under the The ICT-BD Act, the Tribunal enacted its Rules of Procedures, 
which are examined in a comparative context. The trial process, prosecutorial charge framing and 
defence rebuttals, followed by trial, appeal and review judgments with conviction and punishment, 
are all considered. 
Finally, the international standard of the trial and its complementarity with the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) and compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) 1966 are critically evaluated followed by a conclusion and recommendations. 
I.A Background of the Research 
Bangladesh is a South-East Asian country located in a geographically significant area. It 
is located at the eastern part of the Bay of Bengal region. Two states—India and Pakistan—
emerged after independence from British colonial regimes in 1947.1 India and Pakistan emerged 
 
1 Maya Tudor, ‘Explaining Democracy's Origins: Lessons from South Asia’ (2013) 45(3) Comparative Politics 253. 
 
2 
based on two religious philosophies: Hinduism and Islam.2 Pakistan was divided into two parts: 
East Pakistan and West Pakistan. Bangladesh was East Pakistan. The two states, created based on 
the religious philosophy, could not establish peace and harmony among the people of the region. 
From the outset, West Pakistan displayed a discriminatory, prejudiced attitude towards the East.3 
The Language Movement of 1952 was an outcome of that discriminatory rule. The continued 
deprivation of the people of the East Pakistan led them to a movement for independence from 
Pakistan; they finally achieve a glorious independence in 1971 through a nine months’ prolonged 
war with massive atrocities.4 
The independence war caused a massive loss of lives and properties because of the heinous crimes 
by the Pakistani military and their collaborators from East Pakistan. The independence war caused 
the deaths of around three million people.5 About 10 million fled across the border to India, more 
than six million homes were burned, 1,500,000 peasants lost farmland and animals, while 200,000 
to 400,000 women were raped, leading to approximately 25,000 pregnancies.6 In the name of 
saving the unity of Pakistan and Islam, the world had witnessed unprecedented crimes against 
humanity, perpetrated by the Pakistani army and their local accomplices (including the rajakars, 
Al-Badar and al-shams).7 From these facts, a strong prima facie case existed pertinent to 
international crimes, including war crimes, crimes against humanity and breaches of common 
article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.8 
The Pakistani army and their local collaborators engaged in the systematic killing of Bengali 
intellectuals.9 The newly independent Bangladesh government was determined to investigate and 
 
2 Nasir Islam, ‘Islam and National Identity: The Case of Pakistan and Bangladesh’ (1981) 13(1) International Journal 
of Middle East Studies 55. 
3 Rounaq Jahan, ‘Genocide in Bangladesh’ in Samuel Totten and William S Parsons (eds), Centuries of Genocide, 
Essays and Eyewitness Accounts (Routledge, 2013) 250. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Suzannah Linton, ‘Completing the Circle: Accountability for the Crimes of the 1971 Liberation War of Bangladesh’, 
(2010) 21(2) Criminal Law Forum 194. 
6 Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape (Ballantine Books, 1975) 81; Talukder 
Maniruzzaman, Radical Politics and the Emergence of Bangladesh (Mowla Botthers, 2003) 17. 
7 M Rafiqul Islam, ‘The Pursuit of Post-Conflict Justice through War Crimes Trials in Bangladesh: Challenges and 
Options’ in Mizanur Rahman (ed), Post-Conflict Justice, Peace and Human Rights (ELCOP & Palal Prokashoni, 
2009) 1. 
8 Linton (n 5) 201. 
9 Zakia Afrin, ‘The International War Crimes (Tribunal) Act, 1973 of Bangladesh’ (2009) Indian Yearbook of 
International Law and Policy 342. 
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prosecute the officials of the Pakistan army and their local collaborators. In 1972, the government 
of Bangladesh promulgated the Bangladesh Collaborators (Special Tribunal) Order 1972 
(hereinafter the Collaborators Order) to try those who collaborated with the Pakistan army and 
engaged in atrocities.10 About 50,000 collaborators were arrested under the Collaborators Order. 
As of October 1973, 37,471 cases were filed under the Collaborator Order and 2,884 were tried. 
Because of a lack of capacity, the trial convicted 752 accused and imprisoned. The trial convicted 
only one accused and sentenced the perpetrator to capital punishment.11 The trial acquitted as many 
as 2,000.12 On 29 November 1973, the government declared an amnesty for all prisoners held 
under the Collaborators Order. This excluded those who were charged with murder, rape and 
arson. Nearly 33,000 ‘detained collaborators’ were freed. Those accused of murder, rape or arson 
were to be tried under the Collaborators Order. 
In 1973, the government of Bangladesh enacted the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 973 
(hereinafter The ICT-BD Act).13The main purpose of this was to bring to justice top Pakistani 
officials who were involved in mass atrocities; Bangladesh listed 195 perpetrators. The preamble 
of the Act explicitly provides the objective of the Act. Further, it provides that this Act is to provide 
for the detention, prosecution and punishment of persons for genocide, crimes against humanity, 
war crimes and other crimes under international law.14 
To ensure that investigation and prosecution under the Act was feasible, the government brought 
an amendment under the Constitution on 15 July 1973.15 The Constitution (First Amendment) Act 
1973 aimed to allow investigation, prosecution and punishment of persons accused of international 
crimes, including genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes or any other crimes under 
international law. The Amendment excluded the protection under certain fundamental rights 
guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution of Bangladesh. 
The ICT-BD Act received global attention for its incorporation of international crimes and 
procedural mechanisms within the domestic sphere. However, items such as the treaties between 
 
10 President’s Order No 8 of 1972. 
11 Kaler Kantha (A Bengali Daily in Bangladesh), Return of Collaborators Act, 16 December 2010. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Act No. XIX of 1973. 
14 The long title of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973. 
15Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh 1972, Constitution (First Amendment) Act 1973, 15 July 1973. 
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India, Bangladesh and Pakistan, and the assassination of the father of the nation (Bangabandhu 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman) halted the process. In 1975, General Ziaur Rahman replaced the 
Collaborators Order with Martial Ordinance law. This martial law ordinance released all accused 
who were waiting for trial, as well as those who had been convicted under the Tribunal. As a result, 
war criminals remained unpunished. 
The Awami League-led coalition government came to power in 2009 with a strong commitment 
to try and prosecute individuals involved in atrocities of the 1971 Liberation War under The ICT-
BD Act. The Awami League government made an election pledge in 2008 for the prosecution of 
perpetrators of the Liberation War. In this election, the people of Bangladesh overwhelmingly 
supported this pledge to try and punish the perpetrators of the 1971 Liberation War. The ICT-BD 
Act was enacted by the government of Bangladesh, with unanimous support to detain, prosecute 
and punish the criminals who committed international crimes during the Liberation War of 
Bangladesh. 
The first indictments were issued in 2010 and the government formed the ‘War Crimes Fact 
Finding Committee to investigate international crimes against humanity committed in 1971’.16 On 
3 April 2010, the War Crimes Facts Committee completed its report and published a list of 1,597 
war criminals involved in crimes such as murder, rape, looting and arson during the Liberation 
War.17 Pursuant to the 1973 Act, the government t established the International (Crimes) Tribunal-
1 (ICT-BD 1) in 2010 and the International (Crimes) Tribunal-2 (ICT-BD 2) in 2012. Section 6 of 
the Act empowers the government to establish one or more tribunals, each consisting of a 
chairperson and no fewer than two and no more than four other members. The government, by 
notification in an official gazette, established the Tribunal on 25 March 2010, consisting of three 
judges, of whom one is chairperson and two are members. On 22 March 2012, the government, by 
official gazette, announced the establishment of another Tribunal. Thus, two tribunals established 
under the ICTA (1973) are in operation, with the same jurisdiction mentioned in section 3 of the 
ICT-BD Act. 
 




The government formed a team of prosecution headed by a chief prosecutor under section 7 and 
an investigation agency under section 8 of The ICT-BD Act. The office of registry has a registrar, 
deputy registrar and personnel. The Tribunal framed its own Rules of Procedure (RoP) as per the 
power conferred in Section 22 of The ICT-BD Act. Tribunal 1 has functioned uninterruptedly since 
its establishment, whereas Tribunal 2 was activated for a period and suspended on 15 September 
2015 because of an insufficient number of cases. 
Section 3 of The ICT-BD Act provides that international crimes include crimes against humanity, 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against peace, violation of Geneva Conventions and any other crimes 
under international law and complicity and abetment to commit such crimes. The tribunals 
constituted under The ICT-BD Act have the power to try and punish any individual or group or 
organisation, or any member of armed, defence or auxiliary forces, irrespective of nationality, who 
committed any crimes under section 3(2) of The ICT-BD Act. 
The ICT-BD Act makes the tribunals independent to prosecute and try the offences. Section 6(2A) 
of the 1973 Act states that the Tribunal shall be independent in the exercise of its judicial functions 
and shall ensure fair trial. 
The ICT-BD Act was amended in 2009 and 2013 with necessary changes. Moreover, ICT-1 and 
ICT-2 have their own RoP.18These tribunals are a domestic judicial mechanism established 
through the national legislation, intended to try internationally recognised crimes—hence, their 
description as international crimes tribunals (ICTs). However, they are not required to follow 
universally recognised norms or principles established by international law or international 
criminal law when trying persons responsible for crimes enumerated in The ICT-BD Act. 
By March 2020, 41 cases had been decided by both tribunals. Tribunal 1 has delivered verdicts in 
30 cases while Tribunal 2 has conferred 11 verdicts during its functioning until 15 September 
2015. In some cases, the accused has preferred to appeal to the Appellate Division of the Supreme 
Court of Bangladesh and apply for review in the same division. 
 
18 Tribunal-2 was formed on 22 March 2012 and continued until 15 September 2015. See <https://www.ict-
bd.org/ict2/>. 
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Although the degree of fairness of The ICT-BD Act has been considered, and RoP were formulated 
by the Tribunal, questions remain over the RoP for delivering justice in war crimes cases. It is 
important to consider the Tribunal’s mechanisms for safeguarding the accused and witnesses and 
whether they align with international standards. In Chief Prosecutor v Syed Md Qaiser, it states 
that The ICT-BD Act has the merit and means of ensuring the standard of safeguards recognised 
universally to be provided to the person accused of crimes against humanity.19 Therefore, 
examining the extent to which The ICT-BD Act and tribunals have been able to ensure justice in 
prosecuting and adjudicating international crimes of war perpetrators is required. 
I.B Justification of the Research 
The arena of international criminal law has mostly focused on the Nuremberg- and Tokyo-based 
trials of international crimes. After World War II, legal scholars published substantive writings 
and analyses on different aspects of the postwar trials and development of international criminal 
law. During the Cold War, termed the ‘half century of silence’, the issues of mass atrocities and 
their prosecution remained unfocused.20 The massacres and atrocities committed during the 
Liberation War in Bangladesh were also not sufficiently recognised by scholars at the international 
level. 
Bangladesh, however, was proactive and determined to domestically arrange the investigation and 
prosecution of international crimes within its jurisdiction. The enactment of The ICT-BD Act was 
certainly a milestone in the history of international criminal law during the era of impunity, but it 
was not sufficiently analysed by scholars of the time. Although an abundance of materials is 
available for investigation and prosecution of international crimes at the international level, the 
issue of domestic prosecution of international crimes remains one of the least studied areas, but is 
one that requires close examination. 
As a party to The Rome Statute, Bangladesh complied with the requirement of Article 17 of the 
Statute by bringing the Act into reality with the establishment of the tribunals. Although The Rome 
 
19 The Chief Prosecutor v Syed Md Qaiser (International Crimes Tribunal-2, ICT-BD Case No 4 of 2013, 23 December 
2014) [6] 6. 
20 Md Mostafa Hosain, ‘The Significance of Bangladesh’s International Crimes (Tribunals) in the History of 
International Criminal Law and Justice’ in Morten Bergsmo et al (eds) Historical Origins of International Criminal 
Law (Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 2016) 465. 
7 
Statute is not directly applicable to the Liberation War, certainly the spirit of the Statute, which 
aims to end impunity, as enshrined in the preamble, supports the Bangladesh arrangement. 
Therefore, this study would be groundbreaking in its examination of the relationship between the 
ICC and Bangladesh. 
With the amendment to The ICT-BD Act, the tribunals were established, and 41 cases have been 
decided as of March 2020. It is both timely and significant to analyse these tribunals and judge 
their contribution to ending impunity for perpetrators while ensuring justice to victims. Clearly, a 
domestic example of the prosecution of international crimes demands greater analysis and 
research. Hence, this research will fill the gap in the extant literature, particularly relating to 
international crimes tried under purely domestic mechanisms. 
From the Bangladesh experience, this research will extract lessons for the progressive development 
of international criminal law and justice systems. It will help improve the standard and operation 
of international criminal law in the domestic jurisdiction of Bangladesh in particular, and other 
domestic jurisdictions in general. Many jurisdictions with experience of massacre have victims 
still awaiting justice. The Bangladesh experience of domestic prosecution of international crimes 
can be a model for those who wish to engage with the task. This research will focus on the 
Bangladesh ICT-BD as a model for domestic prosecution of international crimes. 
I.C Thesis Statement 
This research explores the perpetration of designated international crimes committed during the 
Bangladesh Liberation War 1971. It examines and analyses the administration of international 
criminal justice in a domestic jurisdiction, with reference to Bangladesh. The thesis specifically 
focuses on the legal principles of international criminal law and the provisions of The ICT-BD Act, 
together with its amendments applicable to international crimes trials in Bangladesh. 
This research assesses both the substantive law and procedural rules under which the trials are 
conducted to assess their standards in the context of other similar ad hoc international and 
mixed/hybrid trials. The judgments delivered by the tribunals and Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court of Bangladesh will be analysed to extract the approach of Bangladesh towards 
international criminal law. On the question of legal principles, on many occasions, the tribunals 
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brought similar examples to those prevailing at international levels and followed jurisprudence 
developed by international tribunals such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). 
Finally, the thesis makes recommendations on how to strengthen domestic trials of international 
crimes across the world by considering the experience of Bangladesh. The experience of 
Bangladesh may be an example to minimise the cost of justice delivery systems and ensure an end 
to the culture of impunity. This recommendation will strengthen and improve the complementarity 
arrangement of the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
I.D Research Questions 
The main research question of the thesis is: How effective are the Bangladesh tribunals in 
providing justice in the context of international criminal law? Are they formed according to 
international law and policy standards? To address the main research question, five sub-questions 
were posed in this study: 
1. What are the substantive laws provided by The ICT-BD Act? 
2. What are the procedural laws and standards followed by ICTs? 
3. What measures and strategies under the substantive and procedural laws have been adopted 
for prosecution and defence under The ICT-BD Act? 
4. What are the RoP for post-trial process under The ICT-BD Act? 
5. To what extent have the domestic trials of international crimes been rendered 
complementary to instrumental crimes trial under the ICC? 
I.E Expected Contributions of the Research 
This research will make a significant contribution to the progressive development of international 
criminal law and its application in domestic jurisdictions. The research will also contribute to 
contemporary international debates on the complementarity between national and international 
criminal justice systems and will assist in evaluating the contribution of the Bangladesh 
experience, which is exclusively domestic. The experience of Bangladesh will make both specific 
and general contributions to further knowledge in international criminal justice. These trials will 
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provide justice for victims of 1971 crimes, which will assist in post-conflict reconciliation in 
Bangladesh. Practically, this research will provide guidelines for judges, lawyers, investigating 
officers and the public to better understand the crimes committed in Bangladesh, as endorsed by 
the judiciary. 
This research has overwhelming and omnipresent significance and relevance for the global 
community. It will be helpful in future research and assist in the adoption of new laws, at domestic 
and international levels, particularly in the area of defining and prescribing procedures for 
international crimes. It will contribute to the distinct experience and practice of Bangladesh in 
managing international crimes within a limited budget and following a timely procedure. This 
exploratory study will contribute to academia. More broadly, it will assist domestic judges and 
lawyers in managing situations in which questions of the application of international law arise. 
Studies such as this thesis have the potential to usher reform in the complimentary provision 
(article 17) of The Rome Statue of the ICC, which has not been adequate in managing 
complementary cases, such as the recent Kenyan and Libyan cases. 
I.F Literature Review 
Trial of international crimes under domestic criminal systems has been a topic of discussion since 
World War II. However, ongoing national trials for international crimes in Bangladesh are of 
recent initiation and have not received much scholarly attention. The ICT-BD Act was adopted in 
1973 so has been analysed by some scholars. Analysis of The ICT-BD Act until now has focused 
on the substantive part of the Act and its compliance and relevance in the then-context of 
international criminal law. The literature review (section I.F) will explore the gaps in the existing 
research and consider the necessity of further research. 
The ICT-BD Act contains international crimes applied by the domestic judicial mechanism. The 
domestic mechanism of international crimes and relevance for international criminal law is 
reflected in the writings of Werle et al and Zahar.21 These two renowned scholars explain how 
 
21 Gerhard Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law (TMC Asser Press, 2nd ed, 2009); Alexander Zahar and 
Göran Sluiter, International Criminal Law: A Critical Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2008); AHJ Swart, 
Alexander Zahar and Göran Sluiter, The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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international criminal law is placed within the domestic sphere. The authors suggest that 
international criminal law is directly enforced by either the International Military Tribunal (IMT) 
and ad hoc or indirectly through domestic prosecution of international crimes.22 
The implication of international criminal law through domestic forums was also a debatable issue 
at the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. Werle and Jessberger mention that from the end of the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials until the creation of ad hoc tribunals, the enforcement of international 
criminal law depended on domestic courts.23 They described this as a unique area of international 
law because it focuses on individuals who are subjects in both international and domestic criminal 
justice systems.24 However, it remains unclear if an individual can be tried under international 
criminal law through a domestic tribunal. 
Meltaux analyses the legal and historical judicial development that has taken place in the last half 
century.25 His book discusses laws of tribunals, application to the law in various criminal cases 
and detailed analysis of the jurisprudence. It also summarises the jurisdiction of the tribunals and 
defines the ingredients of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, and outlines their 
application in the Tribunal.26 
Ellis, in Sovereignty and Justice: Balancing the Principle of Complementarity between 
International and Domestic War Crimes Tribunals, discusses the characteristics and nature of 
international and domestic war crimes tribunals.27 According to Ellis, a domestic war crimes 
tribunal, established under the ICC, could work effectively if the complementarity principle and 
its implementation are ensured, focusing on accountability mechanisms and cooperation between 
international and domestic tribunals.28 The author refers to various local tribunals, including 
Bangladesh, and analyses whether the complementarity principle has been followed by the 
domestic tribunal. He further investigates whether the complementarity mechanism has been fully 
achieved. Ellis shows that the domestic war crimes court in conjunction with the ICC can best 
 
22 Gerhard Werle and Florian Jessberger, Principles of International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2014). 
23 Ibid, 91. 
24 Zahar and Sluiter (n 21) 491. 
25 Guenael Mettraux, International Crimes and Ad Hoc Tribunals (Oxford University Press, 2005) 363–7. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Mark S Ellis, Sovereignty and Justice: Balancing the Principle of Complementarity between International and 
Domestic War Crimes Tribunals (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014). 
28 Ibid. 
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implement practices of the complementarity principle with domestic prosecutors. However, he 
does not explain the provisions of the domestic trials and how they will be rendered more 
complementary to instrumental crimes trials under the ICC.  
Simmons and Danner highlight the potential usefulness of the ICC as a mechanism for some 
governments to commit to de-escalating violence and beginning on the road to peaceful 
negotiations.29 Many states that are vulnerable and unable to ensure justice through their domestic 
tribunals or courts may refer the case to the ICC, which is justiciable and a credible alternative 
means to hold leaders accountable for international crimes. The authors examine the role of the 
ICC in influencing domestic tribunals or courts to adjudicate war crimes or crimes against 
humanity.30 However, the authors do not investigate the substantive and procedural aspects of 
international crimes with reference to any particular state or context. 
The contribution of Knoops is important to this research. The author analyses the values and goals 
of ICTs. He comments that ICC jurisdiction may apply to regional ICTs and be complementary to 
national jurisdictions and prosecution.31 He also evaluates and criticises the Bangladesh War 
Crimes Tribunal. Moreover, crimes against humanity before the ICTs, substantive crimes 
addressed by the tribunals and the general principle of criminal responsibility are discussed in this 
book. 
Bass identifies the gaps in developing a code of conduct or scale of justice in any war crime or 
international crime. The author highlights the harsh reality of Bangladeshis’ profound frustration. 
This research establishes that the code of 1918 and 1945 should not be objected to in 1972. 
Similarly, there cannot be different codes of conduct for bigger powers and poorer countries. The 
author suggests that the subcontinental Nuremberg faded away, leaving the wounds of Bangladesh 
unbound to this day.32 
 
29 Beth Ann Simmons and Allison Danner, ‘Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court’ (Spring 
2010) 64 International Organization 225–56. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Geert-Jan Knoops, An Introduction to the Law of International Criminal Tribunals (Brill, 2nd ed, 2014). 
32 Gary J Bass, ‘Bargaining Away Justice: India, Pakistan, and the International Politics of Impunity for the Bangladesh 
Genocide’ (Fall 2016) 42(2) International Security 140–87. 
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Clark highlights the interesting issue of the outreach activities of the Tribunal.33 She expresses that 
international war crimes tribunals face multifaceted challenges in achieving the objectives of the 
tribunals and receiving support from the local population. Further analysis in this work includes 
challenges of the ICTY, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the ICC and recommends 
ways to address those challenges. However, Clark does not observe the outreach activities 
regarding The ICT-BD Act to investigate whether a similar mechanism could be developed under 
ICT-BD. 
De Costa and Hossain recommend that sexual violence is to be addressed under the Tribunal, 
suggesting identification of the best complementary process to enable the ICT-BD to recover, 
record and recognise the realities of such violence against women during and after the war.34 They 
further argue that the Tribunal should analyse national and international experiences of rape, 
trafficking and other sexual assaults to determine its own decision. Kuo agrees, arguing for 
prosecution of crimes of sexual violence under an international tribunal.35 The author states that 
crimes against women are also crimes against all humanity. 
M Islam claims that the judgments of the ICT-BD drew world attention to wartime sexual crimes 
that had historically been ignored.36 Their precedent-setting effects have significantly expanded 
protections to victims of wartime sexual crimes. These special judicial bodies have proactively 
engaged in changing the world’s perception of wartime rape and its longstanding legal status. They 
have deconstructed the culpability of wartime rape and developed criminalising jurisprudence 
within the broader ambit of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.37 
Schneider et al state that the mission of the ICC is to condemn crimes against humanity though a 
supranational organism to work as an effective mechanism to reduce the gravity of crimes against 
 
33 Janine Natalya Clark, ‘International War Crimes Tribunals and the Challenge of Outreach’ (2009) 9(1) International 
Criminal Law Review 99–116. 
34 Bina D’Costa and Sara Hossain, ‘Redress for Sexual Violence before the International Crimes Tribunal in 
Bangladesh: Lessons from History, and Hopes for the Future’ (2010) 21(2) Criminal Law Forum 331–59. 
35 Peggy Kuo, ‘Prosecuting Crimes of Sexual Violence in an International Tribunal’ (Summer, 2002) 34(3) Case 
Western Reserve Journal of International Law 305–21. 
36 M Rafiqul Islam, ‘Criminalising Rape and Sexual Violence in Armed Conflicts: Evolving Criminality and 
Culpability from the Geneva Conventions to the Bangladesh International Crimes Trial’ in Md Jahid Hossain Bhuiyan 




humanity, urging world leaders to act against crimes against humanity.38 Henry explores the usual 
limitations for bearing witness to wartime rape in international war crimes tribunals. According to 
the author, wartime sexual violence (eg, rape) is a serious human rights violation; she criticises 
legal discourse in this regard.39 
Fairness is the key determinant in the international criminal justice system. Damaška states ‘that 
the criminal justice procedure might vary state to state; therefore, operational context of the 
international criminal courts and tribunals should be taken into account to determine the standards 
of the fairness of the international criminal justice’.40 The author identifies various matters in 
relation to fairness of international criminal justice systems, including political or other internal 
pressures in domestic tribunals, weakness of international tribunal and provisions of amicus curiae 
and the need for speedy trials. Although the operational context is a predominant factor in the 
international criminal justice system, there is no research on the operational context to consider in 
trials of international crimes under The ICT-BD Act. 
Apart from the analysis of the international criminal law and the domestic Tribunal, several studies 
have specifically focused on The ICT-BD Act. It is evident that the application of international 
criminal law by The ICT-BD Act has contemporary significance. The Tribunal was formed under 
The ICT-BD Act, which is a distinct nature of legislation with a trajectory between international 
criminal law and the Act. The Act was made for the detention, prosecution and punishment of 
persons for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes under international 
law.41 
Linton’s seminal work on The ICT-BD Act is highly pertinent here. The treatise is a detailed 
description of the historical background of adopting The ICT-BD Act, and combines analyses of 
each crime and concept articulated under the Act. The author highlights the procedural aspects 
under the Act and the possible expectations in terms of standards maintenance. She makes a 
 
38 E´der Milton Schneider et al, ‘Crimes against Humanity: The Role of International Courts’ (2014) 9(6) PLOS One 
1. 
39 Nicola Henry, ‘The Impossibility of Bearing Witness: Wartime Rape and the Promise of Justice’ (2010) 16(10) 
Violence Against Women 1098–119. 
40 Mirjan Damaška, ‘Reflections on Fairness in International Criminal Justice’ (2012) 10(3) Journal of International 
Criminal Justice, 611–20. 
41 Preamble of the ICT-BD Act 1973. 
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comparative analysis throughout, noting other standards articulated in different international and 
hybrid tribunals. Since her work was published before the initiation of the ongoing trail process, 
the text did not touch upon the reflections of the tribunals and the Supreme Court of Bangladesh.42. 
Nonetheless, her work remains highly pertinent in conceptual discussion and analysis. 
Morrison considers the issue in terms of competing narratives, the issue of ownership of ‘truth’ 
and the contribution of the images of 1971 to the Constitution of Bangladesh.43 The author argues 
that since 2010, belated war crimes trials have been help for local collaborators. This research 
indicates that the accused mainly come from Islamic political parties and the verdicts have spurred 
popular protests, resulting in violent confrontations. The author examines the issue of criticism 
from accused political leaders. According to this research, trials have been criticised as political 
trials, aimed at eliminating political opposition rather than achieving justice and healing historical 
wounds. The author focuses on the issues of political and social instability generated from the 
trials, while commenting that protests against the trials from both fronts ‘may indeed be a defining 
moment for (re)imagining Bangladesh’.44  
D’Costa examines the transitional justice interventions that frequently take place in countries like 
Bangladesh.45 The author highlights that weak democratic states experience serious political 
obstacles in implementing transitional justice mechanisms, such as the ICT-BD. Further, she 
argues that the long-running history of impunity in Bangladesh evidences the pressures that arise 
when ruling elites fear the reaction of various interest groups, especially powerful religious and 
political leaders who are on trial for their past role in serious criminality.46 
Hosain highlights the historical background of The ICT-BD Act in the context of international 
criminal law.47 The author focuses on the background of the adoption of The ICT-BD Act and the 
then-relevant political scenario prevalent at both national (Bangladesh) and international levels. 
Defining rape as a crime against humanity, he views the essence of the domestic Act of a war-
 
42 Linton (n 5) 191–311. 
43 Wayne Morrison, ‘Bangladesh, 1971, War Crimes Trials and Control of the Narrative: The State or Collaborative 
Enterprise?’ (September 2013) Revista Critica Penal y Poder 338–57. 
44 Ibid, 355. 
45 Bina D’Costa, ‘Of Impunity, Scandals and Contempt: Chronicles of the Justice Conundrum’ (2015) 9 International 
Journal of Transitional Justice 357–66. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Hosain (n 20) 459–75. 
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broken country to ensure justice to victims as a reflection of the nation’s commitment to ending 
impunity. He also sheds light upon the principle of retrospectivity in international criminal law 
and its standing in the context of ICT-BD. He suggests that The ICT-BD Act could serve as a 
precedent for domestic prosecutions with limited capacity and resources. 
The application of the post facto law has been a hotly debated issue in nearly every international 
crimes trial. M Islam argues that all international crimes trials are retroactive in nature and have 
been since the Nuremburg Trials.48 However, M Islam focuses on the procedural rules under The 
ICT-BD Act rather than substantive crimes and discusses the scenario prevalent at the international 
level. In line with his immense contribution, this research seeks to elaborate on the historic cases 
of ICT-BD retroactivity.49 
Linton, in other research, by referring to international crimes in The ICT-BD Act, claims that the 
body of laws developing these crimes encompassing treaties, international customs and other 
instruments could be treated as source of the Tribunal along with the Act.50 However, Werleand 
and Jessberger believe that complete adoption of international criminal law can be achieved by 
reference to its relevant provisions and principles.51 Domestic law itself refers to the provisions of 
international criminal law. Ample examples are available under The ICT-BD Act. This argument 
is supported by D’Amato, who opines that domestic prosecution of international crimes cannot 
find domestic precedence when conducted at a domestic level.52 However, a question remains as 
to the application of a post facto law in international crimes. 
Afrin considers the ICC standard the benchmark for Bangladesh’s crimes trials but fails to examine 
the complementarity provision of the ICC Statute as articulated in article 17.53 She discusses the 
shortcomings of The ICT-BD Act, such as evidentiary rules and death penalty issues. Afrin 
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proposes for a hybrid tribunal better suited to the context of Bangladesh. She warns of trying 
international crime solely by domestic personalities without proper consideration to the provisions 
of the ICC. 
Sen examines Bangladesh international crimes trials and identifies difficulties that have arisen 
from their domestic nature.54 Commenting on the standard of international criminal law available 
in 1973, she notes that the Act was compliant with the current standard. However, international 
criminal law has improved with the passage of time. The 1973 Act of Bangladesh, along with its 
2009 amendments, prescribes standards that largely comply with existing international standards. 
However, in several aspects, it seems that ICT-BD has different standards than those of recent 
international tribunals, particularly in the definition and penal provisions of certain crimes.55 
M Islam, in his recent seminal work National Trials of International Crimes in Bangladesh: 
Transitional Justice as Reflected in Judgments, incorporates the practice and approach of the 
tribunals under the ICT-BD.56 Analyses focus on the hardcore legal issues arising in the course of 
the trial in the courtroom and the judgment. The work is unique because it is the first compilation 
of the whole spectrum of the ICT-BD. However, several new judgments have been passed by the 
Tribunal after publication of this book. Also, the historical background of the enactment of The 
ICT-BD Act and parliamentary debates are seemingly a minor focus in the book. 
Paust and Blaustein argue that the Bangladesh Act of 1973 provides detailed provisions for 
detention, prosecution and punishment for acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes 
and other international crimes.57 According to their analysis, despite its rigour, the Act has been 
amended on several occasions. 
Apart from discussion on application of international criminal law and standards, M Islam 
considers that The ICT-BD Act is a self-contained ex-post facto law. According to M Islam, The 
 
54 Jhuma Sen, ‘The Trial of Errors in Bangladesh: The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act and the 1971 War Crimes 
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ICT-BD Act determines the scope and defines certain terms that are relevant and necessary for a 
fair trial.58 He shows that The ICT-BD Act authorises governments to establish tribunals, endorses 
liability (both individual and joint, making the official position of the accused irrelevant) and 
prescribes mechanisms for tribunal functioning. M Islam also focuses on the authority of the 
government to appoint prosecutors and guarantee rights of appeal to both parties, prevent 
application of domestic procedural and evidence law pertinent to and conferring overriding of 
effect of the Act.59 
Zeitlyn examines interpretations of contemporary events in Bangladesh. The research makes no 
claims to any privileged information or ‘truth’ about these events. Instead, it argues that 
interpretations of events in London differ from those in Bangladesh. Recent events in Bangladesh 
have led to an increase in transitional political activism among some British Bangladeshis. In 
London, there have been concerted attempts to challenge dominant discourses about Bangladesh’s 
Liberation War and contemporary politics. In many cases, these are related to Islamic political 
movements that have become influential among British Bangladeshis.60 
M Islam, in ‘Trials for International Crimes in Bangladesh: Prosecutorial Strategies, Defense 
Arguments and Judgments’ reflects on the current picture of the tribunals under The ICT-BD Act. 
He proposes that the tribunals have been mindful of certain basic principles set out in the ICCPR 
concerning the rights of the accused at different stages of the proceedings, with notable exception 
of the death penalty.61 He further notes that issues like safeguards for protection of victims are 
conferred under the law. On the question of death penalty, he argues that Bangladesh is not the 
only country to practice capital punishment; rather, many jurisdictions do this, despite the 
undesirability of capital punishment at the international level. 
In S Islam’s ‘The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act of 1973 and the Rules: Substantive and 
Procedural Laws’, he emphasises the substantive and procedural legal framework applicable to 
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investigations and trials before the ICT-BD.62 This chapter provides valuable insight into the 
practice of The ICT-BD Act and highlights the less-known aspects of the applicable legal 
framework beyond the 1973 Act, such as the domestic Jail Code. He argues for a holistic 
understanding of the ICT-BD’s legal framework. 
Hoque notes that it was a challenge for the government to begin the long-awaited trial of most 
serious international crimes committed during the independence war of Bangladesh.63 Haque 
considers that the tribunals under The ICT-BD Act maintained the maximum standard of domestic 
tribunals of other countries for international crimes. He justifies that the defendant always showed 
concern about fair trials and justice by excusing international provisions and standards that should 
not be considered in domestic trials of international crimes. The author reflects that The ICT-BD 
Act 1973 largely complies with fair trial standards, while the courts relied on, or were kept 
informed about, international standards. The author does not deny that there may be certain gaps 
in the fair trial principle because of some government actions.64 
A Islam, a framer of the Bangladesh Constitution, notes in ‘Towards the Prosecution of Core 
International Crimes before the International Crimes Tribunal’ that The ICT-BD Act aligns with 
the spirit of The Rome Statute’s declaration that perpetrators must not go unpunished and that their 
effective prosecution be ensured by taking measures at the domestic level.65 He sets out the 
historical context of Bangladesh’s 1971 war, emphasises the need to ensure individual 
accountability for atrocities and suggests how impunity had contributed to the destabilisation of 
the Constitution, democracy and the rule of law. 
Boas, in the brilliant ‘War Crimes Prosecutions in Australia and Other Common Law Countries: 
Some Observations’, argues that The ICT-BD Act of Bangladesh was an innovative piece of 
domestic legislation. He notes that while never genuinely employed for its intended purpose, this 
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Act was amended in 2009 to enable prosecution for crimes committed in that country’s war of 
independence with Pakistan. Drawing on some features of legislation and prosecutorial experience 
in Australia, the United Kingdom and Canada, several features of the legislation deserve notice. 66 
According to Bina, the 1973 International Crimes (Tribunals) Act and subsequent 2009 
Amendment provides the Tribunal enough authority and jurisdiction to try and punish any 
individual or group of individuals, or any member of any armed, defence or auxiliary force, 
irrespective of nationality, who commits international crimes. Bina views that criticism on the 
fairness of the Tribunal is political rather than a genuine analysis of the standard and question of 
the application of international provisions relating to international crimes.67 
The impact of the ICT-BD upon other national courts and tribunals for future purposes would be 
immense. This pursuit of justice by the tribunals in Bangladesh may arguably be recognised as a 
path-finding, pioneering national way to seek justice for alleged commission of international 
crimes.68 In future ventures of other domestic courts, Bangladesh’s example will be of benefit for 
its achievements and failures.69 Through the judicial Act, the ICT-BD has retained the continuing 
validity and relevance of Western jurisprudence to other jurisdictions in a manner responsive to 
local requirements. 
Truly, the Bangladesh experience will contribute to the development of Asian jurisprudence of 
international criminal law.70 The ICT-BD will remain an example of a harmonious functioning of 
the ICC complementary jurisdiction, an effective forum for victims to seek transitional justice, a 
vanguard against impunity and unaccountability, a means for punishment of individual 
perpetrators and the creation of precedential value of a civic and judicial response to a militant 
communal fanaticism-induced criminality. 
Triffterer, a distinguished international expert who contributed to drafting The ICT-BD Act in 
1973, reflects in his writing on the Act of Bangladesh that national jurisdiction may prosecute 
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relevant crimes committed even prior to the Act of 1973 and its amendments of 2009.71 Thus, the 
Bangladeshi criminal justice system may become important for interpretation of The Rome 
Statute—that is, interpreting the relationship with the Statute and determining perpetrators 
responsible for international crimes. It will be a milestone in the history of international criminal 
law if Bangladesh ensures fair trials and interprets the law in accordance with the principles at the 
international level. 
Macdermot, in ‘Crimes Against Humanity in Bangladesh’ (an earlier work), argues that some 
substantial benefit could be derived for the international community from the situation of 
Bangladesh if the alleged violation of human rights in Bangladesh are considered when enforcing 
the right to justice of victims. The author focuses on different avenues available in the 1970s for 
responding to the situation of Bangladesh.72 
The ICT-BD has faced criticisms, from national and international stakeholders. Chopra examines 
various debates, dissents and criticisms of the ICT-BD and highlights whether these criticisms 
weaken the Tribunal.73 The author also discusses the political background of the Tribunal, any 
legal gaps and the fairness and contempt of court proceedings by the ICT-BD.74 However, 
Chopra’s research does not critically analyse the limitations of the ICT-BD. 
M Islam highlights some challenges for The ICT-BD Act, such as its lack of mechanism for 
interlocutory appeals, shaky witness and victim protection, non-availability of exemption for 
minors and persons of unsound mind, absence of protection mechanisms against torture and lack 
of provision for amicus curiae.75 
Similarly, Abdus Samad claims that the basis of the trial proceedings on The ICT-BD Act is not 
beyond criticism for due process of trial.76 The Parliament of Bangladesh enacted the Act in 
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accordance with international law shortly after the Liberation War, which provided less time for 
adequate analysis of international standards. He argues that any initiatives to address the impunity 
of perpetrators and offer redress to victims of gross human rights violations should be applauded, 
while any trial proceedings that do not follow appropriate standards for a fair trial and offer the 
right of due process should be criticised.77 
Saikia observes that although earlier research focused on the usefulness of truth and reconciliation 
commission in war crimes tribunals, there has been a gap in exploring new ways of cumulative 
justice.78 The author investigates non-institutional practices based on religio-cultural models and 
holds that they can be particularly relevant if they are narrated and constructed by survivors in 
post-conflict societies. The research focuses on the war of 1971 of Bangladesh within Pakistan and 
the historical construction of an ‘enemy’ who was victimised during the war and the subsequent 
struggle of perpetrators to reconcile with the loss of their humanity. Her research investigates 
victims’ and perpetrators’ understandings of crimes against humanity in Bangladesh and Pakistan. 
Further, the author discusses the new way for reconciliation of crimes against humanity. However, 
she does not discuss the adjudication of war criminals in Bangladesh to ensure justice to their 
victims. 
This literature review reveals that there is a long-overdue need to analyse war crime trials under 
The ICT-BD Act. The experience of Bangladesh’s trials under The ICT-BD Act after such a long 
period is praiseworthy. However, several scholars have criticised and identified gaps in ensuring 
justice in trials by following international standards under The ICT-BD Act. Moreover, some 
scholars have opined that historical and operational contexts cannot be the basis of a domestic 
criminal justice system. Provisions of the ICC should be followed in the domestic Tribunal in trials 
of international crimes. However, this thesis does not agree with this view for two primary reasons. 
First, the ICC is not a substitute for domestic courts. In fact, domestic courts have primary 
jurisdiction to try nationals that have committed international crimes—the ICC is a court of last 
resort. The Rome Conference in 1988 endorsed The Rome Statute to secure support from sovereign 
state parties. Second, international crimes are being committed in non-Western jurisdictions that 
 
77 Ibid. 
78 Yasmin Saikia, ‘Insa-Niyat for Peace: Survivors’ Narrative of the 1971 War of Bangladesh’ (2011) 13(4) Journal 
of Genocide Research 475–501. 
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have established legal systems and judicial traditions. It is naïve to suggest that these jurisdictions 
will adopt and apply international law and international criminal law in its entirety, even if this 
foreign law is consistent with their circumstances and domestic legal systems. 
This debate is further investigated and analysed in Chapter V. This research is intended to resolve 
these debates by analysing prosecution, trial, post-trial and punishment under The ICT-BD Act to 
explore the fairness and justice of the tribunals of Bangladesh. This attempt to resolve debatable 
issues will be a major contribution of this research. 
I.G Research Methodology 
Research uses two approaches: qualitative and quantitative. However, a recent trend is to follow a 
mixed method, blending both qualitative and quantitative. Qualitative research is related to 
analysis of abstract idea, doctrines or theories; researchers use the analytical technique to focus on 
the subject matter of the research to develop a new concept or redesign the existing idea.79 This 
involves analysis and interpretation of the research problems. Conversely, the quantitative research 
methodology is based on quantities or amounts. That is, researchers use statistical information to 
determine and verify the research questions. The quantitative method highlights accurate 
measurements after data are collected from the various sources: for example, questionnaires, 
surveys or the direct source of the research area.80 This research will apply a qualitative research 
methodology.   
As qualitative research, this thesis is interested in understanding the interpretation of a particular 
theory or doctrine.81Generally, it analyses available information to make critical judgements of the 
materials.82 Engaged in qualitative methodology, this research will follow doctrinal methods. The 
doctrinal method is the core legal research method and lies at the foundation of common law. 
There has been no necessity to explain or classify it within any broader interdisciplinary research 
 
79 Abdullah Al Faruque, Essentials of Legal Research (Palal Prokashoni, 2009) 17. 
80 Faruque (n 79) 18. 
81 Sharan B Merriam and Elizabeth J Tisdell, Qualitative Research: A Guide to Design and Implementation (Jossey-
Bass, 4th ed, 2015) 6. 
82 J Myron Jacobstein, Roy M Mersky and Donald J Dunn, Fundamentals of Legal Research (Foundation Press, 7th 
ed, 1998) 1. 
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framework.83Doctrinal analysis explains, clarifies and understands legal norms and concepts with 
a view to identifying ambiguities, exploring inconsistencies and systematically analysing a 
problem.84Doctrinal research is concerned with the formulation of legal doctrines through analysis 
of legal rules.85 
Therefore, this research will formulate various legal doctrines regarding administration of criminal 
justice in Bangladesh. It is a positive analysis of law with historical, comparative, descriptive and 
policy reform styles of research that enable solutions to contemporary problems. Further, it 
illuminates the present and future with comparative, in-depth analysis of problems, and provides 
guidelines for the development of international criminal laws. 
This research has selected the problem of the ICT-BD in relation to the administration of criminal 
justice in Bangladesh. It will seek specific and identified answers to the research questions and 
systematically verify those answers under a predefined set of procedures. Therefore, this study 
investigates the procedures of ICT-BD in relation to victims and witnesses to determine the 
adequacy and justifiability of the measures. Legal norms, judicial precedents and customary law 
will be applied, as an established standard, to verify the appropriateness of the measures. 
This research will be based on primary and secondary sources. Primary sources will include 
relevant legislation and judgments of the ICT-BDs and the Appellate Divisions of the Supreme 
Court of Bangladesh. Secondary sources will include various relevant, published and unpublished 
materials and international materials. 
Writings of proponents on theories and mainstream scholars will occasionally be given preference. 
Germane secondary sources, including books, journals, articles, online resources, statements, 
presented papers and documents of relevant international and non-governmental organisations will 
be considered. Academic writings, views and opinions of experts in the particular field will be 
noted and quoted to explain the questions of the research. The context of Bangladesh is particularly 
significant. Pertinent legislations, cases brought before the tribunals and decisions of the tribunals 
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and Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh will be mentioned. As of now, the 
tribunals of ICT-BD have delivered 41 judgments. 
The research will substantially examine the approach of the tribunals. This research will also 
consider sources of international law. Pertinent international treaties will be anlaysed with their 
travaux preparators. Customs and principles of war have relevance to the context of international 
criminal law as applied by the ICT-BDs of Bangladesh. The decisions of international courts and 
ad hoc tribunals have enriched this pertinent field and such decisions will be identified in relevant 
sections. 
I.H Chapter Overview 
I.H.1 Chapter I 
Chapter I includes a brief historical background, a succinct note about The ICT-BD Act and the 
international crimes articulated there, justification of the research, thesis statement, research 
questions, expected contributions of this research, a literature review and discussion of the research 
methodology. The study highlights the historical background of the adoption of The ICT-BD Act 
and formation of the current tribunals. It will further demonstrate the relevance of this study in the 
greater context and its expected outcome. Finally, it concludes with an overview of all chapters, 
which will briefly mention the issues and matters reflected in each. 
I.H.2 Chapter II 
This chapter focuses on the substantive part of The ICT-BD Act 1973. It will consider the 
interpretation developed by the tribunals and the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of 
Bangladesh. The substantive aspects include: (a) jurisdiction of the tribunals, (b) definitions of the 
designated international crimes under trial, and (c) the legal regime of criminal responsibility, 
individual and joint criminal enterprises (JCEs) alike. The ICT-BD Act is the main operative law 
in the investigation and prosecution of the crimes committed during the Bangladesh Liberation 
War. Therefore, analysis on jurisdiction, definition of crimes and modes of responsibility will 
primarily be highlighted from content of The ICT-BD Act, and commentaries in Parliament, 
judgments of the tribunals and, significantly, standards articulated at different international 
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instruments in terms of the definition and threshold of the substantive aspects of international 
crimes. The major focus of this chapter is the different dimensions articulated in the definition of 
international crimes. 
I.H.3 Chapter III 
This chapter examines the rules and procedures that ICT-BDs follow in conducting their trials. 
The 1973 Act itself prescribed several procedural measures to be followed before ICT-BD 
proceedings. The Act also mandates tribunals to enact its RoP. This chapter is devoted to a critical 
examination of RoP, including investigation, trial process, trial of absentia, rules of evidence and 
preference of appeal. The procedure before us today was not the same as in the early period of 
trials. The mechanisms have been developed through the process of amendments. Amendments 
have been brought, including on the rights of the accused persons to be presumed innocent, fair 
and public hearing with counsel of their choice and the right to apply and be granted bail. The 
amendments prohibit double jeopardy and confessions of guilt from the accused. The prosecution 
bears the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt the commission of crime by the accused. All 
pertinent issues will be considered in this chapter. Particularly, it examines the procedure and rules 
for investigation, trial proceedings, evidence-taking, and rights of the accused, victims and 
witnesses. It will shed light on the scenario prevalent in major international instruments in this 
regard. 
I.H.4 Chapter IV 
This chapter examines the prosecution and defence procedural aspects of the trials. It focuses on 
the legal points claimed by the prosecution and thereby encountered by the defence. Arguments 
put forward by the defence pertinent to questions of different principles of international criminal 
law, and thereby the response of the Tribunal, dominate this part to depict the strategy adopted by 
both sides. Thus, the chapter discusses the strategies that prosecution has adopted in proving its 
cases beyond any reasonable doubt. The prosecution’s dependency on documentary evidence has 
played a major role in their submissions. In response, the defence has largely challenged 
prosecution on four grounds: (a) delayed trial; (b) inconsistency in the definition of crimes against 
humanity; (c) double jeopardy (that the accused were tried under the 1972 Collaboration Order) 
and; (d) the Act was intended to bring prosecution of 195 Pakistani high officials who were given 
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clemency under the Tripartite Agreement. In certain circumstances, the defence has strongly 
emphasised the standards provided in The Rome Statute, while mentioning that Bangladesh is a 
party to the ICC. 
I.H.5 Chapter V 
This chapter examines trials, appeals, review judgments, conviction and sentencing. The chapter 
carries greatest significance in terms of its contents and analysis. The outcome of the tribunals and 
Appellate Division’s position and execution of the judgment is articulated in this chapter. The 
interpretation and application of The ICT-BD Act in the judgments by the tribunals, the 
jurisprudence contributed by the Apex Court of the country are crucial issues of greater 
significance. 
I.H.6 Chapter VI 
The ICT-BD is such a distinct domestic mechanism that it has attracted global attention. It has 
been observed that the tribunals under The ICT-BD Act face the issue of a relationship between 
The Rome Statute and The ICT-BD Act in every case. Among the many issues and aspects, the 
focus of this chapter is broadly a critical appraisal of ICT-BD trials, especially in terms of their 
international standards and complementarity with the ICC, which includes Article 17 of the Statue 
of the ICC. This will be analysed in the context of the Bangladesh trial, whereby the focus will be 
on the relationship of Bangladesh to the ICC and how ICT-BD fits within that juncture. 
I.H.7 Chapter VII 
The tribunals are at the beginning of the prolonged journey of ending impunity of the past, present 
and future in Bangladesh. The final chapter of the research succinctly emphasises the significance 
of the Act for future context and further reference. As a domestic body dealing with international 
crimes, the ICT-BD’s contributions and remaining challenges will be highlighted in this chapter. 
Overall, this chapter summarises the research and make recommendations for further improvement 
of domestic trials of international crimes, to play a complementary role, as enshrined in Article 17 
of the Statute of the ICC. 
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II SUBSTANTIVE LAWS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIME (TRIBUNAL) ACT 1973 
AND ITS APPLICATION 
II.A Introduction 
This chapter analyses the substantive provisions of The ICT-BD Act and addresses the research 
question: What are the substantive laws provided by The ICT-BD Act? It discusses the historical 
background and travois preparation of drafting and adopting the Act for the trial and punishment 
of perpetrators of the Liberation War of Bangladesh. It considers the interpretation and explanation 
of different terms, rights and concepts developed by the tribunals and Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court of Bangladesh. The ICT-BD Act has two types of provisions: substantive and 
procedural. The substantive aspects of The ICT-BD Act include the jurisdiction of the tribunals; 
the definitions of the designated international crimes under trials; and the legal regime of criminal 
responsibility, both of individual and JCE. 
The ICT-BD Act is the main operative law in the investigation and prosecution of crimes committed 
during the Liberation War of Bangladesh. The analysis of jurisdiction, definition of crimes and 
modes of responsibility will be highlighted from, focused on or arising from content of The ICT-
BD Act. With its subsequent amendments, including the RoP, the 1973 Act constitutes substantive 
law of all aspects of the trial1. ‘This domestic jurisdiction has an underlying nexus with universal 
jurisdiction because of the very nature of the crimes on trial, which are also recognised in and 
prohibited by international law’.2 
The chapter analytically discusses the substantive provisions of The ICT-BD Act with the 
provisions of the international criminal law, in particular, the provisions of the ICC Statute. 
Further, it compares the substantive provisions of the Act with the legislation of other countries 
that have tried and punished international criminals under domestic tribunals. In doing so, this 
 
1 M Rafiqul Islam, National Trials of International Crimes in Bangladesh: Transitional Justice as Reflected in 
Judgments (University Press, 2019) 59. 
2 Ibid 61. 
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chapter focuses on the jurisdictions of the ICT of Bangladesh and the subsequent amendments of 
the Act in regard to the substantive aspects of international crimes. 
II.B  Historical Background of the 1973 Act 
History reveals that Buddhists and Hindu kings ruled Bangladesh before the arrival of Islam.3 
During Muslim rule, this region was part of the Delhi Mughal dynasty. The arrival of East India 
Company, followed by British colonial rule, allowed the introduction and inauguration of 
Bangladesh’s current legal system. In fact, most substantive and procedural laws currently 
applicable in Bangladesh were enacted in that period. The partition in 1947 split India and Pakistan 
into separate nations and Bangladesh remained part of Pakistan, named East Pakistan. West 
Pakistan’s rule over the people of East Pakistan became one of domination and discrimination.4 
The imposition of a foreign ‘official’ language was followed by continuing oppression and 
deprivation of the peoples of East. East Pakistan, with a majority population and larger resources, 
was deprived of proportionate development, which caused mass agitation.5 In the general election 
of 1970, Awami League, the East Pakistan-based political party, won an absolute majority. 
However, it could not embrace power because of the denial of West Pakistan.6 This led to further 
mass agitation. To suppress the movement of people and obstruct the rightful claim of the Bengali 
community, Operation Search Light was announced on 25 March 1971 by General Tikka Khan, 
the military governor of East Pakistan. This involved a full-armed attack with equipment like 
tanks, armoured personnel carriers and troops on the civilians of Dhaka.7 
The virtual slaughter of the unarmed people of Dhaka and other cities and towns of Bangladesh 
constituted a severe massacre. The attack in Dhaka targeted student residences and teachers’ 
quarters of Dhaka University, the police headquarters at Rajarbagh, East Pakistan Rifles 
headquarters at Pilkhanas and the Hindu-populated areas of old Dhaka.8 These atrocities were 
 
3 Before the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, Bangladesh was named East Pakistan. 
4 Talukder Maniruzzaman, Radical Politics and the Emergence of Bangladesh (Mowla Botthers, 2003) 17–23. 
5 Md Mostafa Hosain, ‘The Significance of Bangladesh’s International Crimes (Tribunals) Act in the History of 
International Criminal Law and Justice’, in Morten Bergsmo et al (eds), Historical Origins of International Criminal 
Law (Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 2016) 460–1. 
6 Maniruzzaman (n 4) 85–7. 
7 Suzannah Linton, ‘Completing the Circle: Accountability for the Crimes of the 1971 Liberation War of Bangladesh’, 
(2010) 21 (2) Criminal Law Forum 195. 
8 Maniruzzaman (n 4) 92. 
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committed after the departure of military President General Yahya from Dhaka and with him, West 
Pakistani leading politician Zulkifar Ali Bhutto, in the middle of negotiations.9 Dhaka University 
in particular was the target of military rulers. Students were attacked by the military with arms, 
mortars, tanks, cannons and machine guns.10 The attack targeted religious minorities, particularly 
Hindus. The International Commission of Jurists discovered from eyewitness interviews that 
Hindus were considered enemies of the State.11 Some local Bengali Muslims cooperated with the 
West Pakistani Paramilitary in anti-Hindu outbursts to force Hindu people to flee to India.12 
The Bangladesh Liberation War began on 26 March 1971. Mukti Bahini (freedom fighters) was 
formed by enlisting the youth of Bengali.13 By the end of April, a provisional government for 
Bangladesh was formed, headed by Bangabondhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (president) and Taj 
Uddin Ahmed (Prime Minister). The Liberation War continued until 16 December 1971, when 
Pakistani General Niazi surrendered to the Indian commander of the joint Indian–Mukti Bahini 
force, Lt General Jagjit Singh Aurora.14 In the meantime, the Pakistani army formed its auxiliary 
force by taking civilian groups from local Bengalis and Biharis with the titles Razakars,15 Al-
Shams and Al-Badr. All groups operated under Pakistani command.16 One of the most heinous 
acts of the Pakistani army was the killing of intellectuals just a day before the surrender of the 
Pakistani army. There were allegations that the heinous acts were committed in collaboration with 
the local Razakar and Al-Badr militias and Jamat-e Islami Party.17 
It has been estimated that the Liberation War resulted in the deaths of around three million people. 
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resulting in approximately 25,000 forced pregnancies.18 Based on these facts and information, it 
can easily be assumed that there were gross international crimes including war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. These crimes are a clear violation of international law, in particular, breaches of 
common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 1949.19 
Post-independence Bangladesh faced an abundance of challenges in terms of healing the 
destructive wounds inflicted by the bloody war. Economic and infrastructural recovery was 
intended to be the first concern. Despite this, the government of Bangabandhu, Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman, undertook the investigation and prosecution of war crime perpetrators, in particular 195 
top Pakistani officials. In the meantime, in 1972, the Collaborators Order was passed to 
investigate local collaborators. The ICT-BD Act was passed in 1973.  
The Liberation War posed many questions for India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, especially the 
return of civilians and the repatriation of prisoners of war (POWs). Bangladesh was determined to 
prosecute alleged violators of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. However, Bangladesh 
intended to obtain international support and international collaboration in arranging the tribunals, 
trials and prosecution of international crimes. In 1972, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was asked by the 
international community to form an international tribunal in Dhaka. He also approached the UN 
to establish a criminal court.20 The UN Commission on Human Rights responded that Bangladesh 
should form an international court following the model of Nuremberg and Tokyo if it wanted to 
proceed with the investigation and prosecution of international crimes.21 
In 1972, Bangladesh adopted the Bangladesh Collaborators (Special Tribunal) Order, which 
facilitated identification of the collaborators of Pakistan army for prosecution for war crimes and 
crimes against humanity.22 The aim of this Order was to initiate and continue speedy and fair trials 
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for perpetrators who aided, abetted or facilitated the genocide, crimes against humanity or other 
crimes of serious nature by Pakistani occupation force in in the territory of Bangladesh.23 
On 17 April 1973, Bangladesh announced its intention to prosecute 195 Pakistani military 
personnel of West Pakistan for war crimes, genocide and other violations of international law.24 
The list of 195 was reached after careful scrutiny, particularly of those for whom there was specific 
evidence of core crimes against humanity. In the process of making individuals accountable, 
Bangladesh was further challenged to complete the task under the Collaborator’s Order.25 On 30 
November 1973, a general amnesty was declared for those who had opposed independence from 
Pakistan as a matter of principle, excluding those suspected of committing crimes or collaborating 
in committing such.26 This caused the release of 26,000 local detainees, while another 11,000 
lower-level local alleged collaborators went on to face trial; approximately 750 were convicted.27 
However, Bangladesh still firmly believed that it had a right to impose criminal sanctions on at 
least 195 of the accused. The government brought an amendment under the Constitution on 15 
July 1973.28 The Constitution (First Amendment) Act 1973 was brought, enacted or created to 
allow investigation and prosecution of persons accused of genocide, crimes against humanity or 
war crimes and other crimes under international law, not to allow protection under certain 
fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution of Bangladesh. Finally, The ICT-BD 
Act came into existence on 20 July 1973. The drafting of The ICT-BD Act in such a critical time 
frame reveals the strength of Bangladesh. This is because it was adopted when there was little 
precedent for a purely domestic system to proceed with investigations and prosecutions of 
international crimes beyond the gamut of post-World War II models of international criminal law. 
 
23 Ibid. The details of the Order have been discussed on Banglapedia. See Muntassir Mamoon, ‘Collaborator’s Tribunal 
Order 1972’ <http://en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title=Collaborators_Tribunal_Order,_1972>. 
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The drafting of The ICT-BD Act drew attention from the international community. The efforts of 
such legislation were focused in 1972 at the second conference of World Peace Through Law 
Centre in Bellagio, Italy.29 At that conference, a special session was arranged to discuss the 
problems involving Bangladesh.30 The experts’ discussion was significant in the formulation of the 
Act with great historical significance.31 Some internationally proclaimed scholars participated in 
the drafting and consultation of The ICT-BD Act.32 
Despite the above arrangements, Bangladesh had to grant clemency to the 195 Pakistani officials 
under the Tripartite Agreement of 1974 between India, Bangladesh and Pakistan.33 This 
Agreement was signed for several compelling reasons. International pressure and politics 
surrounded the trial process. The effort of trying alleged perpetrators was complicated by 
international politics. Pakistan claimed that it would not send some 400,000 Bengalis (civilians 
and former members of Pakistan’s armed forces) who had been in Pakistan. It further declared that 
it would not recognise Bangladesh as a sovereign state.34  
Bangladesh was confronted with many other challenges, including gaining recognition from global 
communities, in particular Middle Eastern countries, acquiring a member of the UN, expanding 
trade and securing international assistance as a war-broken country.35 The situation was further 
contaminated with the pressure of Pakistan’s Western allies and Islamic states. In the meantime, 
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the new Prime Minister of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, declared that he would ensure the trial of 
the 195 POWs in Pakistan once, and if, they were returned.36  
The trial of these 195 Pakistani officials was also compromised by pressing issues in relation to 
the settlement of India and Pakistan. The first issue was the Shimla Agreement of 2 July 1972, 
which ended the conflict and called for a friendly and harmonious relationship.37 The Agreement 
also asserted the need to establish durable peace in the subcontinent. Bangladesh, despite 
welcoming the Agreement, continued its attempt to formulate the new laws to ensure prosecution 
of perpetrators of international crimes.38 
Another round of bilateral negotiations was held between India and Pakistan on 28 August 1973; 
it resulted in the adoption of the Delhi Agreement, which focused on repatriation of persons. The 
Agreement called for immediate repatriation of prisoners. It was a general Agreement for all 
prisoners, excluding the enlisted 195 prisoners. However, the Agreement persuaded Bangladesh 
not to begin the trail of these prisoners in Bangladesh during the repatriation period. Accordingly, 
the trial process of the 195 POWs did not take place.39 Finally, the Tripartite Agreement was 
adopted in 1974, whereby clemency was guaranteed to the 195 accused and Bangladesh abandoned 
the initiation in line with the treaty. The political pressure perhaps compelled Bangladesh to enter 
such an arrangement. As a result, Pakistan finally recognised Bangladesh as a sovereign state on 
22 February 1974. In other words, the intention to prosecute did not materialise.40 Moreover, the 
assassination of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his family in 1975 further dismissed 
the hope of prosecution under The ICT-BD Act. However, the demand to prosecute perpetrators 
emerged after the Awami League government’s resumption of power by amending The ICT-BD 
Act in 2009. Finally, trials began in 2010. 
 
36 Jordan J Paust and Albert P Balustein, ‘War Crimes Jurisdiction and Due Process: The Bangladesh Experience’ 
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This is a reflection Bangladesh’s strong commitment to bringing perpetrators to the justice 
system.41 The post-Nuremberg and Tokyo-phase of international criminal law was quite 
frustrating, whereas the enactment of the ICT-BD was a clearly vehement step for Bangladesh in 
endorsing the prosecution of international crimes within the domestic sphere. This can easily be 
traced by the name of the Act and the function of the tribunals.42 M Islam commented: 
In order to not prolong the trial endlessly, the 1973 Act has not incorporated any provision for 
interlocutory appeal, which was considered as one of the primary causes of unreasonable delay 
as experienced in similar other international crimes trials, such as the ICTY and Cambodia, 
conducted under their statutes containing interlocutory appeal provision.43 
The arrangement of Bangladesh can be considered the first major effort since the Nuremberg 
Principles, adopted in 1950.44 This gap in international instruments posed a challenge when 
attempting to end the culture of impunity.45 Triffterer, an architect of The ICT-BD Act, believed 
the Bangladeshi system may become significant for the interpretation of The Rome Statute and for 
perpetrators held responsible by the Statute. Hence, it is our only wish that Bangladesh conducts 
fair trials and interpret its law in compliance with internationally accepted standards.46 
II.C Amendments of ICT-BD Act 1973 
The ICT-BD Act has been amended thrice: in 2009, 2012 and 2013. An amendment of The ICT-
BD Act was brought in 2009 by the ruling Awami League government, which entered power with 
the mandate of trying perpetrators of atrocities committed in 1971. The Act was brought to try 
perpetrators of international crimes committed during the Liberation War. The Act, with its 
amendment in 2009 and formulation of the ICT’s RoPs and evidence in 2010, is evidence of 
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political will to pursue justice some 40 years after the war. The Amendments in 2009, under The 
ICT-BD Act, are related to inclusion of ‘individuals and group of individuals’ and insertion of 
independency of tribunals’ functions and assurances of fair trial. The Amendment also added a 
provision on appeal. 
At the time of adoption of the Act in 1973, the purpose of The ICT-BD Act was to initiate trial of 
highly valued suspects members of any armed, defence or auxiliary forces, such as the Pakistani 
POWs.47 However, the recent mandate of the national election of Awami League allowed it to try 
Bangladeshi culprits who contributed in the commission of atrocities during the Liberation War. 
The government of Bangladesh clarified that no Pakistanis were to be tried under The ICT-BD Act; 
rather, Bangladeshi perpetrators were to be tried.48 There had been rounds of talks and discussion 
in media and different forums. Jurists suggested that it was possible to try alleged Bangladeshis 
under The ICT-BD Act 1973. Thus, the Amendment was brought for greater specificity and clarity 
of personal jurisdiction. Thus, this Amendment (2013) intended to include ‘organization’ along 
with individuals and groups of individuals under section 3(1).49 However, it would be possible to 
try any individual civilian without the Amendment by applying ‘attempt, abetment or abetting’ 
and ‘complicity and failure’ criteria, as articulated in (g) and (h) of Clause (2) of section 3 of the 
ICT-BD Act. 
Another amendment related to the right of appeal. The right of appeal to be preferred was 
guaranteed before the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh against the order of 
conviction and sentence. The government is now allowed to prefer appeal against the order of 
acquittal of the accused, which must be exercised within 60 days of the date of such order.50 This 
right of both parties to prefer appeal to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh 
was provided in the 2009 Amendment in the following cases: 
 
47 The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 (XIX of 1973) (Hereinafter ‘The ICT-BD Act’ s 3. 
48 Shafique Ahmed, Former Honourable Minister, Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Bangladesh 
(Speech, Second International Conference on Genocide, Truth and Justice, Dhaka, 30 July 2009). 
49 The International Crimes (Tribunals) (Amendment) Act, 2013 s 3, which inserts the words and comma ‘or 
organisation,’ after the word and comma ‘individuals’; The International Crimes (Tribunals) (Amendment) Act, 2013 
(Act No. III of 2013) (with effect from 14 July 2009). 
50 The ICT-BD Act s 21. 
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• First, where a person shall be convicted and punished by the Tribunal for committing any 
crime, he shall have the right of appeal against such conviction and sentence. 
• Second, if the accused receives acquittal, the government shall have the right of appeal 
against such order of acquittal.51 
• Third, the Amendment reduced the timeframe for the disposal of the appeal. The duration 
of disposing the appeal is fixed at 60 days. Section 21 of The ICT-BD Act provides that the 
appeal shall be disposed of within 60 days of the date of its filing. 
However, section 21 of The ICT-BD Act was again amended in 2013 after the Shahbag Movement, 
which shook the entire country.52 The movement began after the Tribunal’s verdict of life 
imprisonment for accused Abdul Quader Molla. People gathered at Shahbag, in Dhaka, began 
demanding death penalty for the said accused. The legal complexity arose because the government 
could not appeal in this case since the accused was not acquitted from the Tribunal as required in 
section 21. Hence, the Amendment of 2013 granted the right to the government to prefer appeal 
even against the order of sentence. The Amendment was made retrospective with effect from 14 
July 2009. Section 21 of The ICT-BD Act provides that: 
The Amendment of the ICT-BD Act in 2012 encompasses the introduction of trial in absentia, 
transfer of cases between Tribunals and serving copy of judgment to the accused and prosecutor. 
According to section 10A of the Act, if the tribunal, before fixing the date for the trial under sub-
section (2) of the said section, has reason to believe that the accused person has absconded or 
concealed himself so that he cannot be produced for trial, it may hold the trial in his absence 
following the procedure enumerated in section 22.53 
Section 10A(2) of The ICT-BD Act ensures that the government shall arrange a counsel at its own 
expense to cooperate with the Tribunal and help the accused in cases of absconded accused. The 
government shall pay fees and other benefits to such counsel. 
 
51 Ibid. 
52 In 2013, protests began at Shahbag, Dhaka, Bangladesh, following demands for capital punishment for perpetrators 
of international crimes in Bangladesh. 
53 S 10(a) was inserted by The International Crimes (Tribunals) (Second Amendment) Act, 2012 (Act No. XLIII of 
2012) (24 September 2012). 
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Another new section was added by the Amendment. Section 11A of the Act relating to the transfer 
of a case at any stage from one tribunal to another was brought to make the function of the tribunals 
convenient and share the load in a proportionate way. However, this section does not possess its 
implication after the closure of ICT-BD-2. Further amendment was brought subsequently to ease 
the functions of the tribunals and ensure convenience for parties. Section 20 was modified with 
the stipulation that copy of the judgment shall be provided to the parties without any cost so that 
they can use the document for preferring appeal and other purposes.54 
II.D Constitutional Amendments 
It is highly pertinent to articulate the developments and amendments made under the Constitution 
of Bangladesh to ensure investigation and prosecution under The ICT-BD Act. Therefore, updates 
under the Constitution are highly relevant to discuss here. Article 47(3) of the Constitution of 
Bangladesh provides a non-obstante clause: 
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution, no law nor any provision thereof 
providing for detention, prosecution or punishment of any person, who is a member of any armed 
or defence or auxiliary forces [or any individual, group of individuals or organisation] or who is 
a prisoner of war, for genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes and other crimes under 
international law shall be deemed void or unlawful, or ever to have become void or unlawful, on 
the ground that such law or provision of any such law is inconsistent with, or repugnant to, any 
of the provisions of this Constitution.55 
The phrase ‘or any individual, group of individuals or organisation’ was amended by the 
Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act 2011.56 The intended purpose of bringing organisations 
within the purview of a tribunal’s jurisdiction is essentially to try Jamaat e Islam and other 
organisations who opposed the independence of Bangladesh and allegedly collaborated with the 
Pakistani army. This is very similar to the context of ‘Nazi war criminals’ during the post-World 
War II trial and prosecution in Nuremberg.57 However, a question arises as to the suspension of 
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fundamental rights for the collaborators, according to Article 47A of the Constitution of 
Bangladesh. Article 47A of the Constitution suspends the protection of right guaranteed under 
articles 31(1), 35(3) and 44 to the accused to which article 47(3) applies.58 
The question of suspension of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution as a result of 
the first Amendment of the Constitution on Articles 47A and 47(3) was raised in different forums. 
Basically, article 47(3) is about barring challenges on the ground of constitutionality of any law 
pertinent to international crimes. Article 47A denies the rights contained in Part III of the 
Constitution against any person who tried under The ICT-BD Act. Such rights include exclusion 
from the right to protection of law (article 31), safeguards over trial and punishment (article 35) 
and enforcement of fundamental rights (Article 44 of the Constitution). 
It has been asserted that section 3 of The ICT-BD Act gives the Tribunal jurisdiction over crimes 
committed before or after the commencement of the Act. Article 35(1) of the Constitution prohibits 
retrospective application of criminal law in terms of the conviction and penalty. The Constitution 
has been recognised as the supreme law of the land and contradiction of any law with the 
Constitution will stand void, as articulated in Article 7 of the Constitution. The Amendment under 
the Constitution was brought to ensure that The ICT-BD Act remained intact, inviolable and 
unchallengeable and that proceedings are smoothly continued under the Act. At the same time, the 
ability to challenge the Act’s validity was removed under the constitutional amendment under 
articles 47(3) and 47A(2).59 
Amir-Ul Islam, a lawyer of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh and one of the drafters of the 
Constitution, commented that this constitutional amendment was intended to eliminate doubts or 
controversy with respect to the application of The ICT-BD Act in cases of trying offenders.60 In 
this respect, Linton proposed that countries have their own unique principles of public law and 
every constitution has its own internal logic and structure. From the strict positivists’ perspective, 
 
58 The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, P.O No. 76 of 1972. Adopted on 16  December 1972. 
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60 M Amir-Ul Islam, ‘Bringing the Perpetrators of Genocide to Justice’ (Conference Paper, International Conference 
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one can find solace in the assumption that once the law has passed properly, there should be no 
question about the validity of such law.61 
The ICT-BD Act was enacted immediately after the Liberation War when the sufferings of victim 
were still raw. The justification for barring the applicability of fundamental rights was addressed 
by the High Court Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh in one case, in which the presiding 
judge commented that ‘independence comes only once in the lifetime of a nation’ and that a 
reasonable distinction could be drawn between the rights afforded to ‘ordinary citizens’ and to 
‘others accused of war crimes’.62 This categorisation was made because the Liberation War and 
anything related to it has been a highly sensitive issue for the people of Bangladesh. 
The above perception, perhaps, influenced the Amendment of the Constitution of Bangladesh. In 
fact, the preamble of the Constitution signifies that the Liberation War was the greatest 
achievement of the nation. Therefore, any event or concept related to this liberation was not a 
compromising factor for Bangladeshi, as is the case for alleged perpetrators of serious crimes. The 
exclusion of certain fundamental rights for the alleged accused, was perhaps viewed from the 
perspective of the Liberation War project. However, Linton observes that the whole project is at 
the wish and will of the government, which almost secured free hand. The exclusion of 
constitutional challenging mechanism furthers the will of the government.63 
Amendments under The ICT-BD Act were introduced to ensure a fair trial process and equal rights 
for both parties. Amendments were brought, including the principle of the presumption of 
innocence under which the accused has the right to be presumed innocent. It also includes the right 
to a fair and public hearing with counsel of the accused’s choice. Most importantly, it provides for 
the right to apply for bail on the part of the accused. In addition, the amendments embody the 
principle against double jeopardy, prohibiting the conviction of a person twice for the same crime 
or requirement for the accused to confess guilt. It extends further protection to the accused from 
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the perspective that, under this Amendment, the prosecution is endowed with the burden of proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime.64 
Although the original ICT-BD Act contained no provision for victim and witness protection, a 
subsequent amendment in the RoP contains such protection measures, including police protection 
for the victim and witness, particularly for the witness. The amendments authorise the Tribunal to 
ensure protection for the witness and victim against harassment by the defence witness and 
counsel. Under the amendments, the Tribunal is also authorised to order in-camera proceedings if 
it is in the best interests of a victim or witness.65 
In regard the right to bail, the Act provides for equality, which is absent in the governing statutes 
of other international tribunals.66 In addition to the right to appeal, the Act further provides for 
review provisions, permitting the review of the Tribunal’s decisions and the appointment of High 
Court judges.67 According to a press report, the War Crimes Committee of the International Bar 
Association considers that the amended Bangladeshi legislation provides a system that is broadly 
compatible with current international standards, but recommended 17 changes, particularly 
concerning the rights of individuals on trial.68 
The ICT-BD Act was adopted in Bangladesh when the world had few examples of war crime trials 
in the domestic arena, other than Nuremberg and Tokyo. This duration was coined ‘a half century 
of silence’69 and ‘an era of impunity’.70 The negligent attitude of the international community 
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about the establishment of an international penal tribunal in Bangladesh was a result of Cold War 
politics. The dark period for the international community to arrange an international justice 
mechanism made it difficult for Bangladesh to manage or obtain support from international 
communities. There were literally no initiatives taken for war crimes except the International 
Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo and the adoption of the Genocide Convention in 1948. 
Finally, the post-Union of Soviet Socialists Republics’ collapse brought experience of the ICTY 
(1993) and the ICTR (1994) and the continuation of efforts for international justice mechanisms. 
II.E Objective of The ICT-BD Act 19732 
The long title of The ICT-BD Act states that this Act provides for detention, prosecution and 
punishment of persons for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes under 
international law. The Preamble of the Act also refers to the same objectives. In merging the spirit 
of the long title and the preamble, it can be gathered that The ICT-BD Act was brought to ensure 
detention, prosecution and punishment of persons guilty of international crimes such as genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, crimes against peace, violation of the Geneva Conventions 
and other crimes as defined under international law. Under this Act, tribunals were empowered to 
try and punish any individual or group of individuals or organisations. Here, the individual or 
group of individuals may either be any member of any armed, defence or auxiliary forces 
irrespective of nationality. However, it limits the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to try only those 
crimes committed in the territory of Bangladesh, allowing both the retrospective and prospective 
invocation of such jurisdiction.71 The crimes contemplated under this Act are international crimes 
and other similar crimes committed in Bangladesh during the Liberation War, in violation of 
customary international law, which includes crimes against humanity, genocide and crime against 
peace, war crimes and violations of international humanitarian law and crimes of rape and sexual 
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violence in armed conflicts.72 These crimes are recognised by almost all nations, which has led 
them to become part of customary international law.73 
II.F Jurisdiction of ICT-BD Act 1973 
II.F.1 Personal Jurisdiction 
The ICT-BD Act authorises tribunals to try and punish the criminals who committed crimes during 
the Liberation War. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal under The ICT-BD Act has been widely 
compared to other domestic tribunals for war crimes and other international crimes. Section 3 of 
The ICT-BD Act provides: 
A Tribunal shall have the power to try and punish any individual or group of individuals, or 
organization, or any member of any armed, defence or auxiliary forces, irrespective of his 
nationality, who commits or has committed, in the territory of Bangladesh, whether before or 
after the commencement of this Act, any of the crimes mentioned in sub-section (2). 
The ICT-BD Act was designed primarily to deal with the selected 195 highly ranked Pakistani 
officials and those who could not benefit from the 1973 amnesty.74 The Act has broad personal 
jurisdiction and was more focused on Pakistani nationals involved in the commission of the 
atrocities in Bangladesh during the Liberation War. However, in 2009, the law was amended to 
include ‘individual or group of individuals’, which broadened the subject matter jurisdiction of 
The ICT-BD Act. Moreover, a further amendment was brought in 2013, which included 
‘organization’ as a person to be brought within the purview of the jurisdiction of The ICT-BD 
Act.75 Thus, the jurisdiction encompasses: a) individuals, b) groups of individuals, c) 
Organisations, d) members of the Pakistani armed forces, e) Pakistani political leaders, f) Pakistani 
militias—from West or East Pakistan—g) Bengali freedom fighters and other Bengali militias, h) 
Bengali civilians—both pro and anti-Pakistan—and i) non-Bengali civilians.76 
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Under section 3(1), whoever commits any designated crimes in the territory of Bangladesh, 
whether before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be tried under the Act. The 
Amendment here was to insert ‘group of persons’, but there may be questions as to whether it 
seems like criminalisation of the group as such was intended. Linton argues that it does not seem 
to the criminalisation of the group, since joint criminality was already possible under the law 
through conspiracy.77 
The jurisdiction of the Tribunal extends to the whole territory of Bangladesh, with respect to both 
retrospective and prospective application of law.78 The tribunals exercise their powers and 
jurisdictions under the Act and any law contrary to this Act shall not be applicable.79 According to 
section 23 of The ICT-BD Act, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and the 
Evidence Act of 1872 shall not be applicable in proceedings of the Tribunal. Tribunals in all their 
judgments have set a time limitation for crimes committed between 26 March and 16 December 
1971. Therefore, there is territorial and time-based limitations on the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.80  
With respect to personal jurisdiction, it has been argued by the defence before the Tribunal that 
The ICT-BD Act was brought to try and investigate the accused 195 enlisted Pakistani officials 
who were granted clemency under the Tripartite Agreement 1974.81 Therefore, the jurisdiction of 
the present trial upon individuals is not sustainable under The ICT-BD Act. In response, the 
Tribunal opined in favour of trying 195 Pakistani war criminals. According to the Tribunal, the 
fact that 195 Pakistani war criminals belonging to Pakistani armed forces were allowed to evade 
justice on the strength of Tripartite Agreement of 1974 does not diminish the Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction to try any individual or member of auxiliary force, as stated in Section 3 of the Act. 
The Tribunal asserted that the 1974 Agreement was an ‘executive act’ that cannot create any bar 
to try and punish any member of ‘auxiliary force’ or an ‘individual’ or member of ‘group of 
individuals’. It led the Tribunal to contend that the Agreement that grants immunity to the persons 
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committing offences in breach of customary international law was derogatory to the existing law 
that allows prosecution of those offences.82 
The jurisdiction of the Tribunal would not be ineffective or void for trying POWs who received 
clemency.83 It is noted in Chief Prosecutor v Abdul Quader Molla that the Collaborators Order 
aimed to prosecute persons who allegedly committed offences under the Penal Code. However, 
the Act was brought to prosecute and try persons for genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and other violations under customary international law. Hence, offences under the Act 
are different and intended to apply to different categories of offenders.84 
II.F.2 Retrospective Jurisdiction 
In most cases brought before the tribunals, the common issue was the retrospective nature of the 
legislation (ie, crimes committed in 1971) whereas the law was enacted in 1973. The Act has 
provided scope for the adjudication of a crime committed before the adoption of this Act. More 
specifically, in Chief Prosecutor v Abdul Quader Molla, this was a significant issue for the defence. 
The defence council argued that the Act was enacted in 1973 and the alleged crimes were 
committed in 1971; hence, it is of a retrospective nature and does not comply with international 
standards.85 Reference was made to The Rome Statute of 1998,86 which was ratified by Bangladesh. 
In this regard, the Tribunal cited the formation of other ICTs. It observed that prosecution of crimes 
committed in violation of customary international law is fairly permitted in cases of a retrospective 
nature. It justified this observation by referring to the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL,. which were 
constituted for the retrospective trial of international crimes.87 
With respect to the gap of 40 years, the Tribunal viewed that from the point of morality and sound 
legal dogma, a time bar or limit should not apply to the prosecution of human rights crimes. The 
Tribunal adopted this view from international instruments and the practice of international 
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tribunals. No provision in the Genocide Convention of 1948 or the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
places any statutory limitations on war crimes or other crimes, such as crimes against humanity. 
Further, protection against any types of limitations of statutory nature in trying accuseds of crimes 
against humanity is provided under Article I of the Convention on the Non-Applicability of 
Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. Therefore, it is clear that 
criminal prosecutions are open and not barred by any limitation.88 
The Tribunal cited a few instances of violation of international crimes in which a time limitation 
was ignored because of the nature of the crime. Nazi war criminals of World War II have been 
prosecuted until the time of writing. The ongoing nature of prosecution of individuals for the 
alleged commission of genocide during the Chilean Revolution and Cambodian Pol Pot regime 
are evidence of ignoring the lapse in duration for prosecuting international crimes. Immunity 
guaranteed to Slobodan Milošević of Serbia, Charles Taylor of Liberia and Augusta Pinochet of 
Chile as the head of state were not workable excuses for preventing them from prosecution for 
alleged crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.89 The case of Maurice Papon 
was also referred to by the Tribunal.90 Therefore, the Tribunal concluded that because the practice 
prevailed at an international level, the delay itself did not preclude prosecutorial action to 
adjudicate the culpability of the perpetrator of core international crimes. 
II.F.3 Jurisdiction Over Crimes 
II.F.3.(a) War Crimes 
The ICT-BD Act defines war crimes with wide scope and inclusion. Section 3(2)(d) of the Act 
clarifies that war crimes, namely violation of laws and customs of war, shall include but are not 
limited to: a) murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labour or for any other purpose of 
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camps in Germany; Ibid (2013) [84]; Douglas Johnson, ‘Nazi Collaborator Convicted for his Role in the Deportation 




civilian population and b) murder or ill-treatment of PoWs or persons on the seas, killing of 
hostages and detainees plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns 
or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.91This text is almost verbatim from 
the IMT Nuremberg Statute.92 The ICT-BD Act of 1973 defines war crimes mainly as violations of 
laws and customs of war in the territory of Bangladesh. It further includes justification of military 
necessity as a required component in cases of destruction or devastation.93  
The definition of war crimes under The Rome Statute includes the background significance of the 
crime with the deliberation ‘when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale 
commission of such crimes’.94 Unlike The ICT-BD Act, the breach of the four Geneva Conventions 
of 1949 is deemed a war crime under The Rome Statute. Article 8 (2)(a) of the Statute delineates 
one category of war crime, in which ‘grave breaches’ of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949 will be deemed war crimes. Moreover, another sub-article states that ‘in the case of an armed 
conflict of non-international character, “serious violations” of common article 3 to the four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 will be deemed a war crime.’95  
The threshold of violation and breach under both The Rome Statute and The ICT-BD Act is 
different. The ICT-BD Act encompasses every aspect of violations, whereas The Rome Statute 
inserts only ‘grave breaches’ of the Geneva Conventions and ‘serious violations’ of common 
article 3. In the context of Bangladesh, perhaps the clearest breaches in international law were 
those of Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, dealing with ‘armed conflicts not of an international 
character’. It has been argued that with the arrival of the Indian army on 6 December, the nature 
of conflict spread to an international context.96 
However, section 3(2)(e) of The ICT-BD Act clearly provides that violation of any humanitarian 
rules applicable in armed conflicts laid down in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 would be 
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considered a crime under the Act. Further, the clause ‘any other crimes mentioned under 
international law’ as noted in section 3(2)(f) also indicates that any crimes arising out of violation 
of any rules of international law shall invoke the jurisdiction of the ICT-BD under the Act of 1973. 
It seems that the separate placing of war crimes and Geneva Conventions under ICT Act intended 
to distinguish between the regimes of Geneva law contained in the four Geneva Conventions and 
the additional protocols and Hague law contained in the regulations annexed to the Hague 
Convention IV of 1907.97 Under section 3, the reference to ‘humanitarian rules’ and the ‘Geneva 
Conventions’, which comes after the clause relating to ‘war crimes’ provision, gives the notion 
that drafters intended to cover provisions of Hague law related to war crimes and the second 
provision to encompass Geneva law.98 
II.F.3.(b) Crimes Against Humanity 
Article 7 of The Rome Statute provides a comprehensive definition of crime against humanity; The 
ICT-BD Act of 1973 incorporates many features of this definition.99 Section 3(2)(a) of The ICT-
BD Act prescribes components of crimes against humanity, which include murder, extermination, 
enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, abduction, confinement, torture, rape or other inhumane 
acts committed against any civilian population or persecutions on political, racial, ethnic or 
religious grounds. Such a comprehensive definition shows that The ICT-BD Act confirms the 
international standards provided by the ICC Statute that seems to encourage a wider judicial 
regime to combat crimes against humanity. 
 
97 The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 are a series of international treaties and declarations negotiated at two 
international peace conferences at The Hague in the Netherlands. 
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Though The ICT Act has also defined this crime, there are components that were suggested to be included in the 
amendment of 2009, after a comparison with The Rome Statue. The Rome Statue includes ‘sexual slavery, enforced 
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity as 
sexual violence along with rape’ art 7(1)(g). 
 
48 
II.F.3.(c) Rape as a Crime Against Humanity 
The ICT-BD Act includes ‘rape’ within the definition of crimes against humanity; such inclusion 
bears immense significance, particularly in the sense that rape as a crime against humanity was 
almost rare. Rape was committed on a massive scale during the Liberation War by West Pakistanis; 
at least 200,000 women and girls were raped, among whom 25,000 were impregnated.100 
Bangladesh faced further challenges with ‘war babies’ born as a consequence of mass rape and 
enforced prostitution. Policymakers were in a difficult situation, trying to find ways to regulate 
such issues. The inclusion of rape within the definition of The ICT-BD Act was a response to such 
a situation.101 The evidence of such atrocities and larger-scale mass rapes was mentioned in the 
Pakistan-led Chief Justice Hamoodur Rahman Commission of Inquiry, which was set up by then-
Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in December 1971.102 While identifying the use of rape and 
sexual violence for revenge, retaliation and torture, this report specifically recommended public 
trials for several officers of the armed forces.103 
The inclusion of rape in the definition of crimes against humanity during the 1970s may be 
considered an important contribution to the history of international criminal law, for such inclusion 
came when examples of such attempts were rare. Rape has a place within the definition of crimes 
against humanity, as provided in most international criminal law instruments (including the 
statutes of the ICTY,104 ICTR,105 SCSL,106 ICC,107 UNTAET regulations108 and ECCC).109 
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However, The ICT-BD Act was an early legislation in which sexual victimisation was recognised 
as an international crime. 
There were several issues other than rape. First, the Act does not define ‘rape’. It is silent about 
the incorporation of the definition articulated in the Penal Code. However, one can argue that since 
the Penal Code is not excluded, as is the case with evidence law and criminal procedure, the Penal 
Code is applicable. Second, rape alone does not encompass all offences related to sexual violence 
that occurred during the Liberation War. Suggestions were made in 2009, when the Act was 
amended, to include aspects like sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilisation and any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity as sexual violence. The 
ICT-BD Act includes a broad general provision to encompass all the above offences by mentioning 
other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population.110 Under the criminal justice 
system, however, inclusion of clear and specific provisions would assist the Tribunal to ensure 
justice in a clear fashion. 
II.F.3.(d) Widespread and Systematic Attack as Crime Against Humanity 
The question as to whether ‘the attack must be widespread and systematic against civilian 
population’ for constituting the offence of crimes against humanity is uniform or mandatory has 
received extensive interpretation in the Tribunal.111 Related to this question was whether a single 
act could qualify as a crime against humanity if linked with a widespread or systematic attack 
against a civilian population. Scholars viewed that the definition of crimes against humanity under 
the Act missed the components ‘widespread’ or ‘systematic’ nature of attack required to constitute 
crimes against humanity.112 
The definition of The Rome Statute contains (article 7) both ‘widespread’ and ‘systematic’ 
components. However, the Tribunal identified a few other significant international instruments in 
which the definition of crime against humanity is similar to that in The ICT-BD Act. Section 3(2)(a) 
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of the Act resembles article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter, while the Statute of ICTY does not 
contain this component. It was first decided in Prosecutor v Tadic, in which the requirements of 
either ‘widespread’ or ‘systematic manner’ is stipulated.113 The Tribunal then clarified the 
definition of The Rome Statute by asserting that ‘the definition of the Statute will only apply for 
the purpose of the Statute’. Therefore, ‘widespread and systematic’ is not an essential element in 
considering the offence a crime against humanity. 
In Abdul Quader Molla v Government of Bangladesh, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court 
of Bangladesh also held that widespread and systematic attack is not essential to convict an 
accused. The Appellate Division disposes of the requirement to prove that while committing any 
of offences there must be ‘widespread and systematic’ attack against ‘civilian population[s]’ to 
prove that any person/ persons attacked the ‘civilian population’ will be sufficient. According to 
the Division, proof that any person committed such offence during the said period or participated 
in, or attempted or conspired to commit any such crime during Operation Search Light in 
collaboration with the Pakistani regime upon unarmed civilians would be sufficient for the 
prosecution.114 As such, an individual committing a crime against a single victim or a limited 
number of victims might be viewed as guilty of a crime against humanity.115 
II.F.3.(e) Plan or Policy to Constitute Crimes Against Humanity 
It is not a precondition that the crime against humanity must arise out of any ‘plan’ or ‘policy’. 
According to the Tribunal, any plan or policy is thereby not a constitutive element of a crime 
against humanity.116 The Tribunal drew this position from jurisprudence of the ICTY in Prosecutor 
v Kunarac, in which the attack was directed against a civilian population, but it was held not 
necessary to show that they were the result of a policy or plan.117 In relation to the charge of the 
Pallab murder, the Tribunal opined that single or limited acts on the accused’s part would be 
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sufficient as crimes against humanity unless those acts were isolated or random.118 In the case of 
Nahimana, Barayagwiza and Ngeze, the Appeal Chamber of ICTR similarly observed that an act 
against a single victim can constitute a crime against humanity if it forms part of a ‘widespread’ 
or ‘systematic’ attack against a civilian population.119 The abovementioned case stipulates the 
component of ‘widespread’ or ‘systematic’ in constituting a crime against humanity. However, it 
is not mandatory to prove the existence of a ‘widespread’ or ‘systematic’ attack to constitute a 
crime against humanity. The definition of ‘crime against humanity’ in The ICT-BD Act 1973 seems 
to encompass single-victim incidence without establishing its connection with a widespread or 
systematic attack. 
According to article 7(2)(a) of the ICC Statute, it is a requirement that the attack on a civilian 
population be conducted in a way that remains ‘pursuant to or in furtherance of State or 
organizational policy relating directly to the commission of such attack’.120 However, it is 
important to note that customary international law does not require any policy element in the 
definition of crimes against humanity.121 Therefore, ‘policy’ and ‘plan’ might be considerable 
factors but are not essential in forming offences of crimes against humanity.122 
II.F.3.(f) Attack on Civilians 
The defence in several ICT-BD cases asserted that in the pertinent charge, there were two freedom 
fighters whose status were not the same as other civilians. Therefore, this does not constitute a 
crime against humanity. The Tribunal delivered that it could not agree with the defence based on 
the fact that there were two fighters amid many civilian victims. Many victims were killed, hence, 
considering the whole fact into account, the argument of the defence is flawed. The Tribunal noted 
that the specific situation of the victim must be noted, particularly the time when the crime was 
committed. In Prosecutor v Blaskic, ‘civilian’ was defined as anyone who is no longer an active 
combatant in the ‘specific situation’ at the time of the commission of the crime. This wider 
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definition of ‘civilian’ indicates that the character of a predominantly civilian population is not 
altered by the presence of certain non-civilians.123 
The ICTY and ICTR statutes state that to be deemed as crimes against humanity, attacks have to 
be committed against civilians. The interpretation suggests the status of military forces or those 
who have previously borne arms in a conflict does not necessarily deprive the population of its 
civilian character, considering the exact moment crimes are committed.124 ICTR and ICTY 
jurisprudence suggest that the victims’ situations at the moment of attack is to be considered, rather 
than his overall status. Therefore, the Tribunal concluded that the attack in the present case under 
charge No 4 was directed against a civilian population, which resulted in numerous civilian 
deaths.125 
The ICT-BD Act defines crimes against humanity in an inclusive manner. The definition under the 
Act provides legal elements of crime against humanity. The dynamic nature of this type of crime 
means it is difficult to confine ‘crime against humanity’ to a single definition. However, the 
definition of ‘crime against humanity’ under The ICT-BD Act is consistent with customary 
international law. 
II.F.3.(g) Crimes Against Peace 
Crimes against peace are called crimes of aggression in international law. It is the most heinous 
crime. The state is to be held responsible for the violation. Through the lens of international 
criminal law, individuals involved in the planning, preparation or initiation of war or waging of 
aggression will be held responsible.126 Section 3(2)(b) of The ICT-BD Act defines these crimes as: 
Crimes against Peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression 
or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances. 
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The ICT-BD Act followed the classic IMT Nuremberg provision.127 However, the clause ‘or 
participation in a Common Plan or Conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing’ 
was not included within such a provision. This omission can be found to maintain the distinction 
between continental notion of criminality that is prevalent in the common law system and the 
notion of ‘common plan’, which was very controversial at Nuremberg.128 
Aggression has been articulated in many international instruments. The Rome Statute includes this 
crime, although it differs from the other three crimes because it indirectly affects the legal 
sovereignty of a state as opposed to simply influencing the rights of the accused. Although this 
category of crime was regarded as ‘the supreme international crime’ (as reflected in the Rome 
Conference in 1998), there was no unanimity about its definition. However, delegates at the First 
Review Conference of the ICC in Kampala reached an agreement to include provisions on the 
crime of aggression by amending the Statute of the ICC on 11 June 2010. The crime of aggression 
under The Rome Statute is almost the same as crime against peace under The ICT-BD Act. The 
only distinction is that under The ICT-BD Act, the triggering laws are international treaties, 
agreements and assurances.129 However, the amended article 8bis of The Rome Statute is limited 
only to violation of the Charter of United Nations, especially article 2(4) of the Charter. 
II.F.3.(h) Genocide 
Genocide is one of the most serious crimes committed against a targeted group with the intention 
of destroying the group in whole or in part. Section 3(2) of The ICT Act defines genocide in an 
inclusive manner. According to the Act, genocide means and includes any acts committed with 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, religious or political group. The acts 
contemplated under this section include the killing members of the group.130 They also include the 
causing of serious physical or mental harm to, and deliberately inflicting on, the group conditions 
of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction, partly or in whole.131 Most importantly, 
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this section also criminalises the imposition of measures intended to prevent births within the 
group, and forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.132 
The definition of genocide under The ICT-BD Act is compatible with the historical development 
of the wider concept of ‘genocide’. In the twentieth century, the international community observed 
such examples of masterminded operations conducted in different parts of the world, which 
profoundly shocked the conscience of humanity and posed threats to peace and justice. The Indian 
subcontinent had its own extreme experience of such religious and national problems, targeting 
each other during partition and the ensuing Liberation War. The massive atrocities in Rwanda and 
the most heinous operations committed in the former Yugoslavia further shocked humanity’s 
conscience. Because of their heinous nature, the international community took these issues as part 
of erga omnes obligation. Some argued that they have even reached the status of jus cogens norms, 
from which no derogation is allowed.133 
The international community, after witnessing such drastic tragedies, attempted to adopt 
mechanisms to ensure justice to victims and an end to impunity by prosecuting perpetrators. The 
whole concept or this was initiated after World War II. During World War II, Lemkin coined the 
term ‘genocide’ (which is formed from the Greek genos, for race, and the Latin caedere, for 
killing) to describe the crimes committed by the Nazis against the Jews.134 The legal definition of 
genocide as a crime was adopted for the first time in the Genocide Convention in 1948.135 
Following this, many other instruments adopted the definition. Domestic legislations were also 
 
132 Ibid s 3(2)(c)(iv), (v). 
133 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (judgment) (New Application: 2002), (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo v Rwanda) ICJ Rep, 3 February 2006, list 126) [64]; Case concerning Application of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and 
Montenegro) (judgment) (ICJ Rep 4326, February 2007) [161]; Tolimir, ICTY (TC), Judgment of 12 December 2012, 
[733]; Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2013) 113. 
134 Gerhard Werle and Florian Jessberger, Principles of International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 
2014) 291–2. 
135 Art 2 of the Convention defines, ‘In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed 
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members 
of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the 
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures 
intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group’. 
 
55 
enacted in which genocide was defined. One reason for the domestic incorporation of the definition 
was the obligation that states accrued from the Genocide Convention.136  
Pakistan ratified the Genocide Convention of 1948 but did not enact the necessary law in 
accordance with article 5 to give effect to the Convention. However, the Convention declares 
genocide ‘a crime under international law’, so the moment Pakistan ratified the Convention, 
genocide became a crime under international law applicable for all within Pakistan.137 This crime 
was committed in 1971 on a large scale. The International Commission of Jurists adopted a much 
firmer approach with respect to the religious group. However, it identified ‘a strong prima facie 
case that the crime of genocide was committed’ against the Hindu population.138 
One of the challenges as per the definition of genocide is the group determination. Both the 
Convention and The Rome Statute (article 6) fixed four groups: national, ethnic, racial and 
religious. However, divergence in the domestic definitions from internationally agreed definitions 
meant the international community found it challenging, particularly regarding the consequences 
of such diversity. Domestic definitions include political, social, union and other groups. For 
instance, The ICT-BD Act of Bangladesh includes political groups within the definition of 
genocide.139 This extension of the definition has definite implications at the international level. 
Many countries adopted the extended definition of genocide in their domestic legislation. Among 
the extended definitions, two criteria are noticeable.140 
Many countries incorporated ‘social group’ into the four strict groups.141 Section 90 of the 
Estonian Penal Code encompasses in its definition of genocide ‘a group resisting occupation or 
any other social group along with the four strict groups’. This is also the case with Section 71 of 
the Latvian Penal Code, article 319 of the Paraguayan Codigo Penal Code and article 319 of the 
Peruvian Codigo Penal Code. Examples of countries adding ‘political group’ to the four strict 
groups are Article 269 of the Ethiopian Penal Code of 2004, section 3(2)(c) of The ICT-BD Act of 
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Bangladesh, article 137 of the Ivorian Code Penal Code, article 375 of the Costa Rican Codigo 
Penal Code and article 101 of the Colombian Codigo Penal Code. The Uruguayan Ley No 18 026 
of 2006 provided a much-extended definition, including political groups, unions and groups with 
their own identity based on gender, sexual orientation, culture, social status, age, disability or 
health.142 
Many states proposed the extended definition of genocide during the adoption of The Rome Statute. 
It had been proposed by Cuba in 1997 that the definition of genocide could be extended to 
encompass social and political groups. This thesis will introduce the debates and arguments of the 
international community during the adoption of the 1948 Convention, parliamentary debates of 
domestic systems on the inclusive groups, case comments of international courts and tribunals, 
domestic courts and tribunals and pertinent other instruments. The reason for non-inclusion of 
political groups in international statutes by states engaged in the drafting process is clear. Countries 
did not intend to try their own people for genocide for the quite common practice of targeting 
political enemies.143 
The practice at international level is prone to maintaining a static or stable definition, whereas most 
domestic systems adopt expanded or more fluid definitions. This extended view of the domestic 
mechanism emerged for several reasons. First, crimes committed to parties beyond these four 
groups were committed in such a manner or under a differing domestic system that their nature 
and gravity satisfy all other requirements of a stable definition of genocide. Examples include 
massive systematic attacks upon particular political groups with intent to destroy it. Second, 
cultural and historical conflicts that are beyond the four groups can and do cause massive and 
serious violations. Massive atrocities and indiscriminate systemic attacks have been perpetrated 
upon any social, political or other groups. Third, the purpose of the inclusion of such groups would 
be to arrange a politically motivated and biased system for suppressing opposition groups under 
the guise of trial and prosecution. The criticism here is that social, political, economic and other 
comparable groups constantly change their composition and are not directly targeted, as is the case 
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with the above four. Moreover, these groups have not yet come under the purview of customary 
international law or treaty law.144 
II.F.3.(i) Crimes under International Law 
Section 3(2)(f) of The ICT-BD Act declares that, ‘any other crimes under international law’, if 
committed in the territory of Bangladesh, shall be within the jurisdiction of the tribunals. This 
provision includes all contents of international law in terms of bringing crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Act. The incorporation of this broad and inclusive definition is intended to 
endorse the strategy of retaining the catch-all provisions that already exist in the drafting policy of 
international criminal law. Critique has been levelled at the precision and specificity that seems to 
be absent in the drafting of this clause.145 However, Cassese opines that specificity problems are 
common in much international criminal law.146 While encompassing all existing crimes under 
international law, the use of the catch-all provisions envisions all other future crimes to come under 
the regulatory regime of the respective criminal law. For this reason, it can be argued that the 
clause ‘any other crimes under international law’ does not result in derogation of international 
criminal law. It is important to note that the definition of any crime shall be construed strictly and 
thereby shall not be extended by any analogy. In case of doubt, the interpretation should favour 
the alleged accused.147 
II.F.3.(j) Aid or Abetment of Crime 
The ICT-BD Act provides jurisdiction of the Tribunal to try and punish an accused who abated or 
conspired for any crime stipulated under the Act. Section 3(2) of The ICT-BD Act provides for a 
twofold dimension of positive and negative crimes. By criminalising attempt, abetment or 
conspiracy to commit any such crimes, it incorporates positive crimes, while complicity in or 
failure to prevent commission of any such crimes incorporates negative crimes. 
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Either of these two, or both, provisions have been brought in each case before the tribunals. The 
Tribunal had to determine whether aid or abetment alone would be sufficient to prove guilt. In 
Chief Prosecutor v Abdul Quader Molla,148 the Tribunal found that international practice related 
to aid or abetment alone to prove guilt. It referred to Charles Taylor (SCSL), in which a Trial 
Chamber of the SCSL tried and convicted Charles Taylor for ‘aiding and abetting’ war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. The Tribunal determined those international examples as law.149 
Therefore, it took or applied the jurisprudence of ICTR.150 As in this case, the accused was standing 
with a rifle, according to the words of a witness, in front of the camp. Thus, the Tribunal applied 
jurisprudence of ICTY that mere presence or inaction may be sufficient to constitute the actus reus 
of aiding and abetting.151 
In the abovementioned case, the defence council pointed out to the Tribunal that as the principal 
offenders (195 Pakistani enlisted officials) had not been identified or brought to justice, the 
accused could not be held responsible as aider and abettor. They referred to Krstić,152 held by the 
Appeal Chamber of ICTY, in which the Tribunal pointed out that specific intention must be proved 
to convict the defendant for aid and abetment.153 They also referred to the decision of the Appeal 
Chamber of ICTR in Sylvetre Gacumbitsh, in which, according to causation standards, the acts 
must have a ‘substantial effect’ on the commission of the crime for aiding and abetting.154 They 
also argued for culpability of any person who ‘intentionally commits such a crime’ by knowingly 
aiding, abating or otherwise assisting, in the commission of such a crime.155 
The Tribunal preferred to accept the jurisprudence of Prosecutor v Tartic, in which it was held 
that if the presence of the accused can be proved by circumstantial or other evidence with respect 
to the commission of the illegal act, it is sufficient to base a finding of participation and assign the 
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criminal culpability that accompanies it.156 The Tribunal relied also on the principle, as reflected 
in the ICTR jurisprudence, that the acts of assistance need not be the crime caused by the actual 
perpetrator; it is sufficient if the accused had a substantial effect on the commission of the crime 
by the actual perpetrators.157 
These views as to the abetment to crime against humanity are consistent with abetting a crime 
against humanity under The ICT-BD Act. Aiding and abetting crime against humanity under the 
Act includes not only providing physical help, but also giving psychological, sympathetic or moral 
support.158 Therefore, abetting a crime against humanity can be alleged against a person who has 
provided indirect support to the crime because abetting provides physical or tangible assistance 
and abetting gives psychological, sympathetic or moral support. These crimes raise accomplice 
responsibility through indirect participation in the commission of crime. 
II.G Liability and Criminal Responsibility of the Perpetrators 
Criminal liability and responsibility play an important role in determining the gravity of offence 
and severity of punishment. The ICT-BD Act holds that anyone who commits an offence is 
responsible for the crime. Section 4 of the Act declares different responsibilities for the crimes 
listed under the Act. Section 4 of The ICT-BD Act states: 
When any crime as specified in section 3 is committed by several persons, each of such persons 
is liable for that crime in the same manner as if it were done by him alone. 
The official position of an accused shall not be an excuse to release them from any liability.159 
Similar provision is observed in Article 8 of the 1945 IMT Charter (Nuremberg), article 33 of the 
1998 ICC Statute and article 6(4) of the 2002 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. (There 
is a little room for reduction of punishment of the individual accused.) In this regard, section 5 of 
The ICT-BD Act states: 
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1. The official position, at any time, of an accused shall not be considered [as] freeing him 
from responsibility or mitigating punishment. 
2. The fact that the accused acted pursuant to his domestic law or to order of his 
Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility but may be considered 
in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal deems that justice so requires. 
Section 5 of The ICT-BD Act does not allow any room for excuse from responsibility on the ground 
of the official position of individuals. Liability for international crimes can be determined when 
an individual commits the crime, orders others to commit the same, aids and abets in the 
commission or even does not play an active role to prevent the commission, are all triggering 
factors of the individual’s liability. Unlike article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute, which criminalises 
the acts of a person who ‘commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or 
through another person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible’, the 1973 
Act does not address direct perpetration.160 In terms of responsibility, section 3(2)(g) of The ICT-
BD Act provides for joint liability through abetment and conspiracy to commit crime against 
humanity. Therefore, liability under The ICT-BD Act can be categorised under three types: 
individual criminal responsibility, command responsibility and criminal joint enterprises. The 
details of these responsibilities are discussed in Sections II.G.1–3. 
II.G.1 Individual Criminal Responsibility 
The threshold of individuality is articulated in section 4(1) of the Act by clarifying liability. It 
holds that in the commission of crimes by several persons, the presumption is that the individual 
alone committed the crime. Thus, the jurisdiction of the ICTs based on individual criminal 
responsibility is a widely recognised and largely endorsed principle of international criminal 
law.161 Instruments in which this principle is reflected include Article 4 of the Genocide 
Convention 1948, article 50 of the Geneva Conventions I and II, article 86–7 of Additional 
Protocol I to the Geneva Convention of 1977, articles 25 and 28 of The Rome Statute, article 7 of 
the Charter of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg, article 6 the Charter of the 
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International Military Tribunal for the Far East, article 7 of the ICTY Statute, article 6 of the ICTR 
Statute and article 6 of the SCSL Statute. 
ICT-BD judgments have invoked individual criminal responsibility. The tribunals have opined that 
direct individual criminal responsibility arises only when the accused physically and directly 
participated in the commission of the crimes alleged, backed by tangible and admissible 
evidence.162 ICT-2 found that the accused ‘physically participated’ in the crimes that formed part 
of an attack against a civilian population, thereby constituting the offence of murder as crimes 
against humanity, attributable to the accused in the capacity of an individual or member of group 
of individuals as mentioned in section 3(2) of the Act.163 The doctrine of superior responsibility 
imposes a legal duty on civilian leaders to take all necessary and reasonable measures within their 
power to control the criminal acts of their subordinates. Such measures include referring the matter 
to a competent authority for investigation and prosecution.164 Therefore, a civilian leader is to be 
brought to justice for failing to prevent the commission of such crimes and for not taking measures 
to remediate the situation. 
The ICT-BD found the application of the doctrine of superior responsibility encompassing 
civilians to be useful, particularly in relation to political leaders. The crucial question is not the 
civilian status of the accused but the degree of authority he/she exercises over subordinates. The 
Apex Court called for the superior officers mentioned in section 4(2) of the Act to include any 
civilian superior with effective control over the subordinates.165 The court further viewed that to 
be so, a civilian superior need not be de jure, as such; a de facto civilian superior may also incur 
the responsibility of the crimes committed by his subordinates.166 Relying on section 4(2), the 
court found that the accused Motiur Rahman Nizami was the ex-officio leader, with effective 
control over the members of Al-Badr Bahini.167 
 
162 Ibid. 
163 Chief Prosecutor v Moulana Abdul Kalam Azad (International Crimes Tribunal-2, ICT-BD Case No 5 of 2012, 
21 January 2013) [231], [256], [324], [326]. 
164 Islam (n 1) 235. 
165 Motiur Rahman Nizami v Government of Bangladesh, represented by the Chief Prosecutor (International Crimes 





The ICT-BD interpreted ‘superior responsibility’ under section 4(2) in the context of the manifest 
and express intent of the 1973 Act to end impunity and ensure justice for victims. The Tribunal 
referred to section 5(2), which states that official position is no defence. It added that ‘superior 
officer’ does not only mean military superiors but also civilian superiors.168 
II.G.2 Command Responsibility of Civilian Political Leaders 
Where the crimes are international in nature and involve massive widespread participation, 
command responsibility is highly relevant. This applies especially to Bangladesh during its War 
of Liberation. Under section 4(2), The ICT-BD Act embodies the principle of superior command 
as a mode of criminal responsibility. Section 4 (2) of The ICT-BD Act states that  
Any commander or superior officer who orders, permits, acquiesces or participates in the 
commission of any of the crimes specified in section 3 or is connected with any plans and 
activities involving the commission of such crimes or who fails or omits to discharge his duty to 
maintain discipline, or to control or supervise the actions of the persons under his command or 
his subordinates, whereby such persons or subordinates or any of them commit any such crimes, 
or who fails to take necessary measures to prevent the commission of such crimes, is guilty of 
such crimes. 
The principle of command responsibility as embodied in this section has received extensive 
interpretation in ICT-BD. In Bangladesh, the tribunals give wider connotation to the meaning of 
the terms ‘any commander’ and ‘superior officer’ in Md Sakhawat Hossain and others case.169 
Drawing insights from the developments in the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC jurisprudence, the ICT-1 
articulated the ambit of section 4(2) of the 1973 Act to encompass political leaders and other 
civilian superiors in the position of authority.170 In this respect, the ICT- 2 has read section 4(2) in 
conjunction with its amended section 3 and observed that ‘the legislature has no intention to limit 
 
168 Professor Ghulam Azam (2013) [331], [344]–[350]. 
169 Chief Prosecutor v Md Sakhawat Hossain and others (International Crimes Tribunal-1, ICT-BD Case No 4 of 
2015, 10 August 2016) [104], [755]–[780]. 
170 The superior responsibility of a political leader was a major issue in Chief Prosecutor Versus Professor Ghulam 
Azam, in which the ICT-1 applied the principle to assess the liability of Azam as the Ameer (president) of JEI party. 
The ICT-1 held him responsible for either ordering or directing his subordinate followers to commit, or failing to 
prevent them from committing, atrocity crimes all over Bangladesh during the Liberation War; Professor Ghulam 
Azam (2013) [377]. 
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the notion ‘command’ or ‘superior responsibility’ to the military command only.’171 According to 
this Tribunal, it may therefore extend to de jure or de facto civilian superiors if ‘found to have 
exercised, in specific context, authority, and ability to lead and control the members of an 
organised group’.172 By virtue of this interpretation, the tribunals assume its mandate to try civilian 
superiors for the crimes committed by their subordinates, which had become a part of customary 
international law.173  
Suzannah Linton has criticised the possibility of such connotation, as she argues that section 4(2) 
contains the provision that is not known to international criminal law but seems like one that 
confuses the different modes of criminal responsibility.174 But Professor Islam traces the logic of 
such wider connotation to the jurisprudence of ICTY and ICTR that have interpreted that superior 
responsibility in their statutes included both military and non- military superiors.175 According to 
M. Islam, both the tribunals have 
[S]hown heightened sensitivity to crimes against humanity, genocide, and ethnic cleansing 
motivated and instigated by political and civilian leaders on the grounds of political and ideological 
affinity, ethnocide, and religious persecution as opposed to usual crimes committed by members 
of armed forces during routine engagements in war.176 
It seems that Suzannah Linton does not consider this development in the jurisprudence of ICTY 
and ICTR, which leads her to comment that ‘the local civilian and paramilitary groups that are 
most likely to be targeted by Bangladeshi investigations and prosecutions: one could probably 
stretch the definition to make it include those with de facto command, whether military or 
civilian’.177 She seems to misconceive the theoretical significance of the doctrine of superior 
responsibility that should now be contextualized to be linked inseparably to authority and ability 
of a civilian superior to control in affecting the conduct of his/ her subordinates and/ or followers. 
Given that, the ICT-BD’s interpretation of section 4(2) deserves appreciation on the ground that 
 
171 Md Sakhawat Hossain and others (2016) [1080]. 
172 Chief Prosecutor v Muhammad Kamaruzzaman (2013) (International Crimes Tribunal-2 ICT-BD Case No 3 of 
2012, 9 May 2013) [247], [499]. 
173 Professor Ghulam Azam (2013) [345]. 
174 Linton (n 7) 276. 
175 Islam (n 1) 248. 
176 Ibid. 
177 Linton (n 7) 278. 
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it’s essence establishes such link to the authority and ability of the civilians where they either (a) 
deliberately and consciously led their followers and affiliates over whom they exercised clear, 
definitive, and effective control or (b) breached their duties, and remained inactive in preventing 
the perpetrators under their control and authority from committing crimes. It is therefore clear that 
the ICT-BD has maintained a clear pace with the development of international criminal law 
reflected in the ICTY and ICTR judgments as noted above.  
II.G.3 Joint Criminal Enterprise 
The JCE is a mode of attributing criminal responsibility when a crime is committed by more than 
one perpetrator. Criminal responsibility for all perpetrators arises when all commit crimes jointly 
or individually to advance a common plan or purpose, and each incurs JCE liability as a principal 
perpetrator.178 Whoever contributes to the commission of criminal activity to accomplish the 
common plan or purpose may be held criminally liable under JCE. The rationale is that crimes of 
an international character are committed not individually but jointly through other persons.179 The 
requirement of JCE liability was reflected in the ICT-BD judgment as: 
(i) the existence of an organised system of ill-treatment of the detainees and the committing of 
the crime alleged; (ii) the accused’s awareness of this system; and (iii) the active participation of 
the accused in the enforcement of such system, or in any case, in the realisation of the common 
criminal design.180  
Consistent with post-World War II jurisprudence on JCE, ICTs divided JCE into three categories: 
JCE-I, JCE-II and JCE-III. JCE-I is a basic form of liability arising from a criminal enterprise to 
accomplish a common criminal purpose that is based on a common design.181 The mass killing of 
intellectuals by the Al-Badar para-militia in 1971 was intended to reduce the growth of future 
Bangladesh, and so was considered a JCS because it was part of common plan of collective 
criminality under section 4 (1) of The ICT-BD Act.182 The reflection of the ICT-BD on JCE-II and 
 
178 Islam (n 1) 248–9. 
179 Ibid 249. 
180 Md Sakhawat Hossain and others (2016) [377]. 
181 Islam (n 1) 256. 
182 Chief Prosecutor v Ali Ahsan Muhammad Mujahid (International Crimes Tribunal-2, ICT-BD Case No 4 of 2012, 
17 July 2013) [265], [266], [428], [440], [499]; Chief Prosecutor v Motiur Rahman Nizami (International 
CrimesTribunal-1, ICT-BD Case No 3 of 2011, 29 October 2014) [108], [132], [135]; see also ibid 257. 
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JCE-III is evident from the judgments. JCE- II involves a systematic nature of commission of 
crimes to keep victims in camps or other constrained places. In Chief Prosecutor v Mir Quasem 
Ali, the Tribunal pointed out that JCE-II is systematic and institutionalised in form and nature, as 
is what usually happens in detention or concentration camps in which detainees are confined and 
routinely tortured.183 JCE-III, as extracted from the view of ICT-BD, is the extended form of 
responsibility. In this process, a co-perpetrator engages in acts beyond the common plan or design 
for the realisation of the common plan or design and willingly takes the risk and consequence of 
the extended act that is natural and foreseeable.184 
Linton argues that The ICT-BD Act does not include commission of crime among the enumerated 
list of modes of responsibility.185 One may argue that JCE is envisioned in the form of conspiracy 
or perhaps abetment under the Act.186 However, ICTY jurisprudence, which roots JCE in the 
concept of ‘commission’, seems different from the law of Bangladesh because section 3(2)(g) and 
(h) of the Act criminalises complicity in or failure to prevent the commission of crimes. Although 
it was not included in the 1973 Act expressly, section 4 clearly indicates the presence of JCE 
responsibility. Section 4(1) clearly expresses that ‘when any crimes is committed by the several 
persons it is a clear indicating of the existing of the JCE responsibility’. Both tribunals held that in 
several cases, such as Sakhawat and Others. 
II.H Conclusion 
The enactment of The ICT-BD Act was an outcome of the strong determination for the punishment 
of collaborators of international crimes during the Liberation War of Bangladesh. The background 
and travaux preparation of the Act proves that legislators intended to bring a comprehensive but 
 
183 Chief Prosecutor v Ali Ahsan Muhammad Mujahid (International Crimes Tribunal-2, ICT-BD Case No 4 of 2012, 
17 July 2013) [261]. 
184 Chief Prosecutor v Shamsul Hossain Tarafdar @ Ashraf [absconded] and others (International CrimesTribunal-
1, ICT-BD Case No 6 of 2016, 10 January 2018) [47], [481]–[483]; Ibid 263. 
185 Linton (n 7) 273–8. 
186 ICTY mentioned joint criminal enterprise (JCE) to reflect different modes of cooperation that evolved in World 
War II jurisprudence. Art 7(1) of the ICTY Statute and art 6(1) of the ICTR Statute mentions JCE. In Tadic´, the 
Appeals Chamber of ICTY stratified JCE into three categories: a plurality of persons, a common plan and participation 
in the common plan (Tadic´ Appeal Judgement 185–229, especially 185–227). JCE I states that all codefendants, 
acting pursuant to a common design, possess the same criminal intention. JCE II refers to the action of groups of 
persons to a concerted plan. JCE III prescribed that the accused did not personally commit the crime, or it was not a 
component of the common plan, but was a predictable consequence of execution of the common plan and the accused 
was either reckless or indifferent to that risk (Tadic´ Appeal Judgement, 210, 229). 
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broad substantive law, encompassing all international crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
domestic Tribunal. Another purpose intended by legislators was to ensure justice for victims and 
guarantee an impunity-free new Bangladesh. Despite the Cold War politics dominating 
surrounding nations, Bangladesh was committed to ensuring justice by framing The ICT-BD Act. 
There were many challenges in adopting the Act. One of the most important was the issue of 
‘political group’ within the definition of genocide. The inclusion of political groups carries the risk 
of misapplication in the future for political purposes, or wrong use by parties in power against their 
opposition. Further complexity arose in authorising the Tribunal with the jurisdiction to determine 
the commission of crime as ‘before or after the commencement of this Act’. This inclusion means 
that any offence committed even after the commencement of this Act may also be tried under this 
Act. The crimes mentioned here are international crimes, but the Act is domestic. The dichotomy 
is that it excludes the provision of other legislation regarding criminal justice systems (eg, the 
Criminal Procedure Code 1898 and the Evidence Act 1872 of Bangladesh). 
The ICT-BD Act provides necessary powers and rights to try and punish all crimes committed 
during the Liberation War of Bangladesh. The jurisdictions of the Tribunal under the Act help the 
Tribunal ensure criminal justice. The definitions and scope of different offences under the Act are 
consistent with the provisions of international criminal law. Most definitions of offences under the 
Act are similar to provisions of the ICC Statute and domestic tribunals of other countries 
established for the trial of international crimes. However, there are several gaps in The ICT-BD 
Act that have not hampered criminal justice in Bangladesh. 
One of these gaps is the absence of provision for interlocutory appeal in the Act. Interlocutory 
appeal is available in different international instruments. The Act does not have any mechanism 
for interlocutory appeal. The adjournment of trial is only permissible in the interests of justice. 
One can point out the advantage of having an interlocutory appeal for the concerned situation, but 
it is likely that if allowed, this type of advantage will obstruct justice. 
Another gap is the absence of adequate provisions for the protection of witnesses and victims. The 
ICT-BD Act does not provide any measure for protecting witnesses or victims. In cases that offer 
a lack of proper protection, individuals will possibly not be cooperative in testifying before the 
tribunals when there is a threat to their security. In practical terms, the protection has been provided 
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periodically or on occasion by police. To address this challenge, a dedicated protective services 
mechanism is essential. 
The ICT-BD Act is silent about the capacity of individuals in committing the crime. No exemption 
is provided for persons with a mental incapacity or insanity or who are under legal age. Conversely, 
The Rome Statute has clear provisions under Articles 26, 30 and 31. The ICC standard had already 
appeared in various international instruments. The ICTY Rule 67(B)(b) and SLSC Rule 67(ii)(b) 
articulates similar provisions. It is reasonable to assume that in 1971, all involved in committing 
crimes were of sufficient age to be legally tried. 
Despite these gaps, The ICT-BD Act remains prudent for its time—post-Nuremburg international 
criminal justice statutes. It also introduces ground-breaking substantive provisions that affect the 
drafting of any similar domestic legislation aimed to prosecute perpetrators of future international 
crimes. A good combination of effective substantive and procedural provisions of law ensures 
criminal justice. While this chapter has analysed the substantive provisions of The ICT-BD Act, 
Chapter III will discuss the procedural provisions of the Act to investigate the efficiency of the 
Act to ensure criminal justice in Bangladesh. 
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III PROCEDURAL LAWS AND STANDARDS OF THE ICT-BD 
III.A Introduction 
Chapter two analyses the substantive provisions regarding the jurisdiction of the tribunals and the 
definitions of the designated international crimes under The ICT-BD Act and addresses the research 
question: What are the procedural laws and standards followed by the ICTs? The procedural rules 
refer to certain proceedings to be followed to ensure fairness, transparency and justice.1 The 
procedural roles are based on the notion of summum bonum2 of this law which means justice for 
all and at all cost.3 Procedural complexities sometimes cause delay and gross violation of criminal 
justice.4 Because of the procedural complexities, the ECCC which began functioning in the year 
of 2006 could not complete the trial until 2013. The death of Leng Sary in 2013, who was the 
prime target, raised questions about the seriousness of the ECCC team to ensure justice, as they 
clearly failed to complete his trial process in 6 years before his death.5  
The ICT-BD Act provides several procedural measures to be followed by the ICT-BD tribunals in 
the trial for the international crimes. The Act provides provisions as the commencement of 
proceedings, the rules of evidence, the right of accused persons during the trial, the right of appeal, 
the right of review, provisions of bail, privileged communication and medical. Moreover, the Act 
provides rules as to the examination of the ROP, including investigation, trial process, trial in 
absentia, rules of evidence and preference of appeal. The Rules of Procedure bear greater 
significance along with the Act. In line with research question (3), this chapter therefore analyses 
the procedural aspects under The ICT-BD Act and RoP. 
 
1 M Rafiqul Islam, National Trials of International Crimes in Bangladesh: Transitional Justice as Reflected in 
Judgments (University Press, 2019) 271. 
2 Summum bonum is a Latin expression meaning ‘the highest good’, which was introduced by Roman philosopher 
Cicero to correspond to the Idea of the Good in ancient Greek philosophy. Summum bonum is generally thought of as 
an end in itself, and at the same time, containing all other goods. 
3 Huq, Serajul, ‘Debate on the Draft International Crimes (Tribunals) Act’ (Parliamentary Debate, 17 July 1973) 2357. 
4 The situation of Afghanistan is one notable instance. The country became party to The Rome Statute in 2003 and 
preliminary examination of the situation in Afghanistan was made public in 2007. Over 10 years later, the status 
remains at the preliminary examination stage—that is, only at admissibility status. 
5 Stephen Heder and Brian Tiiemore, ‘Seven Candidates for Prosecution: Accountability for the Crimes of the Khmer 
Rouge’ (Conference Paper, American University and Coalition for International Justice, June 2001). 
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III.B Procedural Aspect of the Trial 
Section 22 of the ICT-BD Act enables a Tribunal to regulate its own procedure.6 The Rules of 
Procedure has become more important due to the fact that section 23 of the Act has ousted the 
application of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 and the Evidence Act, 1872. The 
International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure, 2010 has been amended twice: the first 
amendment has been brought in 2010 while second one was passed in 2013.7 The rules elaborate 
the requirements and mandates of the Act. They outline how to practically implement and maintain 
the function of the Tribunal. The Act and RoP recognise the rights of protection of the accused, 
witnesses and victims. The procedure affords reasonable fairness for the parties at the pre-trial, 
trial and appeal stages. However, like other ad hoc international crimes trials, the ICT-BD trial 
process has not been free from deficiencies and inadequacies. The procedural provisions and rules 
of The ICT-BD Act and RoP are discussed in detail below. 
III.B.1  Complaint Lodging, Pre-Investigation Process and Investigation 
Although The ICT-BD Act indicates procedural aspects originating from the investigation, it is 
important to articulate the steps followed before the investigation. Like other criminal proceedings, 
complaints are the baseline from which to initiate the process under the ICT-BD.8 The 
contemporary practice and experience of the ICT-BD suggests that three types of mechanism are 
available to make a complaint. First, complaints can be lodged by the victims. Second, complaints 
may have already been lodged during the post-independence period against perpetrators who were 
not granted general amnesty by the president. The Tribunal considers such complaints as the basis 
of initiating proceedings. Finally, the office of the prosecution can suo moto endorse the report of 
the investigation agency and initiate complaints followed by charge framing.9 
On the basis of the complaints lodged, the concerned authority adopts further steps before formally 
starting investigation under section 8 of The ICT-BD Act. The broader purpose of primary 
 
6 The section says that ‘Subject to the provision of this Act, Tribunal may regulate its own procedure’. 
7 See the International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure (Amendment) 2010 and the International Crimes Tribunal 
Rules of Procedure (Amendment) 2011. 
8 Complaint has been defined in Rule 2(6) as any information oral or in writing obtained by the investigation agency, 
including its own knowledge relating to the commission of a crime under s 3(2) of the Act. 
9 S 8(2) read with Rule 2(6) of the RoP 2010. 
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assessment of the complaint before taking it into the formal process is to make an evaluation about 
the merits and demerits of the complaint. In other words, the authority will look for whether there 
are substances in the complaints.  
Another fundamental issue at this pre-investigation stage is to make a pre-assessment about the 
availability of witnesses, evidence and required documents. This is needed to ensure that if the 
matter is sent to the investigation and continues to the Tribunal, the Tribunal is not left with any 
difficulty in finding evidence to reach its conclusion. The pre-investigation process is a practice 
continued by the prosecution office. In situations where it is deemed necessary, the members of 
the prosecution team visit and interact with concerned persons. 
Regarding the procedure for conducting investigation, the investigation agency may make a 
preliminary inquiry, and if observes or thinks it necessary to further look into the situation, they 
conduct a visit or procced in person to the place concerned to make sure that the situation can be 
investigated and brought before the Tribunal.10 This process is genuinely helpful in ensuring 
justice and procedural fairness. The practice of the Office of the Prosecutor of ICC is also quite 
similar. The Office of the Prosecutor conducts a preliminary examination determining whether a 
particular situation meets the criteria established by The Rome Statute.11 The office conducts an 
inquiry based on the statutory criteria and information available. The examination is initiated on 
the basis of the State Reference, prosecution’s initiative and Security Council’s referrals.12  
Investigation is an essential part of the procedure to ensure fair justice for international crimes. It 
is the baseline point of the whole process. The findings of the investigation signify much in the 
whole process, including its relevance throughout the process in determining the accused as guilty 
or not. According to section 8(1) of The ICT-BD Act, ‘the Government may establish an Agency 
for the purposes of investigation into crimes specified in section 3; and any officer belonging to 
the Agency shall have the right to assist the prosecution during the trial.’13 Subject (3) of section 
8 further provides that  
 
10 Rule 6 of the RoP 2010. 
11 The determination of jurisdictional and complementarity issues and end of justice criterion. 
12 <https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/pe.aspx>. 
13 The ICT-BD Act s 8(1). 
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Any investigation officer (IO) making an investigation under this Act may, by order in writing, 
require the attendance before themselves of any person who appears to be acquainted with the 
circumstances of the case, and such person shall attend as so required.14 
The core purpose of investigation agency is to examine crimes articulated in section 3 of the ICT-
BD Act and the officer involved in the investigation shall have the right to assist the prosecution 
during trial. This section allows prosecutors to conduct the investigation.15 The power of the 
investigating officer includes ordering attendance of any person before him,16 and examining 
orally any person if such person has knowledge or acquaintance with the circumstance of the 
case.17 Rule 5 of the RoP specifies that the Investigating Agency is required to maintain a 
complaint register for initiating the investigation under the Act.18 
In cases, where the IO is of the belief that any offence has been committed, he needs to go in 
person to the spot, investigate facts and circumstances of the case and adopt measures for the 
discovery and arrest of the accused.19 The concerned person is bound to answer all questions, even 
those that incriminate them directly or indirectly.20 However, such answers will not further be used 
for making cause for arrest or prosecution, and could not be used as proof against them. If any 
person fails to cooperate with the investigating officer in terms of refusing to answer any questions 
or refrains from presenting or appearing before the court, they shall be punished by simple 
imprisonment which may extend to six months, or by a fine which may extend to two thousand 
Taka, or both.21 The officer is required to note if statements are given by concerned individuals.22 
The IO may obtain a warrant of arrest from the Tribunal against any person at any stage of the 
investigation through the prosecutor for the purpose of proper and effective investigation. The 
 
14 Ibid s 8(3). 
15 Ibid s 8(2)t. 
16 Ibid, s 8(3). 
17 Ibid, s 8(4). 
18 Rule 8 states that the IO must maintain a case diary in relation to each case’s daily updates. The diary may be 
submitted to the Tribunal. The tribunal may read the diary for clarification or understanding of any fact. However, 
defence shall have to right to use the case diary or produce before the Tribunal. 
19 Rule 6 of ROP. 
20 The ICT Act s 8(5). 
21 Ibid s 8(7). 
22 Ibid s 8(6). 
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arrest will be executed by the local law enforcement agencies. In executing the arrest, the 
concerned person shall be provided a copy of such allegation.23 
The IO has the power to search and seize any document in the presence of two witnesses.24 Rule 
9(5) prescribes that the accused may be released on bail if for the duration of the investigation 
stage, they remain in custody for a period of one year from the date of their arrest and the 
investigation cannot be completed within the required time. However, the duration of the 
investigation can be extended by showing reasons in exceptional circumstances and can also order 
to detain the accused for another period of six months. After every three months of detention, the 
IO is required to submit a progress report of investigation against the detained accused to the 
Tribunal through the prosecutor.25 
Rule 16 describes interrogation of the accused in custody by the IO. It requires that, if the IO 
intends to interrogate the accused in custody, the Tribunal may pass an order for such interrogation 
for a maximum period of three days if the Tribunal is of the opinion that such interrogation is 
indispensable for proper investigation. The rule further stressed that no person during investigation 
under the Act shall be subjected to any form of coercion, duress or threat of any kind.26 The 
investigation shall be stopped or terminated where the IO finds no sufficient grounds to proceed 
further. In other words, the IO will not continue the investigation if he or she is of the opinion that 
there is no substance in furthering the investigation. However, to do so, the IO must obtain the 
consent of the chief prosecutor.27 Rule 19 of the RoP reiterates that the chief prosecutor may stop 
the investigation if it is presumed that there is no prima facie case to disclose against the accused 
in the investigation report. In such circumstance, he may require further investigation.  
Once the IO completes his task, he is required to submit the report to the chief prosecutor. Rule 11 
of the RoP states: 
 
23 Rule 9 of the RoP. 
24 Ibid Rule 10. 
25 Ibid Rule 9(6). 
26 Ibid Rule 16(2). 
27 Ibid Rule 7. 
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After completion of investigation, the Investigation Officer shall submit an Investigation Report 
together with all the documents, papers and the evidence collected during investigation of 
offence(s) as specified in the Act committed by a person(s) before the Chief Prosecutor.28 
Under The Rome Statute, the rights of persons are guaranteed during investigation. A person shall 
not be compelled to incriminate themselves or to confess guilt, nor can their accusers use any form 
of coercion, duress or threat, torture, or any other form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment. The accused will also receive the assistance of a competent interpreter for free if 
they are questioned in a language other than a language the person fully understands and speaks. 
Further, no arbitrary arrest or detention can be issued nor can they be deprived of their personal 
liberty except in accordance with the law.29 
If during the investigation there are grounds to believe that the person to be questioned has 
committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court then the following rights must be guaranteed 
and communicated before the person is brought for questioning. Firstly, they must be informed 
that there are grounds to believe that they have committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court; secondly, they have the right to remain silent if otherwise a consideration could be drawn 
towards determination of guilt or innocence; thirdly, they have the right to the legal assistance of 
their choice. Thus, if the person does not have money, then arranging legal assistance for them is 
to be arranged if the interest of justice so requires; and finally, they have the right to be questioned 
in the presence of counsel unless they have voluntarily waived their right to counsel.30 However 
the pre-trial investigation is not free from criticisms. 
In some cases, the Tribunal found that the IO did not pay rigorous attention to collecting 
appropriate evidence. In Chief Prosecutor v Syed Md Qaiser case, the Tribunal held that ‘we are 
constrained to observe with disappointment that the investigation on the event of killing. Charge 
No 4 of the case suffers from infirmity and inefficiency as well. The IO should have fixed her due 
and rigorous attention on collecting appropriate evidence on this event’.31 In Chief Prosecutor v 
 
28 Ibid Rule 11 
29 The Rome Statute Article s 55(1)(a)–(d). 
30 Ibid. 




Muhammad Kamaruzzaman, the Tribunal held that the charges submitted by the prosecution were 
found to be neither well-arranged nor systematic. Therefore, the ICT-BD-2 ordered the IO to re-
submit the charges in a newly arranged and systematic form.32 The Tribunal found the IO did 
negligent in his duty and he was ordered to be relieved from presenting further investigation reports 
before ICT-BD-2.33 
III.B.2  Commencement of Proceedings 
The proceeding originates with the submission of formal charges. The charges encompass or cover 
the alleged crimes committed by each of the accused persons. The formal charges must contain 
the name and address of the accused person, witnesses, and the date, time and place of the 
occurrence.34 Generally, the Chief prosecutor submits the charges. However, he can authorise any 
other prosecutor to submit the charges.35 Section 9 (1) of The ICT-BD Act states that,  
The proceedings before a Tribunal shall commence upon the submission by the Chief Prosecutor, 
or a Prosecutor authorized by the Chief Prosecutor in this behalf, of formal charges of crimes 
alleged to have been committed by each of the accused persons.36 
For the issue of process, the prosecution will require forwarding all supporting documents and 
materials on the basis of which the Tribunal shall require the appearance of the accused before the 
Tribunal, where the accused is not already arrested.37 After the submission of the charge, the 
Tribunal shall fix a date for the trial. However, the Chief prosecutor shall submit a list of witnesses 
along with their statements and copies of documents before the Tribunal and the minimum time 
for such submission is 3 weeks before the trial commences.38 At any stage of the trial after giving 
notice to the defence the prosecutor may furnish, subject to the permission from the Tribunal, any 
 
32 Chief Prosecutor v Muhammad Kamaruzzaman (International Crimes Tribunal 2, ICT-BD Case No 3 of 2012, 9 
May 2013) [21]–[22]. 
33 The Chief Prosecutor v Md Mahidur Rahman and Md Afsar Hossain @ Chutu (International Crimes Tribunal 2, 
ICT-BD Case No 2 of 2014, 20 May 2015) [419], [424], [425]. 
34 Rule 20(1) of the ROP. 
35 The ICT-BD Act, s 9(1). 
36 Rule 2(11) of the ROP defines ‘formal charge’ as accusation of crimes against the accused in the form of a petition 
lodged by the prosecutor with the Tribunal on receipt of the investigation report. 
37 Ibid Rule 20(2). 
38 The ICT-BD Act 1973 s 9 (3). 
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additional witnesses or further evidence.39 Meanwhile, the defence submits a list of witnesses and 
documents to the Tribunal at the commencement of the trial. The Tribunal, after taking cognisance 
of an offence, shall fix a date for appearance of the accused. Rule 22 of the Rules of Procedure 
2010 states that the Tribunal shall issue summons or warrants for appearance, if the accused is not 
already arrested40 However, section rule 23 provides that if the Tribunal does not take cognisance 
of an offence, the case shall be dismissed.41 
III.B.3  Procedures of Bail 
Rule 2(3) of the International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2010 defines bail as ‘setting an 
accused at large on furnishing [a] bond before the Tribunal’. In various rules contained in the Rules 
of Procedure, the mechanism of bail has been included. The foremost one is rule 21, announcing 
that all the offences as described in section 3(2) of the Act shall be cognisable, non-compoundable 
and non-bailable. However, the accused may get bail if they are in custody during the investigation 
period and the said investigation cannot be completed within one year of arrest of the accused. The 
Tribunal may impose certain conditions upon the accused if enlarged on bail.42 The Tribunal may 
release an accused on bail at any stage of the proceedings with certain conditions. However, such 
bail may be cancelled if the conditions are violated.43 If the accused fails to appear before the 
Tribunal during their enlargement on bail, the Tribunal shall have authority to proceed in the 
presence of their counsel or pass any order which it thinks fit and proper.44 
Speaking about the salient features of The ICT-BD Act, the Prosecutor of the ICT-BD, A. K. M. 
Saiful Islam stated that the Act provided for equality of arms by reference to the bail provisions, 
which is not available under other statutes for international tribunals. He also mentioned about 
review provisions the appointment of judges from the High Court Division and the appeal 
procedure to the Supreme Court as some other positive features of the Act.45 
 
39 Ibid s 9(4). 
40 Rule 22 of the RoP. 
41 Ibid Rule 23. 
42 Ibid Rule 9(5). 
43 Ibid Rule 34(3). 
44 Ibid Rule 43A. This rule was inserted by the International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure (Amendment) 2011. 
45 On 21 November 2012, the prosecutor made this statement in an event held by the International Criminal Court 
Assembly of State Parties at the World Forum Centre in The Hague, hosted by No Peace Without Justice (NPWJ). 
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The right of provisional release on bail and parole of the accused awaiting trial is facilitated in the 
ICT-BD regime. Rule 34 (3) provides that the Tribunal will release the accused in custody 
provisionally on bail subject to fulfilment of some conditions as imposed by it, and in the interest 
of justice at any stage of the trial proceedings. The ICT-BD entertained bail petitions and allowed 
bail for the accused in a number of cases.46 Abdullah Al Baki was released on bail to stay at home 
due to his old age.47 The ICT-BD-1 granted parole freedom to M A Hannan and Rafique Sajjat, 
who were prosecuted and in custody for allegedly committing war crimes during the Liberation 
War, to participate in the funeral of Hannan’s wife.48 
III.B.4 Rules for Privileged Communication and Medical Facilities 
Providing privileged communication and medical facilities are two important principles of 
international criminal justice system. The ICT-BD Act along with the RoP provides the scope of 
granting privilege communication and medical facility. This is also established by the order of the 
Tribunal in the case of The Chief Prosecutor Vs Ali Ahsan Muhammad Mujahid. In this case, the 
Tribunal (ICT-BD-1) also allowed the learned defence counsels to have privileged communication 
with the accused detained in prison.49 Such privileged communication allowed by the Tribunal 
further by its order on the basis of request by the accused. The Tribunal (ICT-BD-1) also ordered 
the presence of engaged counsel and a doctor at a room adjacent to the room of the ‘safe home’ 
where the investigation agency was allowed to interrogate the accused. This order was issued to 
prevent coercion and torture of any kind.50 Prosecution began examining its witnesses on 26 
 
Mentioned in Toby M Cadman, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Complementarity and National 
Prosecutions: The International Crimes Tribunal Bangladesh (Web Page) 4–5 
<http://www.internationallawbureau.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/The-Rome-Statute-of-the-International-
Criminal-Court-Complementarity-and-National-Prosecutions-The-International-Crimes-Tribunal-Bangladesh.pdf>. 
46 Chief Prosecutor v Md Abdul Alim @ M. A. Alim (International Crimes Tribunal 2, ICT-BD Case No 1 of 2012, 
9 October 2013) [15]–[16]; Syed Md Qaiser (2014) [26].  
47 Daily Star, 20 March 20 2017 <http://www.thedailystar.net/backpage/oldest-war-crimes-suspect-theworld- gets-
bail-1378471>. 
48 Islam (n 1) 295. 
49 The Tribunal noted that on 25 January 2012, the defence filed an application seeking privileged communication 
between the accused and his counsel in prison. The Tribunal [ICT-BD-1] on hearing the matter allowed the privileged 
communication as requested. 
50 Chief Prosecutor v Ali Ahsan Muhammad Mujahid (International Crimes Tribunal 2, ICT-BD Case No 4 of 2012, 
17 July 2013) [18]. 
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August 2012 with the facility of privileged communication and on the same day the defence 
submitted a list of witnesses along with documents which it intended to rely upon.51 
III.B.5  Procedure of Trial 
Section 10 of the ICT-BD Act prescribes the procedure to be followed at the trial before a Tribunal 
established under The ICT-BD Act. On commencement, the charge shall be read out and the 
Tribunal shall ask each accused whether they plead guilty or not. If the accused pleads guilty, the 
Tribunal shall record the plea and may convict accordingly. Rule 35 points out that the Tribunal, 
while proceeding to hear the case, shall consider formal charges, and an ‘investigation report 
together with the documents and materials produced and submitted in support of such report’.52 In 
order to ensure speedy process and avoid any multiplicity and log in the process, the Tribunal may 
try every offence at one trial. In this respect rule 36 provides that  
Where persons accused of the same offence committed in the course of the same transaction; or 
Persons accused of abatement or attempt[ing] to commit such offence; or Persons accused of 
conspiracy or planning or design in the commission of an offence or more than one offence; or 
Persons accused of more than one offence.53  
Moreover, when the accused is brought before the Tribunal, the Tribunal shall reflect upon the 
submitted documents and give the parties an opportunity of being heard. If the Tribunal finds that 
there is not sufficient ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the said accused, it 
shall discharge the accused and record the reasons for such discharge.54 The Tribunal may make 
an order for recording the confession of an accused. The Judicial Magistrate conducting the 
confession allows the engaged counsel for the accused to be present. However, the counsel shall 
not be allowed to interfere or speak in the course of recording such a confession.55 Where the 
Tribunal finds sufficient ground against the concerned accused in relation to the alleged crimes 
committed, the Tribunal shall frame charges against them and asks the accused to admit guilt of 
 
51 Ibid [27]. 
52 Rule 35 of the RoP. 
53 Ibid Rule 36. 
54 Ibid Rule 37. 




the said crime.56 If the accused admits that they have committed the charged offence, such 
admission shall be recorded and the accused shall be convicted accordingly. The tribunal may 
record such admission for consideration at the time of trial and pronouncement of judgments.57 An 
accused pleading not guilty will receive at least three weeks for preparing their defence.58 
To begin the trial, the prosecution shall make its opening statement and thereafter the witnesses 
for the prosecution shall be examined.59 Here, the defence may cross-examine such witnesses and 
accordingly the prosecution may re-examine them.60 In the same way, the witnesses for the defence 
shall be examined, cross-examined and re-examined accordingly. The Tribunal is fully or 
completely empowered to conduct the whole process. Section 10 (1) (h) of The ICT-BD Act 
provides that: 
The Tribunal may, in order to discover or obtain proof of relevant facts, ask any witness any 
question it pleases, in any form and at any time about any fact; and may order production of any 
document or thing or summon any witness, and neither the prosecution nor the defense shall be 
entitled either to make any objection to any such question or order or, without the leave of the 
Tribunal, to cross-examine any witness upon any answer given in reply to any such question.61 
The prosecution shall summaries its case first and then the defence shall accordingly. Where the 
defence has summed up its case, the prosecution shall have the right to conclude its case after such 
task is completed. Finally, the Tribunal shall deliver its judgment and pronounce its verdict.62 In 
case of difficulty in understanding the language of the Court, both the accused and witnesses shall 
be provided with interpreters.63 The proceedings shall be in public. However, if the Tribunal finds 
it proper, it may conduct an in-camera trial.64 
One common question arises in this regard is the relevance of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
1898 of Bangladesh and the Evidence Act of 1872. These two laws are fundamental in determining 
 
56 Ibid Rule 38(1). 
57 Ibid Rule 39. 
58 Ibid Rule 38(2). 
59 The ICT-BD Act s 10. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid s 10(1)(h). 
62 Ibid s 10(1)(i)(j). 
63 Ibid s 10(3). 
64 Ibid s 10(4). 
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the procedural aspects of criminal matters in the country since the British colonial era. In this 
regard, section 23 of the ICT-BD Act stipulates that ‘the provisions of the Criminal Procedure 
Code and the Evidence Act 1872 shall not apply in any proceedings under this Act’. The probable 
reason for such exclusion is to maintain a distinct standard considering the nature of the crimes 
committed, the documents’ availability and the longevity of the impunity gap. 
The prosecution and trial under the ICT-BD has some similarity with the ICTY and ICTR. The 
issues of investigation and preparation of indictment were reflected in Article 18 of ICTY Statute 
and Article 17 of ICTR Statute. Under the ICTY regime, the prosecutor is empowered to initiate 
investigations and also assess information received and then decide whether such is sufficient basis 
to proceed.65 The prosecution is bestowed with the power to question suspects, victims and 
witnesses, to collect evidence and to conduct on-site investigations. Upon a determination that 
there is existence of a prima facie case, the prosecutor shall prepare an indictment containing a 
concise statement of the facts and the crime or crimes with which the accused is charged under the 
Statute66. Afterwards, the indictment shall be transmitted to a judge of the Trial Chamber.67 
The commencement and conduct of trial proceeding were articulated in Article 20 of ICTY and 
Article 19 ICTR. Under the ICTY mechanism, the Trial Chamber shall ensure that a trial is fair 
and expeditious, and that proceedings are conducted in accordance with the rules of procedure and 
evidence, ensuring the rights of the accused and guaranteeing that due regard is given to protection 
of victims and witnesses. A person against whom an indictment has been confirmed shall 
immediately be informed of the charges against them. The Trial Chamber shall satisfy itself that 
the rights of the accused are respected, and also make sure that they understand the indictment. 
This shall be followed by the fixing of a date shall be fixed for trial, where, under ordinary 
instances, the hearing shall be public. In respect of such stages, the rules and mechanisms under 
ICTR are found quite similar.68 
 
65 Ibid art 17. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Art 19 of the ICTR states: 
1. The Trial Chambers shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and that proceedings are conducted in accordance 
with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, with full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the 
protection of victims and witnesses. 2. A person against whom an indictment has been confirmed shall, pursuant to an 
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III.B.6 Rules of Evidence 
Section 19 (1) of the Act provides that the Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of 
evidence.69 It however further provides that the Tribunal ‘may admit any evidence including 
reports and photographs published in newspapers, periodicals and magazines, films and tape-
recordings and other materials as may be brought before it’.70 In that case, the Tribunal must satisfy 
itself about the probative value of such evidence.71 The ICT-BD’s have the discretion to consider 
hearsay evidence after weighing its probative value.72 In Chief Prosecutor v Mohibur Rahman 
alias Boro Mia and Others, the ICT-BD-1 confronted with this challenge and addressed certain 
legal issues raised.73 The defence pleaded for exclusion of hearsay witness. The Tribunal opined 
that even anonymous hearsay testimony is admissible and carries probative value if it is 
corroborated by some other evidence. It also commented that the testimony even of a single witness 
on a material fact does not as a matter of law require corroboration.74 Finally, the corroboration is 
not a legal requirement for a finding to be made.75 In another judgment, the ICT-BD-2 observed 
that the probative value of testimony of even a single prosecution witness is to be weighed, and 
accordingly or thus acceptance of and reliance upon uncorroborated evidence, per se, does not 
constitute an error in law, in finding an accused guilty under The ICT-BD Act.76 The issue of 
‘tender age’ was brought before the tribunals. The ICT-BD-1 opined that the tender age of the 
witness at the time of the event itself could not be a reason to disregard their testimony ‘if [it] 
 
order or an arrest warrant of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, be taken into custody, immediately informed of 
the charges against him or her and transferred to the International Tribunal for Rwanda. 3. The Trial Chamber shall 
read the indictment, satisfy itself that the rights of the accused are respected, confirm that the accused understands the 
indictment, and instruct the accused to enter a plea. The Trial Chamber shall then set the date for trial. 4. The hearings 
shall be public unless the Trial Chamber decides to close the proceedings in accordance with its Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence. 
69 Ibid s 19. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid s 19(1). 
72 Rule 56(2) of the RoP. 
73 Chief Prosecutor v Mohibur Rahman alias Boro Mia, Mujibur Rahman alias Angur Mia, and Md Abdur Razzak 
(International Crimes Tribunal 1, ICT-BD Case No 3 of 2015) [2016]. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid [225], [226]. 
76 Chief Prosecutor v Moulana Abdul Kalam Azad (International Crimes Tribunal 2, ICT-BD Case No 5 of 2012, 
21 January 2013) [143]. 
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appears to be natural and gets corroboration from other evidence’.77 In this respect, the ICT-BD-1 
found the following observation of the Appeal Chamber of ICTR in Gacumbitsi case relevant:  
There is no rule requiring the Court to reject per se the testimony of a witness who was [a] child 
at the events in question. The probative value to be attached to testimony is determined to its 
credibility and reliability.78 
The crux of the observation of the ICT-BD is that the tribunals considered circumstantial and 
hearsay evidence as ‘not admissible per se, but such evidence should be considered with caution.’ 
Thus it weighed its credibility in light of other evidence relating to the relevant facts and 
circumstances to assess its reasonable probative value, which is not necessarily absent merely 
because of its hearsay character.79 Therefore, a statement made to the IO without solemn 
declaration lacks probative value as its truthfulness cannot be tested in cross-examination by the 
defence.  
The Tribunal may accept any statement recorded by the magistrate or investigating officer of any 
individual who cannot be brought before the Tribunal at the time of trial due to the death of such 
person or for any reasonable causes (such as, unreasonable avoiding delay and expenses). The 
Tribunal shall take judicial notice and not require proof of facts of common knowledge.80 The ICT-
BD took judicial notice of the fact of common knowledge of the formation of the local auxiliary 
para-militias ‘accessory forces of the Pakistani occupation armed force for providing moral 
support, assistance and [that] they substantially contributed to the commission of atrocious 
activities throughout the country in the context of the 1971 war as a part of a systematic attack on 
Bangladeshi self-determined population in 1971’.81 The ICT-BD-1 held that: 
 
77 Chief Prosecutor v Md Reaz Uddin Fakir (International Crimes Tribunal 1, ICT-BD Case No 4 of 2016, 
10 May 2018) [194]. 
78 Ali Ahsan Muhammad Mujahid v Chief Prosecutor (International Crimes Tribunal, Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court of Bangladesh, Criminal Appeal A 103/2013, 16 June 2015) [167]. 
79 Islam (n 1) 276. 
80 The ICT-BD Act s 19(3). 
81 Moulana Abdul Kalam Azad (2013) [78], [185]–[186]; Chief Prosecutor v Abdul Quader Molla (International 
Crimes Tribunal 2, ICT-BD Case No 2 of 2012, 5 February 2013) [75], [130]; Ali Ahsan Muhammad Mujahid (2013) 
[84]; Chief Prosecutor v Shamsul Hossain Tarafdar @ Askhraf, Md Nesar Ali, Yunus Ahmed, Md Ujer AKhmed 




There were some political parties in this country that played anti-liberation roles during the 
Liberation War in 1971. As a result, many events became a fact of common knowledge in the 
mind of the people at large. Therefore, it does not need to show the documentary evidence to 
prove any of the events of common knowledge at the time when it is required as per provision of 
the Act of 1973.82 
Regarding judicial notice, section 19 provides that the Tribunal may take ‘notice of official 
governmental documents and reports of the UN and its subsidiary agencies or other international 
bodies including non-governmental organisations’.83 In this respect of the UN and NGOs, the 
Tribunal observed: 
Like other international tribunals created for trial of international crimes, this domestic tribunal 
is also empowered under subsection (3) and (4) of section 19 to take judicial notice of official 
governmental documents and reports of the United Nations and its subsidiary agencies or other 
international bodies including non-governmental organizations and shall not require proof of 
common knowledge but shall take judicial notice thereof and the provisions contained in Section 
19 of the ICT Act is consonant with the provisions made in the other Statutes for trial of 
international crimes.84 
The Appellate Division depicted the need for non-technical procedures and for taking judicial 
notice of the facts of common knowledge in international trials. Rule 44 has given the discretionary 
power to the Tribunal under which it may admit any oral and documentary evidence, including 
any print or electronic including materials and tape recordings tendered before it.85 In contrast, the 
Tribunal has the power to exclude any evidence which does not inspire confidence.86 This rule 
further declares the finality of the Tribunal’s decision regarding the admissibility or non-
 
82 Chief Prosecutor v Md Sakhawat Hossain and others (International Crimes Tribunal 1, ICT-BD Case No 4 of 2015, 
10 August 2016) [715]. 
83 The ICT-BD Act s 19(4). 
84 Md Sakhawat Hossain and others (2016) [716]. 




admissibility of evidence by providing that such decision cannot be challenged.87 Rule 55 says that 
‘once the document is marked as an exhibit, the content of such document may be admissible.’88 
The Appellate Division highlighted the difficulties of procuring documentary evidence due to the 
time gap of over 40 years from the commission of the crimes as well as the wilful destruction or 
disappearance of documents in the ensuing fragile political environment. They also noted the 
apathy of the succeeding governments, including those comprising some of the accused and 
convicts.89 The Apex Court observed that the Tribunal is not bound under this Act to follow the 
general rules of evidence that are applicable for proving of a fact. As such, the proof of a fact may 
be admitted by the Tribunal, if such fact is relevant to the facts that may connect the accused with 
the incident for which he is being tried.90 The Appellate Division further allowed the admitting 
digital evidence for proving the statement of those who is not alive or whose presence cannot be 
made without delay. However, such evidence shall be admissible only if the Tribunal considers 
that it is relevant ‘to corroborate a fact in issue or which it deems to have probative value.’91 The 
Tribunal held that the prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the 
crime was committed by the accused.92 The logic of this rule is grounded by the Appellate Division 
in the following fact:  
This is because the trials are being held at a belated stage; most of the material evidence is lost 
in many cases; most of the members of the family were killed and the neighbouring witnesses 
escaped to avoid similar eventuality; the surviving witnesses are not interested in disclosing the 
real incident because of the incidents of brutalities perpetrated against unarmed innocent people 
of the country by an organized armed force with the help of Razakars, Al-Badar, Al-Shams, and 
Peace Committee members for causes mentioned above.93 
 
87 Ibid. 
88 Salauddin Qader Chowdhury v Chief Prosecutor (International Crimes Tribunal, Appellate Division of the Supreme 
Court of Bangladesh, Criminal Appeal A 122/2013, 29 July 2015) [145]–[146]. 
89 Islam (n 1) 282. 
90 Salauddin Qader Chowdhury (2015) [145]–[146]. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Human Rights Watch, Bangladesh: Guarantee Fair Trials for Independence-Era Crimes, Amendments to 
Tribunal’s Rules Fall Short of International Standards (11 July 2011) 
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/07/11/bangladesh-guarantee-fair-trials-independence-era-crimes>. 
93 Abdul Quader Mollah v Chief Prosecutor (International Crimes Tribunal, Appellate Division of the Supreme Court 
of Bangladesh, Rev Pet Nos 17–18 of 2013, 12 December 2013) [40]–[41]. 
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III.B.7 Procedures During Trial 
The tribunals have been mindful of certain basic principles set out in the ICCPR concerning the 
rights of the accused at different stages of the proceedings, with the notable exception of the death 
penalty.94 The ICT Act confers adequate mechanisms to the individual accused during different 
stages of proceedings. The rights of the accused person before the trial include giving notice of 
formal charge and issuing pertinent documents to the defendant while providing reasonable time 
before the starting of trial. Section 16 of the ICT-BD Act provides that  
(1) Every charge against an accused person shall state- (a) The name and particulars of the 
accused person;(b) The crime of which the accused person is charged; (c) Such particulars of the 
alleged crime as are reasonably sufficient to give the accused person notice of the matter with 
which he is charged.95 
According to this section, The ICT-BD Act shall provide a copy of the formal charge and a copy 
of each of the documents to the accused at a reasonable time before the trial. If there is however 
any difficulty in furnishing copies of the documents, the Tribunal shall give reasonable opportunity 
for inspection to the accused.96 Moreover, that the accused has the right to have notice from the 
prosecution applies in cases where the prosecution is intended to call additional witnesses or tender 
additional documents.97 The right to provide a list of witnesses before the Tribunal is guaranteed.98 
Section 12 of The ICT-BD Act states:  
Where an accused person is not represented by counsel, the Tribunal may, at any stage of the 
case, direct that a counsel shall be engaged at the expense of the Government to defend the 
accused person and may also determine the fees to be paid to such counsel.99 
 
94 M Rafiqul Islam, ‘Trials for International Crimes in Bangladesh: Prosecutorial Strategies, Defense Arguments and 
Judgments’ in Kirsten Sellars (ed), Trials for International Crimes in ASIA (Cambridge University Press, 2016) 306. 
95 The ICT-BD Act s 16. 
96 Ibid s 16(2). 
97 Ibid s 9(4) states, ‘Provided that notice shall be given to the defence of the additional witnesses intended to be called 
or additional evidence sought to be tendered by the prosecution.’ 
98 Ibid s 9(5) states, ‘A list of witnesses for the defense, if any, along with the documents or copies thereof, which the 
defense intends to rely upon, shall be furnished to the Tribunal and the prosecution at the time of the commencement 
of the trial.’ 
99 Ibid s 12. 
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The accused’s rights during the trial encompass the right to give an explanation pertinent to the 
charge against him, the right to conduct defence or appoint counsel and the right to present 
evidence.100 At the same time, the accused shall have the right to cross-examine any witness called 
by the prosecution.101 It has been clearly stated in Section 17 of the ICT-BD Act that, 
(1) During the trial of an accused person he shall have the right to give any explanation relevant 
to the charge made against him. (2) An accused person shall have the right to conduct his own 
defense before the Tribunal or to have the assistance of counsel. (3) An accused person shall have 
the right to present evidence at the trial in support of his defense, and to cross-examine any 
witness called by the prosecution.102 
The RoP prepared by the Tribunal confers more rights to the accused. Rule 43 of the RoP ensures 
the right to be represented by any counsel if the accused is not represented by such. The Tribunal 
is tasked to appoint such counsel at the expense of the government so that the accused is 
defended.103 If no counsel represents an accused, the ICTs have the power to order for the 
appointment of a state counsel at the expense of the government to defend the accused. The ICTs 
have facilitated such in the case of Salauddin Quader Chowdhury, Moulana Abdul Kalam Azad, 
Ashrafuzzaman Khan, Md Idris Ali Sardar, and Md Solaiman Mollah, and Zahid Hossain Khokon 
etc.104 The same rule guarantees some of the fundamental principles of law including principles of 
natural justice. 
For instance, ‘presumption of innocence until found guilty’ in cases of any person charged with 
crimes as described under section 3 (2) of the Act has been ensured. Rule 43 (2) of the RoP 
prescribes the presumption of innocence until found guilty. This right is one of the cornerstones 
 
100 For further, see David Bergman, ‘Azad Judgement Analysis 1: ‘In-Absentia’ Trials and Defense Inadequacy’ (Blog 
Post 26 January 2013) <http://bangladeshwarcrimes.blogspot.com>. 
101 The ICT-BD Act s 17. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Rule 43 was renumbered as sub-rule (1) of Rule 43 by the International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure 
(Amendment) 2011. 
104 Salauddin Quader Chowdhury (2013) 3, Moulana Abdul Kalam Azad (2013) [21]; Chief Prosecutor v 
Ashrafuzzaman Khan @ Naeb Ali Khan and Chowdhury Mueen Uddin (International Crimes Tribunal 2, ICT-BD 
Case No 1 of 2013, 3 November 2013) [22]; Chief Prosecutor v Md Idris Ali Sardar and Md Solaiman Mollah 
(International Crimes Tribunal 1, ICT-BD Case No 6 of 2015, 2016) [29]; Chief Prosecutor v Zahid Hossain Khokon 
@ MA Zahid @ Khokon Matubbar @ Khokon (International Crimes Tribunal 1, ICT-BD Case No 4 of 2013, 2014) 
[8], [47]; Shamsul Hossain Tarafdar @ Askhraf, Md Nesar Ali, Yunus Ahmed, Md Ujer AKhmed Chowdhury and 
Mobarak Mia (2018) [34]. 
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of fair trial proceedings and is related to the protection of human dignity and is universally accepted 
settled jurisprudence. The defence has nothing to prove while the prosecution must prove the 
accused’s threshold of guilt beyond every reasonable doubt.105 The criminal jurisprudence and 
requirements preserve the status of innocence of the accused until and unless they are found guilty 
by the court.106 Therefore, the accused was granted the right to a fair and public hearing with a 
counsel of their choice, the right to a trial without undue delay, the opportunity to be heard before 
punishment is imposed, the freedom from compulsion to testify against their will or to confess 
their guilt, and finally the provision of a copy of the judgment free of charge.107 Moreover, the 
right to have a counsel during the interrogation by the Magistrate while being in custody is also 
guaranteed, as is freedom from double jeopardy. The ICT-BD-2 held that 
The provisions of The ICT-BD Act 1973…and the Rules framed thereunder offer adequate 
compatibility with the rights of the accused enshrined under Article 14 of the ICCPR. The 1973 
Act …has the merit and mechanism of ensuring the standard of safeguards needed universally to 
be provided to the person accused of crimes against humanity.108 
In addition, the ICT-BD 2 held that the Tribunal, in the exercise of its discretion and inherent 
powers as contained in Rule 46A of the RoP, has adopted numerous practices for ensuring a fair 
trial by providing all possible rights of the accused. The Tribunal, however, is not precluded even 
from seeking guidance from international reference and relevant jurisprudence, if needed to 
resolve any crucial and relevant issue revealed in [the] course of proceedings.109 
One of the significant features in providing rights to the accused is right to adequate time and full 
opportunity to prepare and present one’s defence. The extent of adequate or reasonable time and 
opportunities depends upon, and varies with, the circumstances of each case. In the proceedings 
of ICTs, additional time was granted when requested for the preparation of the defence.110 The 
 
105 See, Rule 50 of the RoP, which states that ‘If the prosecution alleges the guilt, it must prove this. This onus of proof 
remains when the defense fails to prove its plea of alibi and the success of the prosecution case does not rest upon the 
failure of the defense to prove its affirmative case and the plea of Alibi’. 
106 Islam (n 1) 292–3. 
107 Rule 43(4), (5), (6), (7), (8) were inserted by the International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure (Amendment) 
2011. 
108 Abdul Quader Molla, (2013) [4], [41], [43]. 
109 Moulana Abdul Kalam Azad (2013) [15], [25].  
110 Islam (n 1) 290–1. 
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ICT-BD-2 in Chief Prosecutor Vs Muhammad Kamaruzzaman judgment held that there was no 
single instance where an accused person before the Tribunal was denied any of their rights to have 
time necessary for preparation of their defence or interest.111 
Article 14 of the ICCPR, which has been ratified by Bangladesh, provides bundles of rights for an 
accused facing trial. These rights include equality of all before the courts and tribunals, entitlement 
to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law, 
maintaining privacy of parties in the case, making the verdict public unless a juvenile is 
involved,112and the presumption of innocence until proven guilty.113 Under The Rome Statute, the 
following seven categories provide the minimum guarantee in full equality.  
(a) To be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he understands of the nature and 
cause of the charge against him; (b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of 
his defense and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing; (c) To be tried without undue 
delay; (d) To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance 
of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to 
have legal assistance assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and 
without payment by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it; (e) 
To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and 
examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (f) 
To have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used 
in court; (g) Not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt.114 
The ICT-BD Act stipulates that the prosecution is to specify the name and particulars of the accused 
and the crimes of which the accused is charged, with sufficient information. The prosecution is 
also required to furnish a copy of the formal charges and accompanying documents to the accused 
including a list of witnesses, recorded statements, and copies of documents to be used as evidence 
to prove the charges to the Tribunal at least three weeks prior to the commencement of the trial.115 
 
111 Muhammad Kamaruzzaman (2013) [55]–[57]; Md Abdul Alim @ MA Alim (2013) [40]–[41]; Ali Ahsan Muhammad 
Mujahid (2013) [21], [27]. 
112 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1966 art 14(1). 
113 Ibid art 14(2). 
114 The Rome Statue art 67(1). 
115 The ICT Act 1973 s 9(3). 
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It therefore appears that, under The Rome Statute, first and foremost, the accused shall be entitled 
to a public hearing, to a fair hearing conducted impartially which must have minimum guarantees 
in full quality of some rights.116 The Rome Statue also grants the right that the accused shall also 
be entitled to raise defences and present other evidence admissible under this Statute. The accused 
must be given the assistance of a competent interpreter for preparing for court’s proceedings.117 
The accused must not be compelled to testify or to confess guilt and to remain silent, without such 
silence being a consideration in the determination of guilt or innocence.118 The accused must not 
to have imposed on him or her any reversal of the burden of proof or any onus of rebuttal.119 
Under the ICTR mechanism, the rights of the accused persons are prescribed. Equality of all 
persons before the trial, entitlement of the accused for a fair and public hearing with certain 
limitations, and the presumption of innocence of the accused unless proven guilty are to be 
guaranteed. The Statute contains the minimum guarantee with full quality of the rights including 
immediate communication to the accused relating to the charges in the language he understands, 
providing adequate time and facilities for preparing his defence and opportunity to communicate 
the counsel, trial without undue delay. It also guarantees the right to trial in the presence of the 
accused, to have the counsel of his choice, to have an equal range and number of witnesses in his 
favour and against him, to have the free assistance of an interpreter, and the freedom from 
compulsion to testify against himself or herself or to confess guilt.120 
III.B.8 Procedures of Appeal 
The ICCPR prescribes the measures for the protection of everyone against whom a conviction is 
passed. Article 14 (5) states that everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to their 
conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law. The mechanism is 
available under The ICT-BD Act. Preferring appeal to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court 
 
116 Ibid art 67. 
117 Ibid art 67 (1)(f). 
118 Ibid art 67(1)(g). 
119 Ibid art 67(1). 
120 Ibid art 20. 
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from the decision of the Tribunal is conferred as a right for the convicted person, government, 
complainant or informant as the case may be. Section 21 of the Act provides that: 
A person convicted of any crime specified in section 3 and sentenced by a Tribunal may appeal, 
as of right, to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh against such conviction 
and sentence.121 
The ICT-BD Act also provides the right to appeal to the government or the complainant against 
any order of sentence. The Act provides that the government or the complainant or the informant, 
as the case may be, may appeal, as of right, to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of 
Bangladesh against an order of acquittal or an order of sentence.122 The Act provides that an appeal 
shall be preferred within 30 (thirty) days from the date of conviction and sentence, or acquittal or 
any sentence, and no appeal shall lie after the expiry of the aforesaid period. Moreover, the Act 
provides a timeframe for the disposal of the appeal within 60 (sixty) days from the date of its filing. 
At the time of filing the appeal, the appellant shall submit all documents as may be relied upon by 
him.123 The accused has the right to be represented by the counsel at the expense of government 
has been guaranteed even at the appellate stage. At the same time, absconded accused are to be 
represented by the government appointed counsels to defend them.124 
The amendments under The ICT-BD Act were introduced for the trial process mainly in response 
to international criticisms. Amendments were introduced to provide the rights of the accused 
persons to be presumed innocent, a right of fair and public hearing and right to bail.125 The 
amendments also incorporate the principle against double jeopardy that prohibits the conviction of 
a person twice for the same crime or requiring the accused to confess guilt. The prosecution bears 
the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime. 
It has been argued by M Islam that the appeal mechanism should have certain thresholds on its 
admissibility.126 International jurisprudence has certain criteria in reaching to appeal. Article 81 of 
 
121 Ibid s 21. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid s 10A(2). S 10A was inserted by s 2 of The International Crimes (Tribunals) (Second Amendment) Act 2012 
(Act No XLIII of 2012). 
125 See s 6 (2A) and Rule 34 of RoP. 
126 Islam (n 1) 299. 
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the Rome Statute prescribes mechanisms for preferring appeal. In order to prefer appeal by the 
prosecutor or the convicted person, the grounds encompass (i) Procedural error, (ii) Error of fact, 
or (iii) Error of law; (iv) Any other ground that affects the fairness or reliability of the proceedings 
or decision. The Statute of the ICTY and ICTR allows appeal only on two grounds: (i) an error on 
a question of law invalidating the decision; or (b) an error of fact which has occasioned a 
miscarriage of justice.127 Article 24 of the ICTR states that 
1. The Appeals Chamber shall hear appeals from persons convicted by the Trial Chambers or 
from the prosecutor on the following grounds: (a) An error on a question of law invalidating the 
decision; or (b) An error of fact which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice.  
2. The Appeals Chamber may affirm, reverse or revise the decisions taken by the Trial Chambers. 
The SCSL mechanism includes procedural error as a ground of appeal in addition to the above 
two conditions.128 
The scope of appeal under The ICT-BD Act is much wider than any other ad hoc tribunals from 
two broad perspectives. First, the right to appeal is absolutely open-ended. It does not provide any 
conditions for the admissibility of such appeals. The usual grounds of appeal such as challenging 
the jurisdiction, an error in law or fact that led to a miscarriage of justice, or any new issue that 
would substantially affect the outcome or significantly advance the proceedings, are not required 
for the admissibility of the appeal. Thus, all ICT-BD decisions are appealable. Secondly, the appeal 
is heard by the permanent highest court of the country headed by the Honourable Chief Justice of 
Bangladesh.129 The Bangladesh experience is the first ever exception which allows an appeal to 
the Apex Court of the land against the ICT-BD judgments. 
The only restriction is that an absconding and fugitive convict cannot appeal because of the time 
limitation for the appeal petition to be submitted within 30 days from the delivery of the trial 
 
127 Art 25 of ICTY Statute mentions, ‘1. The Appeals Chamber shall hear appeals from persons convicted by the Trial 
Chambers or from the Prosecutor on the following grounds: (a) an error on a question of law invalidating the decision; 
or (b) an error of fact which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice’.  
2. The Appeals Chamber may affirm, reverse or revise the decisions taken by the Trial Chambers. 
128 The Statute of Special Courts for Sierra Leone art 20. 
129 Islam (n 1) 297. 
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judgment. A convict cannot exercise their right of appeal in absentia under the Act unless they 
surrender or are arrested prior to the expiry of limitation.130 
The ICT-BD appeal lies not with any in-house Appeal Chamber as is the case with nearly all 
international crimes, tribunals, notably the ICC, ICTY, ICTR, the Special Court of Sierra Leone, 
Cambodian Extra Ordinary Chamber and the East Timor Special Panel. It lies with the Apex Court 
of Bangladesh and is heard by the full bench of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court 
headed by the Chief Justice of Bangladesh (these guys sound important so I have given them 
capital initials - June). There is no limitation or conditions on the right of appeal. As a result, all 
decisions of the ICT-BD trials are appealable, which is exactly what has happened in Bangladesh. 
Viewed from this perspective, the appeal right in the ICT-BD trial system is wider and more 
generous than other appeal rights under various international and hybrid trial process referred to. 
III.B.9 Procedures of Review 
The jurisprudence of international criminal law suggests that a review mechanism does exist in the 
ICTY, ICTR and SCSL but with certain limitations.131 Article 26 of the ICTY provides that  
Where a new fact has been discovered which was not known at the time of the proceedings before 
the Trial Chambers or the Appeals Chamber and which could have been a decisive factor in 
reaching the decision, the convicted person or the prosecutor may submit to the International 
Tribunal an application for review of the judgment.132 
 
130 Ibid 298. 
131 Art 21 of the SCSL states: 
1. Where a new fact has been discovered which was not known at the time of the proceedings before the Trial Chamber 
or the Appeals Chamber and which could have been a decisive factor in reaching the decision, the convicted person 
or the Prosecutor may submit an application for review of the judgement. 2. An application for review shall be 
submitted to the Appeals Chamber. The Appeals Chamber may reject the application if it considers it to be unfounded. 
If it determines that the application is meritorious, it may, as appropriate: a. Reconvene the Trial Chamber; b. Retain 
jurisdiction over the matter.  
132 Art 25 of the ICTR Statute mentions the same content and ground for preferring review petition. 
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In compliance with this principle, rule 26 of the RoPs provides for the right to review for the both 
the parties.133 In Chief Prosecutor v Ali Ahsan Mohammad Mujahid, the defence council applied 
for reviewing the order of the Tribunal in the case of the Tribunal-2 mentioned that:  
The defense preferred review [application filed on 01.7.2012] of the order framing charges under 
rule 26(3) of the ROP on hearing which the Tribunal by its order dated 15.7.2012 rejected the 
application with observations that the issues raised at that stage would be better resolved at 
trial.134 
Another dimension of the Review is preferred in the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of 
Bangladesh after the judgment of the appeal is delivered from the said division. This mechanism 
does not exist in the 1973 Act or its Rules of Procedure. However, there is a constitutional 
provision for the right to review. The Constitution of Bangladesh clearly provides in article 105 
that ‘[t]he Appellate Division shall have power, subject to the provisions of any Act of Parliament 
and of any rules made by that division to review any judgment pronounced or order made by it.’135 
Virtually every case in which a verdict has been awarded from the ICT-BD qualifies for appeal 
and all cases are reviewable by the Appellate Division. This unlimited scope has ramifications 
including the possibility of undermining the prestige and authority of the ICT-BD’s and unduly 
delaying trials pending the appeal and review outcome.136 Another concerning aspect is that it has 
the potential for overloading the Apex Court which has multiple jurisdictions in addition to the 
ICT-BD matters.137 
The right of appeal and review in such an unconditional nature in the highest court of Bangladesh 
is unprecedented in any past or present international crimes trials. It has taken the right of the 
accused to procedural due process to a new height. This generous nature and extent of right verifies 
 
133 The Tribunal, on its own motion or on the application of either party, may review any of its order, including the 
order of framing charge(s) in the interest of justice Sub-rule (3) was inserted by The International Crimes Tribunal 
Rules of Procedure (Amendment) 2011. 
134 Chief Prosecutor v Ali Ahsan Mohammad Mujahid (2013) [26]. 
135 The Constitution art 105.  
136 Islam (n 1) 298. 
137 As of now, the Appellate Division decided eight appeal and review cases with more pending (cases reviewed or in 
the process of being reviewed). Ibid 299. 
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the option of flexibility upon the defendants.138 There should have been certain rigorous 
admissibility tests for recourse to appeals and reviews to prevent undue delay, irrelevant issues, 
expansive statements, and frivolous appeals and reviews. The procedure of review before other 
international tribunals prescribes certain thresholds in this regard which Bangladesh should 
endorse.139  
So many trials have been done over a decade of the operation of the ICT-BD trials. Bangladesh 
has not made any amendments to its appeal procedure and requirements. As a result, all accused 
convicted by the tribunals have right to appeal in the highest Court of the land without complying 
with or facing any conditionality in appeal admission. 
III.C Conclusion 
The procedural issues of international forum raise several difficulties in the other contemporary 
domestic tribunals for international crimes. It seems clear that the procedural aspects under The 
ICT-BD Act assist in concluding investigations, trials, prosecutions and executions within the 
shortest possible time. The procedural efficiency has been a distinct advantage as the whole 
process functions within the domestic sphere in Bangladesh. The procedure before us today is not 
the same as at the original period of trial as more procedural mechanisms have subsequently been 
developed through the process of amendments. Amendments have been brought to include the 
principle of presumption of innocence along with the right of a fair and public hearing and right 
of bail. The amendments prohibit double jeopardy or requiring the accused to confess guilt. The 
ICT-BD Act also mandates the Tribunal to enact its own Rules of Procedures whereby it excludes 
the application of ordinary domestic procedural law. This exclusion has been reaffirmed by the 
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh. The ICT-BD Act provides for equality of 
the parties by reference to the bail provisions.  
In addition, being authorised by the Act to ensure the physical well-being of the victims and 
witnesses and to order in-camera proceedings, the Tribunal has been cautious to create a witness 
and victim protection system. It is important to consider here that the cases dealt with by the ICT-





without reasonable delay was possible for following the special procedure enumerated in the Act. 
Overall, it can be argued that the ICT-BD Tribunal has maintained a unique procedure to ensure a 
fair yet speedy trial process. However, the Tribunal needs to continue developing its Rules of 
Procedure to a provide an example for the global community of how a domestic mechanism can 
be used to prosecute war crimes and crimes against humanity. While this chapter examines the 
procedural aspects under The ICT-BD Act, Chapter IV will discuss about rules and strategies for 
trials, prosecutions and defence. 
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IV MEASURES AND STRATEGIES UNDER THE SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL 
LAWS FOR THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENCE 
IV.A Introduction 
This chapter examines the measures and strategies followed in the trials by the Tribunal, 
prosecution and defence. Arguments put forward by both the prosecution and defence pertinent to 
questions of different principles of international criminal law and the response to these of the 
tribunals dominate this chapter, to depict the strategies adopted by both sides. This chapter 
addresses the research question: What measures and strategies under the substantive and 
procedural laws have been adopted for prosecution and defence under The ICT-BD Act? 
The prosecution put forward the best effort. Despite the challenge of proving beyond every 
reasonable doubt that crimes committed more than 40 years ago were committed by the accused, 
the prosecution succeeded in providing so by bringing testimony from victims and their relatives. 
The prosecution was successful in proving that the accused participated in the commission of the 
alleged crimes, showing that the mode of their participation fell within the purview of the liability 
regime under The ICT-BD Act and that the accused had connection with the Pakistani authority. 
The argument of the prosecution was accepted to a large extent in all judgments. The foremost 
issue pressed by the prosecution was the inapplicability of the Tripartite Agreement in the context 
of Bangladesh’s domestic Tribunal dealing with international crimes emanating from peremptory 
obligation. The prosecution was successful in establishing superior civilian responsibility for the 
crimes committed during the Bangladesh Liberation War, arguing that their failure of the defence 
to adopt necessary and reasonable measures within their powers and control to prevent or repress 
the commission of crimes by their followers, associates and subordinates made them responsible. 
The prosecution was successful in bringing the argument that the modes of liability under section 
4 of The ICT-BD Act contained JCE liability in the guise of a ‘common plan of collective 
criminality’. Proving the allegation against the accused where they did not directly participate in 
the commission of the crime was a challenge. The prosecution argued that the commission of the 
crimes was to fulfil the common objectives of the organisations and hence the acts amounted to 
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complicity, conspiracy, encouragement and abetment on the part of the accused leaders, who 
needed not physically and directly participate in the commission of the crimes charged.  
The main problem faced by the defence was the worldwide movement and support for ending the 
impunity of war criminals, marked by the establishment of a number of international hybrid and 
national war crimes tribunals. Moreover, questions were arising as to the acceptability of the 
widely available and compelling factual evidence of the commission of atrocity crimes during the 
Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971. It was exceedingly difficult for the defence to rebut these 
accurate accounts successfully. Further, the burden of proof and the principle of ‘an offence must 
be proved beyond any reasonable doubt’ was a challenge for the Tribunal.1 In the adversarial 
system of trial, whoever claims before a court or tribunal must prove their claims. The defence’s 
pleas of alibi in many instances were mere allegations and the burden of proof by positive evidence 
could not be discharged.2 The defence’s standing on adverse claims, such as that the accused was 
innocent or not present at the site of the crime, was not substantiated by presenting decisive 
evidence. Therefore, an in-depth investigation is essential to explore the strengths and limitations 
of the rules and strategies followed by the tribunals. This chapter will focus on the legal points 
charged by the prosecution and responded to by the defence. It will also consider the charges of 
the prosecution not proved before the tribunals and touch on the substantive crimes of The ICT-
BD Act that so far have not even been alleged by the prosecution. 
In dealing with the arguments and counterarguments of both sides, the tribunals acted within the 
sphere of the rules and strategies for trial, prosecution and defence under The ICT-BD Act and the 
Rules of Procedure. They engaged in judicious deliberation on every charge, argument and 
counterargument presented by the parties. The analysis in this chapter provides that the tribunals 
acted their best to ensure fair trial.  
 
1 Rule 50 of the International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure, 2010 articulates this principle. 
2 Ibid, rule 51 confers an onus of proof for the plea of alibi upon the defence if it is in their possession.  
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IV.B Rules and Defence Strategies in the Trials 
IV.B.1 Rules for the Determination of the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal 
Most of the defence’s substantial arguments were forwarded on different aspects of the jurisdiction 
of the Tribunal. One of the core arguments was the inclusion of ‘individual’ and ‘group of 
individuals’ under the Act, found in section 3, on the point that this Amendment was made more 
than 40 years after the commission of the alleged crime. It was argued that The ICT-BD Act was 
created to try and prosecute only those enlisted Pakistani armed forces officials who were given 
clemency under the Tripartite Agreement. Therefore, bringing charges against individuals under 
The ICT-BD Act in respect to an amendment made 40 years after the commission of the alleged 
crimes was argued not to be a justified way of proceeding. 
Section 3 of the ICT-BD Act provides that the Tribunal can handle the punishment of individuals, 
groups and members of armed or auxiliary forces, regardless of their nationality, based in 
Bangladesh. The Act provides jurisdiction to try any crime that occurred before or after the 
commencement of the Act. The Act provides jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, genocide, 
crimes against peace, violations of the Geneva Conventions 1949, war crimes and other crimes 
falling under international law, covering even the conspiracy to commit such crimes and the 
possible failure of their prevention. As such, the tribunals are able to try the alleged crimes that 
occurred during the Bangladesh Liberation War.  
IV.B.2 Rules for Extension to Constitute Crimes Against Humanity 
The defence in Chief Prosecutor v Abdul Quader Molla questioned the extension of the accused’s 
act to constitute a crime,3 stating that if the act was not isolated, a single action would be sufficient 
to prove the accused guilty.4 In supporting this view, the Tribunal cited other decisions of 
international tribunals. First, the Appeal Chamber of the ICTY stated that if other conditions are 
met, an act can fall as a crime against humanity, except where such acts are random in nature.5 
 
3 Chief Prosecutor v Abdul Quader Molla, ICT-BD 02 of 2012 [61], [78], [124], [200]. 
4 Ibid [164], [203], [208], [234]. 
5 Prosecutor v Miroslav Deronjić (Appeal Judgment) (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 
Trial Chamber, Case No IT-02-61-A, 20 July 2005) [109].  
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Second, in Prosecutor v Zoran Kupreškić et al, the ICTY Trial Chamber stated that in the right 
context, even a single act is already considered.6 Thus, a single act forming part of an attack could 
be regarded as a crime against humanity. However, there must be a clear connection between the 
action and the crime committed. For example, an individual taking the lead in a group of offenders 
towards the area of a crime creates a link for that individual’s actual commission of the alleged 
offence. 
In Chief Prosecutor v Abdul Quader Molla, the defence argued that the presence of two freedom 
fighters, whose status is not the same as for other civilians,7 among the victims to which the charge 
pertained meant that the alleged crime did not constitute a crime against humanity. They argued 
that crimes against humanity are, by definition, operated against civilians. However, the Tribunal 
did not agree with the argument that solely because there were two identified freedom fighters 
among the civilian victims the act could not be categorised as a crime against humanity.8 Rather, 
consideration should be given to the context as well as the situation, and the focus should not only 
be on the status of the individual at the time of the attack.  
In Prosecutor v Tihomir Blaškić, a civilian was defined as anyone who is not an active combatant 
during the commission of the crime.9 This definition of ‘civilian’ should not be altered, even if 
some non-civilians are involved. The ICTY and ICTR statutes reiterate that an action is a crime 
against humanity if it is conducted against anyone coming from a population of civilians. The 
addition of non-civilians does not restrict the civilian nature of this population.10 Further, the focus 
should be on the situation of the victim during an attack, rather than on their status. Thus, charge 
4 pertained to a civilian population, eventually leading to the death of civilians.11 
 
6 Prosecutor v Zoran Kupreškić et al (Appeal Judgment) (International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber, Case No IT-95-16-A, 23 October 2001); Chief Prosecutor v Abdul Quader Molla 
(n 3) [247].  
7 Abdul Quader Molla (n 3) [289]. 
8 Ibid [290]. 
9 Prosecutor v Tihomir Blaškić (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber, Case 
No IT-95-14-T 3 March 2000) [214]. 
10 Abdul Quader Molla (n 3) [290].  
11 Ibid [292]. 
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IV.B.3 Rules for the Retrospective Application of The ICT-BD Act 
The defence counsel claimed that the Amendment made in 2009 to section 3(1) of The ICT-BD 
Act to use the words ‘individual’ or ‘group of individuals’ implied a ‘prospective effect’.12 Hence, 
offences included in the Act should not be prosecuted retrospectively. The argument was, since 
the Amendment was not expressed as having a retrospective effect, it much be prospective.13 The 
Tribunal’s response was that the legislation permits the retrospective prosecution of genocide and 
other crimes that violate international law. Supported by the UN, the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL and the 
judicial bodies have been constituted under their respective retrospective statutes.14 
The defence counsel also argued that the Tribunal should borrow standards from The Rome Statute, 
which is prospective.15 In this regard, the Tribunal cited the formation of other international 
tribunals, stating that there should be no confusion, as under retrospective legislation, prosecuting 
crimes is permitted.16 The defence counsel questioned whether prosecuting crimes committed 40 
years earlier could allow for fairness and impartiality.17 The Tribunal viewed that, for both moral 
and legal reasons, no time limit should be put on bringing to trial crimes against human rights.18 
The Tribunal took this view from international instruments and the practice of international 
tribunals, noting that neither the Genocide Convention of 1948 nor the Geneva Conventions of 
1949 provide any policy on setting limits in terms of war crimes or crimes against humanity.19 
IV.B.4 Rules for Statutory Limitations on Trials 
The Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes 
Against Humanity, as stated under article I, follows General Assembly Resolution 2391 (XXIII) 
of 26 November 1968. This resolution explains that there should be protection, even in the case of 
statutory limitations, for the prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity. As a result, 
 
12 Chief Prosecutor v Delowar Hossain Sayeedi, ICT-BD 01 of 2011 [51]. 
13 Ibid.  
14 Abdul Quader Molla (n 3) [3], [83]–[84]; Ibid [52]. 
15 Ibid [78], [122] 
16 Delowar Hossain Sayeedi (n 12) [52]. 
17 Chief Prosecutor v Moulana Abdul Kalam Azad, ICT-BD 05 of 2012 [40]. 
18 Ibid [55]–[56]. 
19 Delowar Hossain Sayeedi (n 12) [55]. 
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such criminal proceedings are not bound by time limitations and remain open for trial. The 
Tribunal also referred to the case of Maurice Papon,20 as well as instances in which time limitations 
on prosecuting international violations were ignored due to the nature of the crime. For example, 
Nazi war criminals are able to be prosecuted, and trials are ongoing for acts of genocide committed 
during the Chilean Revolution of 1973 and Pol Pot’s regime in Cambodia of the 1970s. Further, 
the sovereign or senate immunity of Slobodan Milošević of Serbia, Charles Taylor of Liberia and 
Augusta Pinochet of Chile has been held not to exempt them from being detained and prosecuted 
for committing genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.21 
The defence raised the issue of the exclusion of the rights of the accused by constitutional 
guarantee.22 The Tribunal held that the words ‘individual’ or ‘group of individuals’ have been 
incorporated both in section 3 of the ICT-BD Act and article 47(3) of Bangladesh’s Constitution 
by way of amendments in 2009 and 2011, respectively. The power of the Supreme Court to move 
any law regarding crimes by a person charged with crimes against humanity has been removed, as 
stated in article 47A(2) of the Constitution. No right is given to an accused prosecuted for offences 
to call into question any provision of The ICT-BD Act or any amendment to it.23 
IV.B.5 Rules for Hearsay Evidence in Trial 
The defence questioned the weight of hearsay evidence. In the judgment of Chief Prosecutor v 
Abdul Quader Molla, the defence counsel referred to the principle described in the jurisprudence 
of the ICC and ICTR that a lack of supporting evidence apart from hearsay evidence cannot 
determine the involvement of the accused in the alleged crime.24 The counsel further argued that 
 
20 Maurice Papon, who died at 96, was the minister for the budget in the administration of Prime Minister 
Raymond Barre in 1981. Papon played a role in the deportation of French Jews during World War II. He was 
charged in 1997 based on his activities from 1942 to 1944. He underwent trial and was convicted in 1998 of 
participation in crimes against humanity. He suffered a 10-year prison sentence because he ordered the arrest 
and deportation of 1,690 Jews, including 223 children, from the Bordeaux region to the Nazi death camps in 
Germany. Douglas Johnson, ‘Nazi collaborator convicted for his role in the deportation of French Jews’, 
Guardian (Online, at 19 February 2007) 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2007/feb/19/guardianobituaries.france. 
21Abdul Quader Molla (n 3) [83].  
22 Ibid [93] 
23 Ibid [100]–[101].  
24 Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Nguctjoto Chui (International Criminal Court, Pretrial Chamber 
I, 30 September 2008) [174], [225]. 
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adding another decision in Prosecutor v Juvénal Kajelijeti of the ICTR Trial Chamber had no 
bearing on probative value. In response to this argument, the Tribunal referred to the same 
judgment of the ICTR Trial Chamber, stating that the decision as to the weight to be given to the 
testimony was based on tests of relevance, probative value and reliability. Accordingly, the 
Chamber noted that evidence that appears to be second hand, is not, in and of itself, inadmissible; 
rather, it should be assessed, like all other evidence, on the basis of its credibility and relevance.25 
IV.B.6 Rules for Delayed Trial 
In respect to delayed trials, there are several international procedures. For international crimes, the 
concept that justice delayed is justice denied is no longer applicable.26 This has some repercussions 
for crimes that occurred in the past because, given its retroactive effect, international criminal law 
has permitted the abolishment of domestic statutes, even though the prosecution of acts has already 
become time-barred. The defence counsel questioned the limitation given the extended period that 
had elapsed of more than 40 years.27 However, the law of restraint as a bar was negatively dealt 
with by the Tribunal after applying international criminal law instruments and the jurisprudence 
of international courts and tribunals in trying Nazi war criminals, Maurice Papon in France, 
Cambodia’s Pol Pot regime, Slobodan Milošević of Serbia, Charles Taylor of Liberia and Augusto 
Pinochet.28 
The defence counsel put forward the same argument in most of the cases. In Chief Prosecutor v 
Delowar Hossain Sayeedi, the Tribunal concluded in response to the prosecution’s claim that 
criminal prosecutions are always open and not barred by time limitations.29 Therefore, given that 
this position is settled and the fact that there is no statutory limitation, a delay does not itself impede 
arbitration of the liability of an alleged perpetrator of a crime. In other words, inactivity, regardless 
 
25 Prosecutor v Juvénal Kajelijeti (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Trial Chamber, Case No ICTR-
98-44A-T, 1 December 2003), see the Final Argument Pack, at [230], [45]; Abdul Quader Molla (n 3) [178].  
26 Delowar Hossain Sayeedi (n 12) [58]. 
27 Chief Prosecutor v Professor Ghulam Azam, ICT-BD 06 of 2011 [47] 
28 Augusto José Ramón Pinochet Ugarte was a Chilean general and politician who ruled as dictator of Chile from 
1973 to 1990. He was first the President of the Government Junta of Chile from 1973 to 1981. Afterwards, he 
was declared the President of the Republic by the junta in 1974. Abdul Quader Molla (n 3) [83]–[84]; Ibid [58]–
[60]. 
29 Delowar Hossain Sayeedi (n 12) [55], [56]. 
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of its reasons, does not permit the delayed prosecution to be frustrated or barred by any law.30 A 
‘system crime’ cannot be categorised under any theory and can only be prosecuted within a 
specified period. Delays can create doubt; however, this has been addressed with consideration of 
certain circumstances. 
The ICT-BD Act provides no time bar for the trial of international crimes, which is consistent with 
the rule for the prosecution of the crimes of the Khmer Rouge during 1975–1979 in East Timor.31 
Due to their nature and gravity, international crimes are never waived by the passage of time. The 
Nuremburg Charter, for example, contains no time bar, and Nazi war criminals continue to be 
captured, prosecuted and punished in various national courts around the world.32 The ICT-BD 
Tribunal also maintains this international rule. In Chief Prosecutor v Ali Ahsan Muhammad 
Mujahid, the Tribunal recorded that, considering the context of the last decades, a delay in the 
presentation of a prosecution does not acquit the accused and should not hinder the case, the 
effective adjudication of which rests on the evaluation of the totality of the evidence presented.33 
IV.B.7 Rules of Double Jeopardy 
The limitation of The ICT-BD Act due to the availability of the Collaborators Order of 1972 was 
questioned in Chief Prosecutor v Abdul Quader Molla. The tenured senior defence lawyer claimed 
that the accusation of being an aider and abettor is only considered in the Collaborators Order if 
the commission of offence against which such allegations of aiding and abetting the principles 
arise has been proved.34 The Tribunal observed that the Collaborators Order was meant to allow 
the prosecution and trial of persons responsible for penal offences, rather than international 
crimes.35 The offences categorised as punishable under the Penal Code are detailed in the 
Collaborators Order.  
 
30 Ibid [57]. 
31 M Rafiqul Islam, National Trials of International Crimes in Bangladesh: Transnational Justice as Reflected 
in Judgments (University Press, 2019) 351. 
32 Ibid 352. 
33 Chief Prosecutor v Ali Ahsan Muhammad Mujahid, ICT-BD 04 of 2012 [92]. 
34 Abdul Quader Molla (n 3) [59]. 
35 Ibid [79]. 
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Conversely, The ICT-BD Act was enacted to prosecute and try crimes against humanity, genocide 
and other system crimes committed in violation of customary international law. There has been no 
scope that would encompass the offences in the Collaborators Order as similar to those covered 
by The ICT-BD Act.36 The Tribunal thus concluded that it was unwilling to accept the argument 
that as the accused had not been brought to justice under the Collaborators Order, he was immune 
to prosecution under The ICT-BD Act.37 
In 1973, the Bangladesh government declared a general amnesty for those who opposed the 
independence of Bangladesh politically. However, this general amnesty is not for those who 
collaborated in or committed rape, murder, attempted murder or arson.38 Individuals tried before 
The ICT-BD Act are neither covered by the general amnesty nor the Collaborators Order. The 
ICT-2 found that the doctrine of double jeopardy is not acceptable in a trial under The ICT-BD 
Act.39 The Tribunal held that double jeopardy applies when the accused has formally been in 
jeopardy or peril of an accusation in a legal court; there has been a final and legal judgment in a 
former trial; there was a final verdict, be it of acquittal or conviction, after the conduct of a 
meritorious hearing; and the criminal offence for which the accused is charged on the second 
commission if similar or at least considerably like the crime for which they were initially acquitted 
or convicted. The Collaborators Order and ICT-BD Act are different in nature and scope.40 
Perpetrators involved in international crimes (ie, mainly war crimes and crimes against humanity) 
are not covered by the Collaborators Order. Therefore, trials under The ICT-BD Act are not barred 
by the doctrine of double jeopardy.41 
IV.C Rules and Prosecution Strategies in the Trials 
IV.C.1 Rules for Formal Charge 
The rules and strategies of the prosecution can best be extracted from The ICT-BD Act and the 
Rules of Procedure. Sections 7 and 9 of the ICT-BD Act provide the provisions relating to the 
 
36 Ibid [102]–[104], 118].  
37 Ibid [111]. 
38 Suzannah Linton, ‘Completing the Circle: Accountability for the Crimes of the 1971 Liberation War of 
Bangladesh’ (2010) 21(2) Criminal Law Forum 191, 205–206. 
39 Delowar Hossain Sayeedi (n 12) [63].  
40Abdul Quader Molla (n 3) [113]. 
41 Ibid [115]. 
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prosecution in trial. Section 7 of the Act empowers the government to appoint members of the 
prosecution team, with one among all to be designated as ‘the Chief Prosecutor’. It declares: 
(1) The Government may appoint one or more persons to conduct the prosecution before a 
Tribunal on such terms and conditions as may be determined by the Government; and every such 
person shall be deemed to be a Prosecutor for the purposes of this Act. (2) The Government may 
designate one of such persons as the Chief Prosecutor. 
The prosecution of a case or appearing before the Tribunal is a task bestowed upon the Chief 
prosecutor or any other empowered by him.42 The prosecutor is responsible for commencing the 
trial by the submission of a formal charge. Section 9 of the ICT-BD Act deals with the 
commencement of the proceedings before tribunals under the Act. According to this section, the 
proceedings start with the submission of formal charges.43 Section 9(1) of The ICT-BD Act states: 
The proceedings before a Tribunal shall commence upon the submission by the Chief Prosecutor, 
or a Prosecutor authorised by the Chief Prosecutor in this behalf, of formal charges of crimes 
alleged to have been committed by each of the accused persons. 
Submitting the formal charge requires the charge to first be framed. The charge must be official, 
in the form of a petition, and composed of the contents extracted from the report of the IO and 
pertinent documents. Rule 18 of the Rules of Procedure of the ICT-BD Act clarifies:  
Upon receipt of report of investigation of offence(s), the Chief Prosecutor or any other Prosecutor 
authorized by him shall prepare a formal charge in the form of a petition on the basis of the papers 
and documents and the evidences collected and submitted by the Investigation Officer and shall 
submit the same before the Tribunal. 
One of the pre-trial tasks of the prosecution would be to file all necessary supporting paperwork, 
documents and materials in support of their case to issue a process by the Tribunal so that the 
accused is brought before the Tribunal in situations in which he or she has not been arrested.44 One 
of the fundamental points articulated in the Rules of Procedure is the burden of proof conferred on 
 
42 Rule 17 of International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure, 2010. 
43 Ibid, Rule 2(5) defines ‘charge’ as referring to the accusation of crimes against an accused, as framed by the 
Tribunal.  
44 Ibid, Rule 20(2). 
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the prosecution team. It is a cardinal principle of criminal law that the accusation must be proved 
beyond every reasonable doubt. Rule 50 of the Rules of Procedure points out that the burden of 
proving the charge beyond a reasonable doubt shall rest with the prosecution. Section 10(e) of The 
ICT-BD Act requires the prosecution to examine its witnesses and to re-examine them again after 
the cross-examination by the defence. Moreover, the prosecution must cross-examine the 
witnesses of the defence. Some common strategies for framing and proving formal charges used 
by the prosecution include: 
1. Considering documentary evidence to establish a prima facie case that the crime was 
committed, the accused participated in the commission of the crime and the mode of 
participation falls within the purview of the liability regime under The ICT-BD Act.45 
2. Establishing a nexus between the status of the accused and their collaboration with the 
Pakistani authority and the commission of the alleged crimes; as well as that the 
participation of the accused has links to the broader purpose of the Pakistani authority of 
annihilating and suppressing Bangladeshi.46 
3. Including factual accounts from surviving victims and close relatives of deceased victims 
regarding the commission of the alleged crimes and the involvement of the accused (eg, 
the prosecution presented witnesses with experience and living witnesses before the 
Tribunal to prove charges).47 
IV.C.2 Rules to Prove the Aiding or Abetting of a Crime 
In Tribunal-2, the defence argued that the accused would have to have been involved in the 
commission of the crime, and that having aided or abetted alone would not be sufficient to prove 
guilt. In other words, evidence of direct participation by the accused would be required to prove 
guilt.48 In response, the Tribunal observed the international law practice of considering aiding or 
abetting sufficient to find the accused guilty.49 The defence counsel highlighted that, as the main 
offenders had not been brought before the justice process, having been exempted from prosecution 
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under the Tripartite Agreement, the charges against the accused as aider or abettor could not be 
continued.50 They referred to the Kristic case held by the Appeal Chamber of the ICTY, where the 
Tribunal pointed out that specific intention must be proved to convict the defendant of aid and 
abetment.51 The defence counsel further cited the decision of the Appeal Chamber of the ICTR in 
Prosecutor v Sylvestre Gacumbitsi, which held that according to the standard of causation, for an 
act to be aiding and abetting, it must at least have a substantial effect on the commission of the 
crime being aided or abetted’. 52 The learned counsel also drew attention to Prosecutor v Dusko 
Tadić, in which it was stated: 
The ILC Draft Code draws on these situations from Nuremberg war crimes trials as well as other 
laws that are customary, and summarizes that an accused might be recognized as guilty if it has 
been proven that a crime has been intentionally done, inter alia, if he knowingly aids, abet or 
otherwise assists, directly and substantially, in the commission of such a crime.53 
In rejecting the arguments of the defence counsel, the Tribunal also referred to Prosecutor v Dusko 
Tadić, in which it was observed:  
if there is showed or inferred presence, by circumstantial or other evidence, to know and to create 
an effect either direct or substantial on the illegal act commission, then it is enough to base a 
finding of participation and assign the criminal culpability that accompany it.54 
In Tribunal-1, it was held that the presence of other perpetrators during the attack on the inmates 
indicated that the accused had substantially aided in the commission of the crime, despite their act 
not directly resulting in killing at the crime site. It was decided to rely on the decision of the Trial 
Chamber of ICTR, which stated: 
 
50 Ibid [78]; Moulana Abdul Kalam Azad (n 17) [40]. 
51 Prosecutor v Radislav Krstić (Appeal Judgement) (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 
Trial Chamber, Case No IT-02-61-A, 20 July 2005) [359], [143]. 
52 Prosecutor v Sylvestre Gacumbitsi (Judgement) (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Rwanda, 
Appeals Chamber, Case No ICTR-2001-64-A, 7 July 2006). 
53 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić (Appeal Judgment) (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 
Case No IT-94-1-A, 15 July 1999) [248]. Abdul Quader Molla (n 3) [361]. 
54 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić (Trial Decision) (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Case 
No IT-94-I-TI, 10 August 1995) [362]  
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Such acts of assistance … need not have actually caused the commission of the crime by the 
actual perpetrator, but must have had a substantial effect on the commission of the crime by the 
actual perpetrators.55 
Based on the jurisprudence arising from Prosecutor v Siméon Nchamihigo,56 it is not a legal 
requirement that evidence be corroborated to draw a specific finding. As such, the Chamber can 
rely on the testimony of a single witness as evidence of a material fact. Thus, one witness is 
sufficient for the Chamber to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Tribunal-1 cited the case of Charles Taylor, in which the SCSL, with Justice Richard Lussick 
presiding, acted to convict former President Charles Taylor of aiding and abetting war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. The Tribunal subsequently declared, ‘therefore, we find that in law, 
either “aiding” or “abetting” alone is ample to render the perpetrator criminally liable’.57 The 
Tribunal further recalled the jurisprudence applied in the ICTR, wherein the Trial Chamber 
declared, ‘A person may be tried for complicity in genocide even where the principal perpetrator 
of the crime has not been identified, or where, for any other reasons, guilt could not be proven’.58 
Finally, the Tribunal declared that it had been settled between the jurisprudence of the ICTR and 
SCSL that the perpetrator’s abettor and aider of the crime can underlie the statutes. As such, the 
statement of the witness that the accused had a rifle was sufficient to indicate, due to the physical 
presence of the rifle, that the accused aided and abetted in the commission of the crime. This is 
supported by the judgment in Furundžijaas, delivered by the ICTY, wherein it was held that 
inaction suffices to create the actus reus of aiding and abetting.59 
Further, it has been found that the presence of the accused at the crime site and their guilty acts 
can substantially enable the main perpetrators in the commission of the crime by providing support 
 
55 Prosecutor v Siméon Nchamihigo (Judgement and Sentence) (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
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and assistance. The Tribunal referred to Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor, wherein Trial 
Chamber II of the SCSL held that: 
The necessary item that is needed for aiding and abetting is that the accused recognize that his 
acts will aid the conduct of the crime by the perpetrator or at least he knows that there is a certain 
possibility that his behavior would help the commission of a crime by the perpetrator.  
For intent crimes, like terrorism, the accused should also be aware of the perpetrator’s intent.60 
IV.C.3 Rules for ‘Widespread’ or ‘Systematic’ Crime 
The defence counsel strongly argued as a lacuna the absence of the component of ‘widespread’ 
and ‘systematic’ crimes under the definition of crimes against humanity. The definition contained 
in The ICT-BD Act covers not only murder but also annihilation by killing in the form of 
extermination. However, a significant component of such crimes has not been articulated in The 
ICT-BD Act. In the words of Suzannah Linton, this component is a ‘hallmark of crime against 
humanity and which has distinct this crime than ordinary murder’; that is, the ‘widespread and 
systematic attack upon civilians’ in the commission of crimes against humanity.61 According to 
the War Crimes Committee and Professor Linton, the description of crimes against humanity in 
The ICT-BD Act misses the systematic nature of such attacks against civilian populations.62 It is 
true that this component was not articulated in the Nuremberg Charter, having been first introduced 
in the statute of the ICTR in 1994.63 Previously, this component was found in the report of the 
Secretary-General to the Security Council on the procedure of formation of the ICTY, in which 
crimes against humanity were described as ‘acts that are inhumane and serious in nature … 
Committed as part of a systematic attack against a population of civilians’.64 
The decision in Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić held that crimes against humanity should be part of a 
systematic attack on a population of civilians. In this case, it was required to include this element 
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in the burden of proving the crime.65 This component has further been articulated in various 
statutes and decisions.66 Although The ICT-BD Act was enacted in 1973, there has been limited 
scope to include this component during the amendments made. The definition in The Rome Statute 
is more comprehensive, with article 7 containing ‘widespread’ or ‘systematic’ elements as the 
prime conditions to constitute a crime against humanity. This ‘widespread or systematic’ 
component distinguishes this type of crime from ordinary crimes.  
In relation to the definition of crimes against humanity in The ICT-BD Act, the tribunals have 
interpreted the phrase ‘against population’ as being systematic or widespread in nature. Since the 
definition of a crime against humanity under the ICT-BD Act includes ‘against people’, it is not 
necessary to include the component that the commission of the crime be systematic’. Further, 
adding ‘against population’ has been seen as establishing the criteria that the crime must be 
committed in an operative manner. Concerning the definition of crimes against humanity 
articulated in section 3(2)(a) of the Act, the Tribunal has viewed this as self-contained and 
relatively compatible with international jurisprudence.67 
The constituent elements of a crime against humanity, as stated in section 3(2) of the Act, are that 
the behaviour should have been committed on national, ethnic, political, racial or religious grounds 
against an individual coming from the ‘civilian population’. This ‘attack against a person coming 
from the civilian population’, as referred to in section 3(2)(a), may be a kind of mistreatment due 
to a series of violent acts. In Chief Prosecutor v Abul Kalam Azad, the Tribunal found that the 
commission of certain offences, such as rape, confinement, murder, abduction and torture, can all 
be categorised as crimes against humanity.68 
The absence of the component of being widespread or systematic in The ICT-BD Act is not an 
exception; rather, many other international instruments do not contain this component. The 
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Tribunal in this regard has referred to other global tools in which the definition of a crime against 
humanity is the same as in The ICT-BD Act. For example, the definition contained in section 
3(2)(a) of the Act is similar to that in article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter. The Tribunal clarified 
the definition of The Rome Statute by pointing out that the definition will only apply for the 
purpose of the Statute.69 The rationale for including this particular phrase in The Rome Statute 
under the definition of a crime against humanity is, as the Tribunal stated, that these civilian people 
are conscious of the fact that the descriptions are not yet final and that there are still others.70 
According to the Tribunal, the absence of the component of ‘widespread and systematic’ is not a 
bar to the prosecution of perpetrators: 
Our Tribunal which is a domestic Tribunal constituted under our own legislation enacted in the 
sovereign parliament meant to prosecute, try and punish the perpetrators of ‘international crimes’ 
taking the context and pattern of atrocities into account may arrive at decision whether the acts 
constituting the offences can be qualified as crimes against humanity.71 
Moreover, in the case of the Bangladesh Liberation War, the systematic nature of the atrocities 
committed on a large scale against Bangladeshi civilians is plainly evident. Studies of this war 
highlight the policies and systematic planning of operations by Pakistani authorities in the East.72 
Therefore, the systematic nature of the alleged crimes need not be proved separately,73 as any 
actions contributing towards crimes against the Bangladeshi civilian population are linked with 
the organised and systemic nature of the broader attack. In this context, alleging the nonexistence 
of a systematic attack is baseless.74 
The defence counsel argued that this definition does not comply with international standards, 
referring to the Statute of Rome. Article 7 of this Statute is not followed in The ICT-BD Act.75 In 
response, the Tribunal pointed to other significant international instruments whose definitions 
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resemble that in The ICT-BD Act, including the Nuremberg Charter. Further, the Tribunal 
highlighted that the ICTY Statute does not include any systematic or widespread element.76 
However, jurisprudence development has been similar to the case of Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić, in 
which the alleged crime qualified as an offence against humanity. Therefore, it should take part in 
the widespread attack. There has been a failure to provide evidence from which the offence is 
accused and charged regarding the large-scale attack. In this regard, Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić has 
been cited, as below: 
This issue has been talked about for some debate, it has now been established that an act is 
required which is directed to a civilian population and can be fulfilled if it occurred in either a 
systematic manner or on a widespread basis. Even if one criteria has been met, it will suffice to 
exclude isolated or random acts.77 
Article 5 of the ICTY Statute does not state the need for an attack to be widespread or even for 
there to be evidence of the accused having ‘knowledge’ of the broader crime as a condition to 
establish the ground for a crime against humanity. The Tribunal then clarified that the definition 
contained in the Rome Statute (being prospective in nature) differs from that of both the ICTY and 
ICTR Statues in the sense that they are intended to be used for the purpose of the Rome Statue 
itself and not for others.78 
Overall, the defence’s argument was not sufficiently appropriate to dispose of the prosecutor’s 
charges, as the prosecution presented both eyewitness accounts and documentary evidence to 
prove its charges. The defence also repeatedly raised in every trial the common points of delayed 
trial, the Tripartite Agreement and double jeopardy, already examined in section IV.C of this 
thesis, despite their outright rejection by both tribunals, with reasons. This was unnecessary and 
time-consuming for the tribunals. Moreover, the prosecution benefitted from the recognition of the 
historical fact of common knowledge and judicial notice of previous decisions and judicially 
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established facts without requiring any proof. The defence found it extremely difficult to refute 
such prosecutorial evidentiary materials. 
IV.C.4 Rules for Compensation to Victims 
The argument of the prosecution was accepted to a more significant extent in all judgments. 
However, in some of the cases, the prosecution argued to provide compensation to the victim. 
They explained that the Penal Code provides fines as one category of punishment and that The 
ICT-BD Act does not exclude the application of the Penal Code.79 The Tribunal did not accept the 
argument of the prosecution regarding the payment of compensation to victims.80 
The performance can be estimated through the best effort of the prosecution. The challenge lay in 
submitting old documents and bringing witnesses of crimes committed more than 40 years earlier. 
However, the prosecution successfully argued their case to secure conviction. 
IV.C.5 Rules for Peaceful Settlement 
Bangladesh was determined to prosecute alleged perpetrators of grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions. The International Crimes Tribunals Act was brought into operation in 1973. 
Immediately after independence, Bangladesh engaged in post-conflict justice initiatives by 
enacting the Collaborators Order, aimed at prosecuting collaborators. The attempt to bring to 
justice the perpetrators of serious crimes under The ICT-BD Act became a matter of politics at the 
international level, with China exercising its veto power in the Security Council of the United 
Nations.81 The pressure imposed by Pakistan was most challenging for the newly independent state 
of Bangladesh. It refused to release some 400,000 Bengalis (civilians and former members of 
Pakistan’s armed forces) who were being held in Pakistan.82 
One of the first attempts taken during the post-conflict period was the adoption of the Shimla 
Agreement on 2 July 1972, with the aim of ending the confrontation between Bangladesh and 
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Pakistan and establishing peace. The Agreement further urged the settlement of the differences 
between the states by peaceful means through negotiation or mutually agreed peaceful means.83 
The proper implementation of this Agreement required some further arrangements. Bangladesh, 
while welcoming the Shimla Agreement,84 continued its efforts to make laws and arrange for the 
prosecution of collaborators and violators of customary international law.  
The tension between India and Pakistan also led Bangladesh to step back from criminal 
prosecution. In mid-December 1973, India and Pakistan reached an agreement in which India 
agreed to repatriate all Pakistani POWs and detainees. As a result, Pakistan declared its intention 
not to continue with its proceedings against India initiated before the International Court of Justice 
in May 1973. As a result, the World Court removed the list from its docket.85 On 28 August 1973, 
the governments of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan entered into a bilateral agreement 
signed in Delhi regarding the repatriation of persons.86 This Agreement urged the immediate return 
of Pakistani POWs and civilians, Pakistanis in Bangladesh and Bengalis in Pakistan.87 Crucially, 
the Agreement was without prejudice to the positions of the parties regarding 195 POWs, although 
it hinted at the assurance of Bangladesh not to initiate trials against the 195 POWs during the 
repatriation period.88 Significantly, the Agreement did indicate that after the completion of the 
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repatriation process, Bangladesh, India and Pakistan would discuss and settle the question of the 
POWs.89 
The Tripartite Agreement, was adopted mainly for the purpose of repatriating the 195 POWs, 
prevented the prosecution of these war criminals. While adopting this Agreement, Bangladesh’s 
foreign minister stated that the crimes committed by the POWs constituted war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and genocide, in accordance with the provisions of the UN General Assembly 
resolutions and international law relating to war crimes, and that there was consensus that the 
individuals charged with those crimes (ie, the 195 Pakistani POWs) should be subject to a clear 
due process of law.90 
Pakistan, in the Tripartite Agreement, condemned and deeply regretted any crime committed in 
Bangladesh.91 After the declaration of this recognition on 22 February 1974, Pakistan’s Prime 
Minister stated that he would visit Bangladesh, having been invited by Bangladesh’s Prime 
Minister, and appealed to Bangladesh’s people to forgive and forget the mistake of previous years 
so that the two nations could achieve reconciliation. Similarly, Bangladesh’s Prime Minister 
declared that he wanted the people not to dwell on the past and to have a new start, given that its 
people would be forgiving.92 Finally, it was declared in the Agreement that: 
Having regard to the appeal of the Prime Minister of Pakistan to the people of Bangladesh to 
forgive and forget the mistakes of the past, the Foreign Minister of Bangladesh stated that the 
Government of Bangladesh had decided not to proceed with the trials as an act of clemency. It 
was agreed that the 195 prisoners of war may be repatriated to Pakistan along with the other 
prisoners of war now in the process of repatriation under the Delhi Agreement.93 
It was reported that India, Pakistan and Bangladesh had reached an agreement for Bangladesh to 
repatriate 195 Pakistani prisoners. Dr Kamal Hossain, the Foreign Minister of Bangladesh at the 
time, claimed: 
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This is a moment for satisfaction. The efforts for enduring peace in the subcontinent will put an 
end to conflict and confrontation, and the 700 million people of the subcontinent will be able to 
live as good neighbors.94 
Political pressure influenced the decision not to hold trials for the 195 POWs. Pakistan recognised 
Bangladesh on 22 February 1974, at a time when Bangladesh was firmly committed to initiating 
prosecution. A news article on 23 February 1974 reported:  
Bhutto had held out for months against recognizing Bangladesh until Mujibor Rahman, who is 
known as Mujib, would call off proposed war crime trials of 195 Pakistanis but neither Bhutto 
nor Mujib mentioned the question in Friday’s announcements. It is assumed that the trials will 
be cancelled.95 
In view of the above, the limitation put forward by the defence counsel was that The ICT-BD Act 
was not applicable, as the 195 Pakistani war criminals had already been granted immunity under 
the Tripartite Agreement. The defence argued that a press release from Bangladesh’s government 
dated 17 April 1973 endorsed The ICT-BD Act to try only the 195 war criminals.96 This was 
followed by the Collaborators Order, to decide whether civilians would be responsible for an 
offence. The mala fide intention of the government was brought as a case against them. But this 
arrangement was challenged by the Tripartite Agreement, which gave the war criminals clemency.  
Tribunal-1 responded that it was not suitable to state, based on section 3 of the ICT-BD Act, that 
there was no person or member of the auxiliary force able to shed light on and enable justice under 
the Act for the offence(s) as mentioned. This is because the 195 Pakistani war criminals belonging 
to Pakistan’s armed forces were permitted to intervene with justice on the strength of the Tripartite 
Agreement, which was an ‘executive act’. Such an Act cannot prevent members of the ‘auxiliary 
force’ or an ‘individual’ or even any person coming from a ‘group of individuals’ to show how to 
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forgive, or grant immunity to those having committed offences, especially a breach of international 
law, which contravenes the current law endorsed for the prosecution of such crimes.97 
The Tribunal has emphasised that the obligation imposed on the state is inescapable and 
indispensable under the UDHR and the ICT-BD Act. As such, the Tripartite Agreement, which is 
considered an executive act, does not release the state from its responsibility to bring perpetrators 
of systematic crimes to justice. Hence, the Tripartite Agreement is not considered a barrier to 
charging a civilian perpetrator under The ICT-BD Act. The ICT-BD Act was not enacted solely for 
the trial of the 195 Pakistani war criminals. Rather, it has jurisdiction based on section 3(1) of the 
Act to charge armed forces, auxiliary forces, individuals or groups for the offences indicated in 
section 3(2) and performed in Bangladesh before or after the commencement of the Act.98 Thus, 
the response of the Tribunal took the view that the obligation to prosecute is a peremptory one. 
The content of the Tripartite Agreement cannot stand as valid to such norm.99 Likewise, the 
intention not to prosecute those 195 POWs does not exclude the trying of others.100 
The prosecution argued that the Tripartite Agreement did not give immunity to the listed 195 war 
criminals belonging to the Pakistani occupation forces. Further, they debated whether the 
Parliament of Bangladesh had ratified it as such. Therefore, it cannot stand as a barrier to holding 
trials under The ICT-BD Act against local accused perpetrators.101 
The Tribunal did not accept the argument that due to the Tripartite Agreement’s granting of 
clemency to 195 members of the Pakistani armed forces, individuals or members of auxiliary 
powers, as stated in section 3 of the ICT-BD Act, cannot be brought to justice under the Act for the 
offence(s) enumerated therein.102 The Tribunal held that the Act proposed that no prosecution be 
made of members of the Pakistani armed forces if the person or persons have the capability as 
included in section 3(1). Instead, any person prima facie can be responsible for criminal offences 
and be delivered to justice under The ICT-BD Act.103 As the Tripartite Agreement is an executive 
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act, it should not create any delay in prosecuting a member of an auxiliary force or even an 
individual if the Agreement gave immunity to those individuals who committed offences in breach 
of international law that is not in alignment with existing law.104 
There is an inescapable and indispensable imposition on the state based on the UDHR and the ICT-
BD Act to prosecute crimes against humanity. The Tripartite Agreement does not release the state 
from its responsibility to bring the perpetrators of atrocities to justice. According to the Tribunal:  
As state party of UDHR and Geneva Convention, Bangladesh cannot evade obligation to ensure 
and provide justice to victims of those offences and their relatives who still suffer the pains 
sustained by the victims and as such an ‘executive act’ (the Tripartite Agreement) can no way 
derogate this internationally recognized obligation. 
For this reason, the Tribunal found that this obligation under jus cogens norms must prevail over 
any other executive acts and functions.105 
Finally, it concluded that: 
Therefore, we are of the view that the ‘tripartite agreement’ is not at all a barrier to prosecute 
civilian perpetrator under the Act of 1973. Thus, we also hold that ICT-BD Act of 1973 was not 
enacted only for holding trial of 195 Pakistani war criminals rather it has jurisdiction under 
section 3(1) of the Act to try armed forces, auxiliary forces, an individual or group of individuals 
for the commission of offences specified under section 3(2) committed in Bangladesh before and 
after commencement of the Act.106 
IV.C.6 Rules for Superior Responsibility 
The doctrine of superior responsibility confers a legal obligation on civilian leaders to take all 
necessary and reasonable measures within their power to prevent criminal acts by their 
subordinates.107 Thus, a civilian leader should be brought to justice if they fail to prevent the 
commission of such crimes. The prosecution was successful in establishing superior private 
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responsibility for the crimes committed during the Bangladesh Liberation War. It pressed for their 
superior private status and criminal liability emanating from their failure to adopt necessary and 
reasonable measures within their powers and control to prevent or repress the commission of 
crimes by their followers, associates and subordinates.108 The ICT-BD found the application of the 
doctrine of superior responsibility to encompass civilian political leaders. The crucial question is 
not the private status of the accused but the degree of authority exercised over their subordinates. 
The Appellate Division opined: 
It is now … an established position that superior officers mentioned in section 4(2) of the ICT 
Act include any civilian superior having effective control over the subordinates and that a civilian 
superior need not be de jure, rather a de facto civilian superior also may incur the responsibility 
of the crimes perpetrated by his subordinates in the situations mentioned in section 4(2).109 
The Tribunal referred to section 5(2), which states that the official position is no defence. Then it 
interpreted that a superior officer does not only specifically mean military superiors but also 
includes civilian superiors.110 The strategy and legal argument followed by the prosecutor was that 
the alleged accused was a civilian political leader of his party who possessed the ‘actual’ or 
‘constructive’ knowledge about the so-called international crimes committed by his followers 
and/or subordinates.111 
IV.C.7 Rules for Joint Criminal Enterprise 
The prosecution brought the argument that the articulation of ‘when any crime is committed by 
several persons’ in section 4(1) presses charges of a ‘common plan of collective criminality’. It 
also implies the existence of a group’s collective plan, design or purpose of criminal acts. The 
association of the accused with such collective criminal acts constitutes a common unlawful 
enterprise. The prosecution submitted that the design of section 4 incorporates the doctrine of JCE 
for application to cases under the Act, particularly as seen in Chief Prosecutor v Ali Ahsan 
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Muhammad Mujahid112 and Chief Prosecutor v Md Abdul Alim.113 The prosecution argued that the 
modes of liability under section 4 of The ICT-BD Act contain JCE liability in the guise of a 
‘common plan of collective criminality’.114 In Chief Prosecutor v Md Abdul Alim, the submission 
of the prosecution to bring JCE was praiseworthy. It argued that (1) the patterns in the commission 
of the crimes alleged were indicative of the existence of a common plan, design or purpose; (2) 
the accused consented to a common unlawful enterprise and each one of the enterprises acted in 
furtherance of a common purpose; and (3) the participation of the accused furthered the object of 
the group of perpetrators with foreseeable knowledge of the consequence of his act or conduct.115 
IV.C.8 Rules for Criminal Conspiracy 
In many cases, the prosecution did not bring any direct charges (ie, a charge of direct participation 
in the crimes), instead alleging intrigue, conspiracy and abetment. The commission of crimes 
against humanity by members of Jamat-e-Islam (JEI), Islami Chatra Sangha (ICS), the Muslim 
League and other pro-Pakistani organisations has nexus with the top leaders of these organisations, 
and the commission of these crimes contributed to fulfilling the organisations’ common objectives. 
The prosecution argued that these acts amounted to intrigue, conspiracy, encouragement and 
abetment on the part of the accused leaders, who did not need to have physically and directly 
participated in the commission of the crimes charged.116 In Chief Prosecutor v Md Abdul Alim, the 
prosecution established that the accused’s anti-liberation ideology was the reason for his inaction 
to prevent systematic attacks against unarmed pro-liberation civilians in the Jaipurhat area, despite 
his authority to prevent the commission of these killings. Tribunal-2 responded that the behaviour 
of the accused might even constitute instigation or abatement of the perpetrators of the crime.117 
IV.C.9 Rules as to Acts and Omissions 
Religion dominated political organisations such as JEI, ICS and the Muslim League, which were 
famous for their direct participation in the Pakistani military’s planning and waging of aggression 
 
112 Ibid [440–[442]. 
113 Chief Prosecutor v Md Abdul Alim @ MA Alim, ICT-BD 01 of 2012 [55]–[56]. 
114 Ali Ahsan Muhammad Mujahid (n 33) [440]–[442]. 
115 Md Abdul Alim (n 113) [55]–[56]. 
116 Islam (n 31) 321. 
117Md Abdul Alim (n 113) [373]. 
 
120 
against peaceful Bengali civilians. This participation falls within the purview of the definition of 
crimes against peace under The ICT-BD Act.118 However, the prosecution brought no formal or 
specific charges in relation to this crime. Similarly, the trial did not bring any legal or accurate 
charges against any persons accused of war crimes.119 On several occasions, the Tribunal could 
not proceed against individuals due to the absence of their names from the formal charge, despite 
their involvement in the commission of the crimes. In Chief Prosecutor v Md Sakhawat Hossain 
and others, the abduction and torture of victim Maleque Sardar by a local para-militia and his 
murder on the banks of the river Kapatakha was proved. Based on witness testimony, it was also 
proved that Lutfor Moral was present there and accompanied the group of Razakars in committing 
the crime. However, the prosecution could not include his name on the submitted formal charge, 
and hence Tribunal-1 could not try him under charge 4.120 In the judgment of Chief Prosecutor v 
Md Obaidul Haque alias Taher, and Ataur Rahman alias Noni, Tribunal-1 observed: 
Prosecution … has failed to show even as to what happened to the dead bodies of the victims. 
Naturally, the relatives would have made effort in getting dead bodies of victims, after the alleged 
event of killing happened. But no evidence in this regard has yet been provided. Even it remains 
undisclosed as to the availability of relatives of alleged victims.121 
The Tribunal also held that the relatives of the alleged victims would have been the best, most 
competent and material witnesses to prove the event. However, the Tribunal was constrained by 
the lack of due diligence on the part of the investigation agency to unveil all the material facts 
relevant to the principal event through effective investigation.122 
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IV.C.10 Shortcomings of the Rules of Prosecution 
The prosecution was successful in proving offences, particularly crimes against humanity; 
however, the failure rate to establish genocidal charges was quite high. While actus rea was proved 
successfully, and the production of old evidence was evident regarding the commission of crimes 
against minority groups, particularly Hindus, it was more difficult to prove the required mental 
component for establishing the commission of genocide. In other words, the prosecution could not, 
in most circumstances, provide convincing proof of mens rea, stipulated in the definition of 
genocide under section 3 of the ICT-BD Act as ‘with intent to’.123 For instance, the prosecution 
could not prove charge 3 concerning the genocidal intent of Kamaruzzaman. Tribunal-2 pointed 
out that the argument of the prosecution was ‘misconceived’. The mass killing of victims and 
indiscriminate sexual invasion lack the genocidal requirement of belonging to a particular ‘group’ 
or having a certain ‘intent’.124 
The prosecution could not prove eight charges out of 17 in Chief Prosecutor v Md Abdul Alim 
case. It brought 20 charges in Chief Prosecutor v Delowar Hossain Sayeedi but failed to prove 12 
of those charges. The observation of the Appellate Division in Allama Delwar Hossain Sayedee v 
Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh reflects the lacuna that existed:  
we have noticed neglects and lacks on the part of investigation officer in collecting legal evidence 
to prove charges. Similarly, the prosecutor also did not take any step in this regard. It did not 
make any inquiry for ascertaining whether [the evidence] was genuine or forged; that he remained 
silent despite finding interpolations in it which can be detected with bare naked eyes. It appears 
to us that the prosecuting team performed its responsibility by tendering witnesses without 
bothering as to whether they made statements in support of the charges or not.125 
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IV.D Rules and Strategies for the Defence 
The tasks of the defence can be generalised into two broad categories: (1) the defence responses 
specific to the prosecutorial charges and (2) the common defence responses. Needless to say, the 
task of countering was daunting. Nonetheless, the defence’s pleading of the identical common 
grounds in every successive case despite their reasoned rejection by the Tribunal in previous 
instances is indicative of insipid defence rebuttals.126 Rule 18(6) of the Rules of Procedure provides 
that the defence shall be required to submit three sets of their list of witnesses along with the 
documents that the defence intends to rely on before the Tribunal while furnishing the same under 
section 9(5) of the Act. Like the prosecution, the defence is also bestowed the power to examine 
their witnesses. Section 10(f) of The ICT-BD Act requires the defence to examine its witnesses and 
re-examine them again after their cross-examination by the prosecution. Moreover, the defence 
must cross-examine the witnesses of the prosecution.127 Concerning the onus of proof, rule 51 
contends that: 
(1) The onus of proof as to the plea of ‘alibi’ or to any particular fact or information which is in 
the possession or knowledge of the defence shall be upon the defence. (2) The defence shall also 
prove the documents and materials to be produced by them in accordance with the provisions of 
section 9(5) of the Act. (3) Mere failure to prove the plea of alibi and or the documents and 
materials by the defence shall not render the accused guilty. 
The defence attempted to argue against every point forwarded by the prosecution before the 
Tribunal. The defence’s arguments were based on common grounds despite their rejection by the 
tribunals in previous cases. They claimed alibi but failed to establish such beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The defence should have argued in a positive way, using evidence to establish the innocence 
of the alleged accused or their absence from the place of the commission of the crime. 
IV.E Conclusion 
The tribunals generally acted within the sphere of the rules and strategies for trial, prosecution and 
defence under The ICT-BD Act and the RoP. The tribunals engaged in judicious deliberation on 
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every charge, argument and counterargument presented by the parties. The tribunals judged 
whether the prosecution was successful in proving its charges after discharging its burden of proof. 
Viewed from this perspective, one can conclude that fair trial procedures were followed.  
The tribunals also followed the rules and strategies to ensure a fair trial. Both the tribunals accepted 
as admissible evidence reports and documents from interstate and intergovernmental organisations 
and their specialised agencies; judicially determined facts and applicable legal principles; and 
hearsay testimony with probative value. The tribunals did not have any opportunity to adjudicate 
war crimes and crimes against peace, despite their embodiment in The ICT-BD Act, for want of 
prosecutorial charges on these two listed crimes. However, the prosecution raised the commission 
of war crimes not as independent and separate charges but in conjunction with other crimes, 
particularly crimes against humanity. The tribunals made some judicial deliberations and gave 
opinions about war crimes, but convictions and punishment pertained only to the main charges. 
Both the prosecution and defence received the opportunity to plead their case and press their 
evidence in support of their pleading. The prosecution succeeded in proving beyond any 
reasonable doubt most of the charges brought against the accused. The prosecutorial strategies and 
approaches marshalled enough evidence to prove the guilt of the accused of particular crimes 
committed with deliberate intent and actual and constructive knowledge.128 The prosecutorial rate 
of success has been very high on charges of crimes against humanity and accessorial crimes, such 
as aiding, abetting and conspiracy. However, success on charges of genocide has been limited 
because of the difficulty of proving genocidal intent (mens rea). The prosecution also benefitted 
from the admissible evidence (as listed above), as it did not have to discharge the onus of proof. 
The main problems of the defence were (1) the worldwide movement and support for ending the 
impunity of war criminals marked by the establishment of a number of international hybrid and 
national war crimes tribunals and (2) the widely available and compelling factual evidence of the 
commission of atrocities during the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971. It was exceedingly 
difficult for the defence to rebut these accurate accounts successfully. In the adversarial system of 
trial, whoever claims before a court or tribunal must prove their claims. The defence’s pleas of 
alibi in many instances were mere allegations and the burden of proof by positive evidence could 
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not be discharged. The defence’s standing on adverse claims, such as that the accused was innocent 
or not present at the site of the crime, was not substantiated by presenting decisive evidence. In 
the next chapter, these aspects of procedural justice are analysed in detail.  
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V RULES FOR POST-TRIAL PROCESS AND ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES 
V.A Introduction 
In Bangladesh, the tribunals have delivered judgments in 41 cases under The ICT-BD Act and the 
Rules of Procedure.1 Tribunal-1 has conferred judgments in 30 cases, while Tribunal-2 delivered 
judgments in 11 cases.2 The judgments of both tribunals have contributed to the development of a 
comprehensive jurisprudence in dealing with the international crimes that occurred during the 
Bangladesh Liberation War. All these tribunal decisions have been enriched by objective 
interpretations and criminal jurisprudence.3 The most common allegation in all cases has been the 
perpetration of crimes against humanity. This chapter analyses the rules of the post-trial process 
and examines the efficiencies of the rules to ensure criminal justice by the tribunals. This chapter 
addresses the research question: What are the RoP for the post-trial process under The ICT-BD 
Act? 
The most common charges brought against the accused include the attempt to commit, or the aiding 
and abetting of the commission of, crimes against humanity and acts of alleged perpetrators. A 
question thus arises as to the post-trial process and the rights of the convicted criminals. Answering 
this question requires the examination of the efficiency and compatibility of the rules for post-trial 
processes and rights, to explore the extent to which the trials and criminal justice were fair. This 
chapter focuses on the cases adjudicated by the tribunals created under The ICT-BD Act. The 
interpretations and opinions of the Appellate Division are also examined to reach a conclusion 
regarding how the Apex Court reviewed the tribunals’ application of international criminal law. 
How The ICT-BD Act has been interpreted and applied in the judgments of the tribunals and the 
jurisprudential contribution of Bangladesh’s Apex Court is significant for the emerging judicial 
norms for adjudicating international crimes under a domestic tribunal. This chapter examines the 
rules for the post-trial process, including judgment, conviction and sentencing. It analyses the 
 
1 The judgments of Tribunal-1 are available at https://www.ict-bd.org/ict1/judgments.php; The judgments of 
Tribunal-2 are available at https://www.ict-bd.org/ict2/judgments.php.  
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decisions of the tribunals and the Appellate Division, to explore the efficiency of the rules to ensure 
fairness and justice. 
V.B Rules for Judgment 
Section 10(1)(j) of The ICT-BD Act empowers the Tribunal to deliver judgment and pronounce the 
verdict.4 Moreover, section 21 of the Act confers the right of the accused to prefer appeal to the 
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court. In addition, section 24 of the Act states that ‘no order, 
judgment or sentence of a Tribunal shall be called in question in any manner whatsoever in or 
before any Court or other authority in any legal proceedings whatsoever except in the manner 
provided in section 21’.5 Further, section 26 of the Act provides that the provisions of this Act 
shall have effect despite any inconsistencies with the provisions of any other laws that are in force 
in Bangladesh.6 
The abovementioned sections make it clear that judgments conferring by the tribunals must be 
substantiated, due to the fundamental criteria of having quality in judgment. The Act confers ample 
jurisdiction upon the tribunals to award any criteria of punishment from death penalty to 
imprisonment. Section 20 of the ICT-BD Act states that: 
(1) The Judgment of a Tribunal as to the guilt or the innocence of any accused person shall give 
the reasons on which it is based: Provided that each member of the Tribunal shall be competent 
to deliver a judgement of his own; (2) Upon conviction of an accused person, the Tribunal shall 
award sentence of death or such other punishment proportionate to the gravity of the crime as 
appears to the Tribunal to be just and proper.7 
That the punishment must be proportionate to the seriousness of the alleged crime is an established 
rule of the international criminal justice system. This point is emphasised in the review system of 
the Appellate Division, with the Apex Court determining the punishment based on the gravity of 
the crime.8 So far, judgments have been delivered in a total of 41 cases by both tribunals. Below, 
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the significant decisions concerning issues of criminal law, principles of jurisprudence and norms 
of international criminal jurisprudence are briefly described, along with the relevant case law. 
V.B.1 Rules for Trial and Judgment in Absentia  
Any trial operated in the absence of the accused is regarded as a trial in absentia. The ICT-BD Act 
has a mechanism for trials in absentia, with section 10A of the Act stating that: 
Where a proceeding is commenced under sub-section (1) of section 9, the Tribunal, before fixing 
the date for the trial under sub-section (2) of the said section, has reason to believe that the 
accused person has absconded or concealed himself so that he cannot be produced for trial, may 
hold the trial in his absence following the procedure as laid down in the Rules of Procedure made 
under section 22 for such trial.9 
On the question of trials in absentia, the Tribunal has attempted to justify the legality of in absentia 
trials. The Tribunal has delivered a few judgments following an in absentia trial. After taking 
cognisance of the offences, the Tribunal fixes a date of appearance for the accused. If the accused 
is not in custody, the Tribunal issues a summons or warrant for the accused to appear. If this fails 
to produce the accused, a publication is issued in both Bengali and English newspapers calling for 
the appearance of the accused before the Court.10 Rule 32 of the Rules of Procedure states that if 
the Tribunal has reasonable ground to fear the accused has absconded or is in hiding, with no 
immediate hope for their arrest, or they cannot be arrested or produced before trial, then the process 
will commence in their absence. This threshold must be tested and met. Several international 
instruments provide similar mechanisms.11 The presumption in such circumstances is that the 
accused has concealed themselves to evade justice. Otherwise, they would have prepared to defend 
themselves by facing trial.12  
 
9 ICT-BD Act (n 4) s 10A. 
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Lebanon (30 May 2007), art 22. 
12 Islam (n 8) 268. 
 
128 
In Chief Prosecutor v Moulana Abdul Kalam Azad, the Tribunal provided a significant decision as 
to trials in absentia.13 The decision of the case attracted the attention of the international 
community. In this case, the Chief prosecutor submitted formal charges against Abul Kalam Azad 
for the offences defined in sections 3(2)(a), 3(2)(b), 3(2)(g) and 3(2)(h) of The ICT-BD Act. The 
accused Abul Kalam Azad had absconded and was absent from the trial. In total, eight charges 
were framed against the accused.14 The Tribunal took note of the offences and issued an arrest 
warrant for the accused. In conducting the trial, the prosecution adduced and examined 22 
witnesses. The examination and cross-examination were completed within 13 working days. Due 
to its inability to submit a full list of witnesses, the defence counsel relinquished its option to 
adduce and examine any witnesses in defence of the accused.15  
The Tribunal ordered certain factors to be considered before determining the status of the accused. 
In total, eight criteria were developed: the facts of common knowledge, the context of attacking 
the Hindu community, documentary and circumstantial evidence, relevant facts, the political status 
of the accused, the accused’s relation with local Pakistani armed forces and the jurisprudence of 
the ad hoc tribunals.16 These criteria were adhered to in this trial.  
In determining the culpability of the accused, the Tribunal further considered whether the accused 
was a potential member of the Razakar force and was substantially associated with the local 
Pakistani armed forces and their activities in facilitating the commission of offences.17 The 
Tribunal also considered whether the accused physically participated in the commission of the 
alleged crimes.18 Third, and most importantly, the Tribunal took into consideration whether the 
allegations against the accused constituted heinous crimes against humanity and genocide.19 
Considering these factors, in assessing the testimony of the witnesses and examining the procedure 
required at the trial stage, the Tribunal found that the accused, as an armed member of the Razakar 
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force, directly participated in the commission of the crimes.20 The Tribunal therefore invoked 
section 3(1) of The ICT-BD Act, which states that any person, individual or member of a group of 
individuals is liable to be prosecuted for committing the offences under this section.21 Importantly, 
the Tribunal asserts its jurisdiction over the individual if their culpability is proved under section 
3(1) of the Act,22 since section 4(1) of The ICT-BD Act provides for individual criminal liability 
for the direct commission of a crime.23  
In Chief Prosecutor v Moulana Abdul Kalam Azad, the Tribunal found that the accused had 
physically participated, and was accompanied by his armed accomplices, in the commission of the 
crimes, and so it was proved he should be held criminally responsible for the direct commission 
of the crimes.24 The accused, due to having absconded, cannot be considered merely an absentee 
accused; he is an absconded accused, as he is evading trial for the offences of which he has been 
charged. This fact of his abscondence signifies his culpability for or involvement in the 
commission of the crime. In this case, the accused deliberately waived his right to be present at 
trial, adding to his culpability. Therefore, the fact of the absconding of the accused can also be 
taken as an adverse and material incriminating circumstance to reinforce the evidence and 
circumstances available in the case.25 Finally, the accused was found guilty for all charges except 
charge 2. In all charges except charge 7, the accused was found guilty of crimes against humanity; 
in charge 7, the accused was found guilty of genocide.26 As such, the accused, Abul Kalam Azad, 
was convicted and a death sentence was pronounced against him under section 20(2) of The ICT-
BD Act.27 
In so doing, the Tribunal referred to the jurisprudence of both ICCPR and the International 
Covenant on Economic and Social Rights (IECHR) 1966, which have recognised trials in absentia, 
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declined to exercise this right.28 The view of the Tribunal was that ‘it is abundantly clear that the 
accused absconded to evade the process of justice and avoided to face the trial’.29 The Tribunal 
declared in the same judgment that ‘abscondment itself is an incriminating circumstance to be 
considered together with evidence for determining culpability of the accused’.30 The accused’s 
wilful and deliberate withdrawal or waiver of the right to be present and heard at trial corroborated 
his culpability.31  
The Tribunal in Chief Prosecutor v Moulana Abdul Kalam Azad mentioned that the position of the 
UN has changed on the question of trials in absentia since the inauguration of the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon (STL) in 2006, which involved in absentia trial.32 The STL provided a retrial 
mechanism that is not provided under The ICT-BD Act.33 However, the Tribunal opined that there 
was no mention in The ICT-BD Act that the trial must be held in the presence of the accused. It is 
important to note that the absence of this provision does not violate the recognised norms of 
international human rights law because Bangladesh made reservation at the provision of ICCPR 
that relates to trial in absentia.34  
However, international jurisprudence on trial in absentia is not uniform. Article 63 of the Rome 
Statute does not allow trial in absentia except when the accused ‘being present before the Court, 
continues to disrupt the trial’.35 Under this article, the Trial Chamber is allowed to remove the 
accused and ‘make provision for him or her to observe the trial and instruct counsel from outside 
the courtroom, through the use of communication technology, if required’.36 The provision of this 
article also stipulates that such measures be taken only in exceptional circumstances when other 
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reasonable alternatives have proved inadequate and ‘only for such duration as is strictly 
required’.37 A similar sentiment regarding trial in absentia can be seen in ICTY.  
Article 21(4)(d) of the STL Statute establishes that the accused has the right ‘to be tried in his 
presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing’. Thus, 
while the jurisprudence of STL allows trial in absentia, certain conditions are imposed by the STL 
Statute to ensure that such trials are fair in terms of providing the rights of the defence. The article 
that provides for trials in absentia stipulates the three situations in which such a trial might be 
held:38 (1) it must be proved that the accused has waived expressly and in writing his right to be 
present, (2) there is no handing over of the accused to the Tribunal by the state authorities and (3) 
all reasonable steps have been taken to secure the appearance of the absconded accused and to 
inform them of the charges against them.39 The right of retrial is permitted under certain 
circumstances, but is not available if the absent defendant is represented by their chosen counsel.40 
Further, the right to retrial should not be applied where the accused failed, after expressly waiving 
in writing the right to be present, to appoint their chosen counsel.41 This right also exists where the 
accused’s refusal to come under trial is not cured by the state’s failure to produce them to STL.42  
The trials before the SCSL were held in absentia in pursuance of rule 60 of the Rules of Procedure, 
which permits a trial in absentia if the accused abstains from appearing at the trial or refuses after 
an initial appearance to appear further before the court.43 In domestic systems, trials in absentia 
are permissible under certain circumstances. In Crosby v United States, the US Supreme Court 
observed, while interpreting the relevant rule,44 that it is compulsory for the defendant to present 
before the court at every stage of trial,45 and such presence will be waived only when a defendant 
 
37 Ibid. 
38 Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (n 11), art 22. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid, s 22(3). 
41 Paola Gaeta, ‘To Be (Present) or Not To Be (Present): Trials In Absentia before the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon’ (2007) 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1165. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone 2013, rule 60. 
44 Crosby v United States (113 US Supreme Court 748, 13 January 1993). The court referred to the United States’ 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 2016, rule 43. 
45 Crosby (n 44). 
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appears at the initial stage but remains voluntarily absent in the later stage.46 In the absence of such 
circumstances, the rule therefore allows the continuation of an ongoing trial, even if it deprives the 
accused of their right to hearing and defending themselves before the court.47  
V.B.2 Rules for Proof Beyond Any Reasonable Doubt 
That an accusation must be proved beyond any reasonable doubt is an established principle of the 
international criminal justice system. The tribunals followed and confirmed this principle during 
the trials, such as in Chief Prosecutor v Abdul Quader Molla.48 In this case, the prosecution filed 
the formal charge against the accused, Abdul Quader Molla, on the basis of which the Tribunal, 
after hearing both sides, framed six charges, including for committing crimes against humanity as 
defined in section 3(2)(a) of The ICT-BD Act and for complicity in committing such crimes as 
defined in sections 3(2)(a)(g)(h) of the Act.49  
During the trial, the prosecution adduced and examined as many as 12 witnesses, including the 
Investigation Officers. The defence examined six witnesses, including the accused himself.50 After 
examining the evidence and witnesses, the Tribunal stratified each charge individually, thereby 
connecting them to the accused’s culpability. In the first charge, which was related to the murder 
of Pallab, the Tribunal found the accused guilty for his complicity in the said offence, which 
constituted a crime against humanity as defined in section 3(2)(a)(h) of The ICT-BD Act, as 
punishable under section 20(2) of the Act.51  
The second charge concerned the murder of Meherunnesa and her inmates, in the commission of 
which the accused was found guilty of complicity. This murder constituted a crime against 
humanity under section 3(2)(a)(h) of The ICT-BD Act, and the punishment was awarded 
 
46 Ibid. 
47 As the Court explained, the rule allowing an ongoing trial to continue when a defendant disappears deprives 
the defendant of the option of gambling on an acquittal knowing that he can terminate the trial if it seems that 
the verdict will go against him—an option that might otherwise appear preferable to the costly, perhaps 
unnecessary, path of becoming a fugitive from the outset. See Gaeta (n 41) 1167–68. 
48 Chief Prosecutor v Abdul Quader Molla, ICT-BD 02 of 2012. 
49 Ibid [1]. 
50 Ibid [26]–[27]. 
51 Ibid [427]. 
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accordingly.52 In the same way, Abdul Quader Molla was found guilty of a third charge, for the 
murder of Khandoker Abu Taleb, which also constituted a crime against humanity as defined under 
section 3(2)(a)(h) of The ICT-BD Act.53 However, for the fourth charge, the accused was not found 
guilty of mass killing as a crime against humanity. Nevertheless, he incurred criminal liability 
under section 4(1) of The ICT-BD Act for the offence of mass killing and for the crimes against 
humanity as specified in section 3(2)(a) of The ICT-BD Act.54 These are punishable under section 
20(2), read with section 3(1) of The ICT-BD Act, under charge 5. As in charge 5, the same 
culpability and proof were found by the Tribunal regarding the guilt of the accused in charge 6.55 
Thus, the Tribunal unanimously declared that: 
The accused Abdul Quader Molla who has been found guilty beyond reasonable doubt is 
condemned to a single sentence of ‘imprisonment for life’ and for the crimes as listed in charges 
no. 1 (guilty—commit murder), 2 (guilty—commit murder) and 3 (guilty—commit murder) to a 
single sentence of ‘imprisonment for fifteen (15) years’ under section 20(2) of the Act of 1973.56 
In this case, the Tribunal found that the testimony of a single witness on a material fact 
does not as a matter of law require corroboration;57 however, the Tribunal did not apply the 
evidentiary value of this uncollaborative evidence for the highest punishment. Subsequently, 
Bangladesh’s Apex Court altered the Tribunal’s decision based on the Appellate Division’s finding 
that the lone witness account was reliable and had probative value, allowing the handing down of 
capital punishment.58  
In Chief Prosecutor v Ali Ahsan Muhammad Mujahid, the accused, Mujahid, was charged with 
participating in, abetting and facilitating the commission of offences such as murder, which 






56 Ibid [429]. 
57 Ibid [366]. 
58 Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, represented by the Chief Prosecutor, International 
Crimes Tribunal, Dhaka, Bangladesh (Appellant) v Abdul Quader Molla (Respondent), Appellate Division of 
the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, Criminal Appeal No 24 of 2013 [201]–[202]. 
59 Chief Prosecutor v Ali Ahsan Muhammad Mujahid, ICT-BD 04 of 2012. 
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seven charges constituting crimes against humanity or genocide were framed against the accused.60 
The prosecution adduced and examined a total of 17 witnesses,61 while the defence submitted a 
list of 1315 witnesses but only produced and examined one.62 
The accused, Ali Ahsan Muhammad Mujahid, was an active member of the ICS, the student wing 
of the JEI. He was also the president of ICS for Faridpur district for two years. His affiliation as a 
leader of this organisation is also seen in his assignment in 1970 as Secretary of East Pakistan 
Islami Chatra Sangha.63 In 1971, as alleged, he played a crucial role in opposing the Liberation 
War as Chief of Al-Badar Bahini.64 The Tribunal found the guilt of the accused beyond every 
reasonable doubt for charges 1 (the accused committed the offence of abetting and facilitating the 
commission of the offence of murder as a crime against humanity), 3 (facilitating the commission 
of the offence of confinement as a crime against humanity), 5 (abetting and facilitating the 
commission of the offence of murders as crimes against humanity), 6 (abetting, planning and 
facilitating the commission of the offence of extermination as a crime against humanity) and 7 
(participating in and facilitating the commission of the offences of murders and persecution as 
crimes against humanity), as defined in section 3(2) of The ICT-BD Act. The accused was thus 
convicted with the sentence of ‘imprisonment for five years’ for the offence listed in charge 3, ‘life 
imprisonment’ for the offence listed in charge 5 and to a ‘single sentence of death’ for all of his 
crimes.65  
It is important to note that charges 1 and 6 relate to the commission of offences involving the 
alleged abduction and murder of journalist Seraj Uddin Hossain and the tragic killing of notable 
Bangladeshi intellectuals.66 The accused has been charged for the abetment and commission of 
these crimes, with the allegation that the accused also incurs liability under superior responsibility, 
as described in section 4(2) of The ICT-BD Act.67 Though he is not alleged to have physically 
participated to the commission of the principal crimes described in the two charges, the crimes are 
 
60 Ibid [1]. 
61 Ibid [28]. 
62 Ibid [30]. 
63 Ibid [16]. 
64 Ibid.  
65 Ibid [658].  
66 Ibid [214] 
67 Ibid.  
 
135 
alleged to have been committed by the armed Al-Badar men in furtherance of a concerted plan and 
common purpose.68  
V.B.3 Rules for Judgment Based on Uncorroborated Evidence 
In Chief Prosecutor v Salauddin Quader Chowdhury,69 a total of 23 charges were framed against 
the accused under sections 3(2)(a), 3(2)(c), 3(2)(g) and 3(2)(h) of The ICT-BD Act. This section 
relating to the offences committed during the Bangladesh Liberation War is read in conjunction 
with section 4(1) and punishable under section 20(2).70 The prosecution produced witnesses in 
relation to 17 charges. Of these, Chowdhury was found guilty on nine charges, mostly for aiding 
and ordering the killings of minority Hindus in the Chittagong area. The verdict of Chief 
Prosecutor v Salauddin Quader Chowdhury is significant for many reasons. The trial of genocide 
and conviction by a domestic system naturally attracted international attention. Chowdhury was 
found guilty of genocide under The ICT-BD Act in charges 2 (genocide at Madhya Gohira),71 4 
(genocide at Jogot Mollapara)72 and 6 (genocide at Uttarpara).73 
The remainder of the proven charges were charges 3 (murder of Nutun Chandra Singha),74 5 
(murder of Nepal Chandra and three others),75 7 (killing of Satish Chandra Palit),76 8 (killing of 
Mozaffar and his son),77 17 (abduction and torture of Nizamuddin Ahmed)78 and 18 (abduction 
and torture of Saleh Uddin).79 The charges in which the accused was not found guilty included 
charge 1, which concerned alleged murder, referring to a crime of genocide and crime against 
humanity. The Tribunal concluded, in relation to this charge, that it could not convict on the basis 
of a single instance of uncorroborated hearsay evidence.80 
 
68 Ibid. 
69 Chief Prosecutor v Salauddin Quader Chowdhury, ICT-BD 02 of 2011 [15].  
70 Ibid [3]. 
71 Ibid [79]–[88]. 
72 Ibid [114]–[125]. 
73 Ibid [142]–[158]. 
74 Ibid [89]–[113]. 
75 Ibid [114]–[141]. 
76 Ibid [159]–[163]. 
77 Ibid [164]–[175]. 
78 Ibid [195]–[202]. 
79 Ibid [203]–[216]. 
80 Ibid [75]–[78].  
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V.B.4 Rules for Mitigating Factors for Judgments 
Mitigating circumstances are those factors that lead to a lesser range of punishment being inflicted 
on a perpetrator. These factors include being underage or elderly; having poor physical health, a 
physical disability or mental impairment; cooperating with the prosecution, voluntarily 
surrendering, acting under a superior’s order, acknowledging the crimes, admitting guilt and 
expressing remorse.81 However, while mitigating circumstances result in the accused being 
awarded a lighter punishment, this is in no way related to the culpability of the accused. For 
instance, Tribunal-1 awarded a lighter sentence to Ghulam Azam considering his personal 
circumstances of extreme old age and infirmity.82 
Tribunal-2, in Chief Prosecutor v Md Abdul Alim, observed that the expression of remorse or 
repentance for horrendous crimes conducted by the accused before or during the trial could have 
been a mitigating factor in the severity of the punishment inflicted.83 However, the consideration 
of mitigating factors can reduce the punishment only when they outweigh the aggravating factors. 
Tribunal-2 held: 
The advanced age of an accused does not readily warrant some mitigation of the sentence. His 
advanced age with other factors thus carries very limited weight in mitigation. Therefore, 
considering the mode of participation and magnitude of crimes proved we are not convinced to 
take his old age into account as a mitigating factor, in awarding sentence.84 
The Tribunal further held that the multiplicity and gravity of the crimes for which the accused was 
responsible deserved the highest punishment. However, it considered his very old age, physical 
disability, comorbidity and relevant medical reports as mitigating factors for sentencing. The 
Tribunal noted cautiously that such mitigating factors are relevant only to the assessment of 
sentence and in no way derogate the gravity of the crime.85 
 
81 Islam (n 8) 402. 
82 Ibid 404. 
83 Chief Prosecutor v Md Abdul Alim @ MA Alim, ICT-BD 01 of 2012 [686].  
84 Chief Prosecutor v Moulana Abdus Sobhan, ICT-BD 01 of 2014 [589]. 
85 Md Abdul Alim (n 83) [680]–[687]. 
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In Chief Prosecutor v Professor Ghulam Azam, the proceedings started with the formal charge as 
filed by the Chief prosecutor, along with documents, which the Tribunal directed for resubmission 
in a systematic form.86 The prosecution submitted the formal charge with a list of 88 witnesses, 
while a voluminous list of 2939 witnesses was submitted by the defence to counteract the formal 
charges.87 In the end, the Tribunal-1 allowed the prosecution to examine only 16 witnesses and the 
defence to examine a maximum of 12 witnesses of the 2939 listed.88 There were 61 charges 
brought against Professor Golam Azam, but these were ultimately reduced to five. Charge 1 
(conspiracy) contained 6 counts, charge 2 (planning) had 3 counts, charge 3 (incitement) contained 
28 counts, charge 4 (complicity) had 23 counts and he was charged with one count of murder and 
torture as crimes against humanity in charge 5.89 Particularly in this case, there was a lack of 
preparation from the prosecution. Therefore, the State could not provide adequate supporting 
documents against the accused. 
The Tribunal jailed Ghulam Azam for 90 years after finding him guilty of the offences of murder, 
conspiracy, planning, incitement and complicity in crimes against humanity.90 The Tribunal 
concluded: 
We have found that the prosecution has successfully proved the status of accused Prof. Ghulam 
Azam that he had superior responsibility over his subordinates but he failed to prevent them from 
committing atrocities as contemplated in section 4(2) which substantially aided and contributed 
to the commission of crimes against humanity, genocide and other class crimes as specified in 
section 3(2) of the Act during the War of Liberation in 1971.91  
The Tribunal therefore concluded by stating that ‘we are convinced to hold that prosecution has 
proved all the broad charges (five charges) brought against the accused beyond reasonable 
doubt’.92 This case was appealed by both the defence and the prosecution. While it was being 
 
86 Chief Prosecutor v Professor Ghulam Azam, ICT-BD 06 of 2011 [3]. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid [35].  
89 Ibid [387].  
90 Ibid [394]. The sentence was awarded considering his old age and illness. It specified that for the first two 
charges, he would receive 20 years imprisonment and for the third and fourth charges, 20 years imprisonment 
for each. He was awarded imprisonment for 31 years for the fifth charge. In total, he was sentenced to 90 years.  




scheduled for hearing at the appeal, the accused died. This judgment is an example of consideration 
of mitigating factors. Tribunal-1 awarded a lighter sentence to Ghulam Azam due to his personal 
circumstances of very old age and infirmity.93 However, there are arguments for considering this 
lighter punishment in view of his lack of repentance. Rafiqul Islam argued in his book that Azam’s 
persistent objection to the birth and existence of Bangladesh is well known. He never cooperated 
with the prosecution, never recognised the existence and continuation of the Tribunal justice 
system, never accepted guilt and denied or recanted his repentance about his participation in favour 
of Pakistan.94 The Appellate Division reflected on the threshold for considering mitigating factors, 
observing that: 
It is the solemn duty of the courts to award proper sentence commensurate with the gravity of the 
crimes. Inappropriate lesser sentences cause injustice not only to the victims of the crimes but 
sometimes to the whole society.95 
Had the matter of Azam in Chief Prosecutor v Professor Ghulam Azam been dealt with by the 
Appellate Division, perhaps a different line of reasoning and argument would have been 
developed.96 The mitigating factor of his old age was considered during the trial but not in relation 
to his commission of the crimes.97 Nevertheless, in this case, a single mitigating factor seems to 
have been overemphasised in relation to the other overwhelming aggravating factors. The lighter 
sentencing does not reflect and is not proportional to the inherent gravity and seriousness of the 
crimes for which Ghulam Azam was found guilty and convicted.98 The Tribunal gave a reduced 
sentence to Golam Azam, the main architect of the atrocity crimes committed during the 
Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971 because of his advanced age and failing health. However, he 
committed these crimes when he was only 49 years old. Moreover, once Bangladesh achieved 
independence, he expressed no remorse and sought no forgiveness for his crimes from the people 
 
93 Islam (n 8) 404. 
94 Ibid 406. 
95 Motiur Rahman Nizami v Government of Bangladesh, represented by the Chief Prosecutor, International 
Crimes Tribunal, Dhaka, Bangladesh, Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, Criminal Appeal 
(A) 143/2014 [152]. 
96 Islam (n 8) 404–7. 
97 Ibid 404. 
98 Ibid 407. 
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of Bangladesh. As a result, his reduced punishment appears to be too light a sentence for such a 
heinous crime.  
V.B.5 Rules for Considering Aggravated Factors in Judgment 
Aggravating circumstances include holding a commanding position and the abuse of authority, 
intelligence and education, hate speech and statements made, discriminatory thinking, 
reprehensible motives, premeditated plans, vicious patterns of attack and violent participation, the 
extreme seriousness of the crime, the deliberate instilling of fear among civilians, the duration of 
the period of committing the crime and public abhorrence of the crime. These factors warrant 
heavier punishment.99  
The Tribunal in Chief Prosecutor v Md Abdul Alim pointed out that, when well-educated and high-
ranking perpetrators commit such dreadful and systematic planned crimes,100 no sentence other 
than capital punishment suffices to punish the gravity of their culpability.101 Such factors were also 
mentioned in Chief Prosecutor v Md Idris Ali Sardar and Md Solaiman Mollah.102 In this case, 
Tribunal-1 held that, when awarding sentence against complicity in committing the offence of 
genocide as well as murder and rape as crimes against humanity, all aggravating factors have to 
be considered against the accused, which may require increasing the sentence for the sake of 
justice.103  
Tribunal-1 in Chief Prosecutor v Md Obaidul Haque alias Taher, and Ataur Rahman alias Noni 
explained that the aggravating factors grow out of the way a crime was committed and the cruel 
attitude of the offender towards the victim. The accused’s recidivism, pattern of causing harm and 
level of involvement in the commission of such crimes are all influential factors.104 The Appellate 
Division in Mir Quasem Ali v Chief Prosecutor, International Crimes Tribunal, Dhaka, 
Bangladesh also endorsed these aggravating factors and observed that it was not appropriate to 
 
99 Ibid 397. 
100 Md Abdul Alim (n 83) 
101 Ibid [671]. 
102 Chief Prosecutor v Md Idris Ali Sardar [absconded], and Md Solaiman Mollah [died at the stage of summing 
up of the case], ICT-BD 06 of 2015 [896]. 
103 Ibid [908]. 
104 Chief Prosecutor v Md Obaidul Haque alias Taher, and Ataur Rahman alias Noni, ICT-BD 04 of 2014 [464]. 
 
140 
convict under the grounds of both direct individual and superior responsibility for the same count. 
However, the accused should be convicted of direct responsibility and his superior position should 
be considered as an aggravating factor for sentencing.105 
In Chief Prosecutor v Syed Md Qaiser, the accused, Qaiser, was charged with the allegation that 
he abetted, facilitated and contributed to committing murder constituting crimes against humanity. 
He was also charged, in charge 3, with abetment and contributing to the actual commission of an 
offence coming under the definition of ‘other inhuman acts’ as crimes against humanity.106 In 
addition, he was accused of the actual commission of killing seven unarmed civilians by 
substantially aiding, abetting, facilitating and contributing to the killing.107 This constitutes the 
offence of murder as a crime against humanity in charge 5, as specified in section 3(2)(a)(g)(h).108  
The charges framed against the accused relate to the commission of crimes that include the events 
that occurred around the localities of the then Habiganj and Nasirnagar police stations. The 
atrocities were allegedly committed during the Liberation War, where Qaiser directed the civilian 
population, with the aim of terrorising and displacing the pro-liberation Bengali civilians. These 
atrocities were carried out in furtherance of the policy and plans of the Pakistani occupation 
army.109 In considering the aggravating factors, the Tribunal observed: 
for showing the aggravated status of this force [Qaiser Bahini] prosecution does not require 
showing that the ‘force’ was an ‘auxiliary force’ as defined in section 2 of the Act of 1971. It is 
incorrect to make speculative argument that the activities carried out by the ‘Qaiser Bahini’ may 
be mitigated if it [force] is not considered as an ‘auxiliary force’. The way it collaborated with 
the army, in carrying out atrocities and what it did, to further plan and policy of the occupation 
army, as a locally formed outfit of accused Qaiser shall be taken into account for assessing the 
intrinsic gravity of the offences alleged and accused’s role and mode of participation that may 
 
105 Mir Quasem Ali v Chief Prosecutor, International Crimes Tribunal, Dhaka, Bangladesh, Appellate Division 




108 Chief Prosecutor v Syed Md Qaiser, ICT-BD 04 of 2013 [191], [272]. In both the charges, the accused was 
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eventually lead to fix the aggravating factors, through the process of rational and integrated 
evaluation of evidence presented before the Tribunal.110 
In Chief Prosecutor v Mir Quasem Ali, the accused, Mir Quasem Ali, was tried by Tribunal-2.111 
The prosecution framed 14 charges on distinct events of criminal acts constituting the offences of 
crimes against humanity and aiding and complicity to commit such crimes, as defined in section 
3(2)(a)(g)(h) of The ICT-BD Act.112 The accused was convicted and sentenced to ‘rigorous 
imprisonment for 20 years’ for committing the crimes as listed in charge 2 (guilty of the offence 
of abetting and facilitating the commission of the offences of abduction, confinement and torture 
as crimes against humanity); ‘rigorous imprisonment for seven years’ for committing the crimes 
listed in charge 3; and a similar period of imprisonment for committing the crimes listed in charge 
4 (guilty of the offence of abetting and facilitating the commission of the offences of abduction, 
confinement and torture as crimes against humanity). The same charges were proved in charges 6, 
7, 9 and 10. In addition, Mir Quasem Ali was convicted and sentenced to death for committing the 
crimes as listed in charge 11 and sentenced to ‘suffer rigorous imprisonment for 10 years’ for 
committing the crimes as listed in charge 14. In charge 11, it was alleged that brutalities and murder 
were committed at the Hotel Dalim in Chittagong under the leadership of Mir Quasem Ali. In 
confirming the punishment, the Apex Court of Bangladesh held that: 
The accused Mir Quasem Ali has incurred criminal liability which may legitimately be taken into 
account as an aggravating factor for the purpose of determination in the degree of culpability and 
awarding sentence.113 
In Chief Prosecutor v Delowar Hossain Sayeedi,114 the charges brought against the accused were 
crimes against humanity and genocide as specified in sections 3(2)(a) and 3(2)(c)(i)(g)(h) of The 
ICT-BD Act. This was the first judgment delivered by Tribunal-1. To try the accused for the said 
crimes, 20 charges were framed.115 A list of 48 witnesses was submitted by the defence and 138 
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111 Chief Prosecutor v Mir Quasem Ali, ICT-BD 03 of 2013.  
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113 Mir Quasem Ali v Chief Prosecutor, International Crimes Tribunal, Dhaka, Bangladesh, Appellate Division 
of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, Criminal Review Petition 58/2016 [26]–[27].  
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witnesses were listed by the prosecution.116 However, during trial, the prosecution only examined 
28 witnesses, while the defence examined only 17 despite the Tribunal allowing the defence to 
examine a maximum of 20 witnesses.117 Of the 20 charges originally framed against the accused, 
the prosecution succeeded in proving eight charges beyond a reasonable doubt.118 
On charges 1–5 and 13, the accused was found not guilty of the offences of murder, persecution, 
genocide, abduction, abetment and torture.119 As such, he was not accused of committing crimes 
against humanity and genocide as specified in sections 3(2)(a) and 3(2)(c)(i) of The ICT-BD Act.120 
The Tribunal therefore declared that he would be acquitted of the aforesaid charges.121 In the same 
way, the accused was found not guilty on charges 18 (the offence of abetment of torture) and 20 
(the offences of abduction, torture and rape), all of which are deemed crimes against humanity as 
specified in section 3(2)(a) of The ICT-BD Act. Charges 9 (the offence of persecution) and 17 (the 
offence of rape), which constitute crimes against humanity) were also not proved, nor were charges 
12 and 15, which were pertinent to the offence of genocide, which falls within the purview of 
genocide in section 3(2)(c)(i) of The ICT-BD Act. 
However, the accused was found guilty on charges 6 and 11 for the offence of persecution, and 
charge 7 for persecution and abetment as crimes against humanity. He was also found guilty on 
charges 8 (the offences of murder, abduction, torture and persecution falling within the purview of 
crimes against humanity), 10 (the offences of persecution and abduction), 14 (the offences of 
persecution and rape), 16 (the offences of abduction, confinement, rape and abetment) and 19 (the 
offence of other inhuman act). All the above offences of which the accused was found guilty 
formed crimes against humanity under sections 3(2)(a) and 3(2)(g).122 Further, the accused 
forcefully made or conducted forcible religious conversions, particularly from Hindu to Muslim, 
which also amounted to a crime against humanity. 
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In Chief Prosecutor v Motiur Rahman Nizami, the trial and prosecution of the accused was 
challenging due to his having been the President of Pakistan ICS, the student wing of JEI, and also 
the chief of Al-Badr Bahini.123 As the leader of Al-Badr Bahini, he actively opposed the liberation 
of Bangladesh, acting as an auxiliary force in collaboration with Pakistani occupation forces in 
committing crimes against humanity, genocide and atrocities all over Bangladesh. The allegations 
against Nizami included crimes against humanity, genocide, abetment and complicity, along with 
superior responsibility to commit such crimes.124 Tribunal-1 framed 16 charges against the accused 
under sections 3(2)(a), 3(2)(c), 3(2)(f), 3(2)(g) and 3(2)(h) of The ICT-BD Act. The offences under 
this section are read with sections 4(1) and 4(2) and punishable under section 20(2) of the Act.125 
Of the 16 charges, the accused was found not guilty on charges 5, 9–15. However, he was found 
guilty on the other charges. For instance, on charge 16, the accused was found guilty of the offence 
of complicity in the commission of exterminations as a crime against humanity, as specified in 
section 3(2)(a)(h).126 In most of the charges, the accused was found guilty of conspiracy and 
complicity. More broadly, he was accused of crimes against humanity and genocide. However, the 
allegation of genocide was not proved.127  
Some crucial issues drew the attention of a wider audience to this case. In particular, the fact that 
the accused mostly had the role of plan maker meant he had not directly participated in the 
commission of the crimes. The Tribunal describes his role by relating it to aggravating factors:  
Mass killing of a large number of individuals belonging to the intelligentsia class of Bengali 
nation as well as un-armed civilians ‘extremely serious’ offence of crimes against humanity. The 
case in hand concerns such type of unheard of killing committed in execution of designed 
murderous scheme. It not only increases the magnitude of the crimes, but it has imprinted untold 
trauma to the nation. Such ‘extreme seriousness’ inevitably is considered as an aggravating factor 
in awarding sentence for the crimes of mass killing.128  
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Another key requirement in this case was the clarification of the relationship of The ICT-BD Act 
and the Tribunal with international criminal law. The Tribunal clarified the consistency of The 
ICT-BD Act with other international instruments and a detailed chapter in the judgment focused 
on the compliance of the Tribunal’s standard with international standards.129 
In Chief Prosecutor v Muhammad Kamaruzzaman, the accused was one of the top leaders of the 
JEI. The verdict was significant for several reasons.130 The allegations brought against Muhammad 
Kamaruzzaman mostly fell under or formed part of crimes against humanity, and included aiding 
and/or being complicit in such crimes as articulated in section 3(2)(a)(g)(h) of The ICT-BD Act. 
This case produced the third verdict of the Tribunal.131 Tribunal-2 framed seven charges against 
the accused on 4 June 2012, which were read over and explained to the accused in open court. The 
accused pleaded not guilty.132 The discussion included the issues of the right of the victim to obtain 
justice, the assurance of a fair trial, opportunities for the accused to be presumed innocent and the 
allowance of privileged communication. All of the above aspects were examined via the 
instruments of international human rights law.133 
The accused was proved not guilty on charges 5 and 6 for the offence of murder as a crime against 
humanity. In all other charges, he was found guilty beyond every reasonable doubt. The allegations 
and charges were complicity in the commission of murder constituting a crime against humanity 
in charges 1, 3, 4 and 7. He was also found guilty of complicity in committing ‘other inhuman 
acts’ as crimes against humanity.134 
The Tribunal, before imposing any specific punishment, observed that some factors needed to be 
considered. These included the leadership position of the accused, determined by the level of his 
influence and control over the Al-Badar camp; his role as co-offender; and his participation as a 
superior in the criminal acts of his subordinates.135 The violent and humiliating nature of the acts 
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and the victims’ vulnerability in the face of such criminal acts were also considered.136 As a result, 
the Tribunal opined that: 
The conduct of the accused in the exercise of his superior authority could be seen as an 
aggravating circumstance. In the case in hand, we deem it just and appropriate to pen our finding 
that the accused was a perpetrator in white gloves who deserves the highest penalty.137 
The punishment imposed upon him considered multiple charges. Though there had been seven 
charges, the accused was found guilty on five charges, for which he was punished under section 
20(2) of The ICT-BD Act.138 The Tribunal declared that the accused was condemned with the 
punishment of a ‘single sentence of death’. He was also convicted for the crimes as listed in charges 
1 and 7 with a ‘single sentence of life imprisonment’, with an additional ‘10 years imprisonment’ 
for the crimes listed in charge 2.139 
From the above, it appears the Tribunal took the gravity of the offence into consideration when 
determining sentencing. In addition, the defendant’s individual circumstances (ie, age and ailing 
health) as mitigating factors and the brutality of the crimes as an aggravating factor were 
considered in determining sentencing. These aspects of sentencing resonate with the jurisprudence 
of international criminal law as reflected, for example, in the judgment of the ICTR, which has 
instructed under rule 101 that any mitigating and aggravating factors be considered in sentencing. 
Indeed, the trial process of Bangladesh’s tribunals requires the prosecutor and defence to prove 
beyond any reasonable doubt any aggravating or mitigating factors, respectively, that relate 
directly to the offence charged. This is in line with the requirement of the international criminal 
justice system that an accused convicted of a crime does not suffer from excessive punishment, 
which must be proportional to the gravity of the crime and the circumstances under which it was 
committed. The Bangladesh trial process has followed this well-established sentencing rule and 
principle, recognised in both international human rights law and international criminal law. 
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V.C Rules for Appeal of Judgment 
Section 21 of The ICT-BD Act provides that appeal against the decision of the Tribunal may be 
preferred to the Appellate Division. The section states that: 
A person convicted of any crime specified in section 3 and sentenced by a Tribunal may appeal, 
as of right, to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh against such conviction 
and sentence.140 
The section provides for preferring appeal within 30 days from the date of the order given by the 
Tribunal, and it further provides that the ‘appeal shall be disposed of within 60 (sixty) days from 
the date of its filing’.141 
Before the amendment of the ICT-BD Act, there was no option to prefer appeal by the government 
in cases in which the Tribunal awarded any punishment to the accused. The government was only 
allowed to prefer the appeal where the Tribunal declared acquittal of any accused. It is important 
to note that this right to appeal was applicable for those criminals charged with and convicted of 
crimes against humanity and war crimes. This is despite the constitutional provision stated in 
article 47A(2) of the Bangladesh Constitution: 
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution, no person to whom a law specified in 
clause (3) of article 47 applies shall have the right to move the Supreme Court for any of the 
remedies under this Constitution.142 
The constitutional provision as to the right of appeal by any person convicted of any international 
crimes under article 47(3) provides that: 
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution, no law nor any provision thereof 
providing for detention, prosecution or punishment of any person, who is a member of any armed 
or defense or auxiliary forces or any individual, group of individuals or organization or who is a 
prisoner of war, for genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes and other crimes under 
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international law shall be deemed void or unlawful, or ever to have become void or unlawful, on 
the ground that such law or provision of any such law is inconsistent with, or repugnant to, any 
of the provisions of this Constitution.143 
It therefore appears that The ICT-BD Act provides for the right to appeal before the Supreme Court 
even for criminals charged with war crimes such as mass murder, genocide and rape. It does not 
make any distinction between them and criminals charged with other ordinary crimes; a feature 
that makes The ICT-BD Act unique.144 
In Mir Quasem Ali v Chief Prosecutor, International Crimes Tribunal, Dhaka, Bangladesh, the 
Appellate Division allowed appeal on partial charges.145 The accused, Mir Quasem Ali, was tried 
by Tribunal-2 on 14 charges for the offences of crimes against humanity and aiding and complicity 
in the commission of the crimes.146 The Tribunal found him guilty and awarded the death penalty 
in charge 11, as well as imprisonment in several other charges. Charge 11 was framed from the 
allegation that the accused has abetted and facilitated the offences of abduction, confinement, 
torture and murder as crimes against humanity and thereby substantially contributed to the 
commission of crimes against humanity under sections 3(2)(a), 3(2)(a)(g) and 3(2)(a)(h) of The 
ICT-BD Act.147 In the same way, the accused was alleged to have committed the above offences 
under sections 4(1) and 4(2) of the Act.148  
The Tribunal found Mir Quasem Ali not guilty in respect of charges 4 and 12, but convicted him 
in respect of other charges (ie, charges 2, 3, 7, 9, 10 and 11). In an appeal against this order, the 
Appellate Division maintained the conviction and sentence against Mir Quasem Ali.149 The 
Appellate Division was of the view that the way of making the accused guilty was not within the 
comprehension of the Division. Instead of portraying the accused as an ‘abettor’, the Tribunal 
could prove direct participation of the accused in charge 11. Nonetheless, the Apex Court agreed 
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with the outcome of the Tribunal, stating that the sentence of death in respect of charge 11 was 
‘proportionate to the gravity of the crime’.150  
A similar rule was followed by the Appellate Division in Motiur Rahman Nizami v Government of 
Bangladesh.151 The appeal was preferred by the convicted appellant, Motiur Rahman Nizami, 
under section 21(1) of The ICT-BD Act, against the judgment and order dated 29 October 2004, 
passed by Tribunal-1 in ICT-BD Case No. 03 of 2011. The Tribunal convicted the appellant for 
the offence of crimes against humanity and sentenced him to ‘imprisonment for life’ in respect of 
charges 1, 3, 7 and 8, and to ‘death’ in respect of charges 2, 4, 6 and 16, under section 20(2) of The 
ICT-BD Act.152 The Appellate Division considered the application of the appellant and agreed 
partially with the findings of the Tribunal. The Division agreed with the award of the Tribunal; 
however, the appellant was acquitted of charges 1, 3 and 4. His conviction and sentences in respect 
of charges 2, 6, 7, 8 and 16 were maintained.153 
The same rule was followed in Allama Delwar Hossain Sayedee v Government of the People’s 
Republic of Bangladesh.154 In this case, two appeals (Criminal Appeal No 39 of 2013 and 
Criminal Appeal No. 40 of 2013) were preferred by the convicted accused and prosecutor, 
respectively. The former was against the conviction and sentence of the Tribunal, while 
the latter was against the non-awarding of a proportionate sentence in respect of charges 
6, 7, 11, 14, 16 and 19.155 Both the appeals were allowed in part by the majority of judges.156 
The Apex Court held that the convicted appellant be acquitted of charges 6, 11 and 14 and part of 
charge 8 by majority. He was sentenced to ‘10 years rigorous imprisonment’ by a majority in 
charge 7, while his sentence in charge 8 was altered to ‘12 years rigorous imprisonment’. In charge 
10, his sentence was commuted to ‘imprisonment for life’ (ie, the rest of his natural life) by a 
 
150 Ibid [243]. 
151 Motiur Rahman Nizami (n 95). 
152 Ibid [2].  
153 Ibid [153]. 
154 Allama Delwar Hossain Sayedee v The Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, represented by 
Chief Prosecutor, International Crimes Tribunal, Dhaka, Bangladesh, Appellate Division of the Supreme Court 
of Bangladesh, Criminal Appeal A 39/2013. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Ibid [2]. 
 
149 
majority. The same punishment was awarded in respect of charges 16 and 19, which was life 
imprisonment.157 
The Appellate Division also followed the partial acquittal and conviction rule in Ali Ahsan 
Muhammad Mujahid v Chief Prosecutor, International Crimes Tribunal, Dhaka, Bangladesh.158 
This appeal was brought for the judgment and order passed by Tribunal-2, in which the 
accused was found guilty of crimes against humanity, as articulated in section 3(2) of The 
ICT-BD Act.159 He was convicted and sentenced to a ‘single sentence of death’ for the 
crimes listed in charges 6 and 7, ‘five years imprisonment’ for the crimes listed in charge 3 
and ‘imprisonment for life’ for the crimes listed in charge 5.160 However, the Tribunal did 
not award any separate sentence for the crimes listed in charge 1, since charges 1 and 6 
were identical (ie, charges for intellectual killings for the same period). Tribunal-2 
acquitted the appellant of the other charges framed against him;161 however, the Tribunal 
observed that the accused substantially contributed to the commission of the crime of 
genocide.162 The Apex Court considered the appeal in part. The accused appellant was acquitted 
of the first charge. His conviction and sentence were upheld despite what was conferred by the 
Tribunal in charges 3, 5 and 6. His conviction in respect of charge 7 was upheld; however, his 
punishment was commuted to ‘imprisonment for life’.163 
A similar rule was followed in Salauddin Qader Chowdhury v Chief Prosecutor, International 
Crimes Tribunal, Dhaka, Bangladesh.164 In this case, the appeal was brought for the judgment of 
Tribunal-1, in which the accused was found guilty in respect of charges 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 17 and 
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18 and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment, death, 20 years imprisonment, death, death, death, 
five years imprisonment and five years imprisonment, respectively.165 The Apex Court allowed 
the appeal in part and held that the appellant, Salauddin Qader Chowdhury, be found not guilty of 
charge 7 and be acquitted of the corresponding charge. The convictions and sentences in respect 
of charges 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 17 and 18 were maintained.166 
In Muhammad Kamaruzzaman v Chief Prosecutor, International Crimes Tribunal, Dhaka, 
Bangladesh, appeal was allowed with certain modifications.167 The appeal was brought against the 
judgment and order passed by Tribunal-2.168 The Appellate Division held that the appellant, 
Muhammad Kamaruzzaman, be acquitted of charge 1. The majority upheld his conviction and 
sentencing in respect of charges 2 and 7, and commuted his conviction in respect of charge 4 to 
‘imprisonment for life’.169 While his conviction in respect of charge 3 was maintained 
unanimously, his sentence of death for said charge was only maintained by a majority.170  
In Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh v Abdul Quader Molla; Abdul Quader 
Molla v Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, appeal was allowed by majority,171 
the appeal was brought by the government against the judgment and order passed by Tribunal-2, 
and was allowed by a majority. The Appellate Division found the accused guilty in charge 4 and 
sentenced him to ‘life imprisonment’, whereas he had been acquitted by the Tribunal. By a 
majority of 4 to 1, Abdul Quader Molla was convicted and sentenced to death in respect to charge 
6,172 which was unanimously upheld by the Appellate Division through the dismissal of the appeal 
filed by the convicted accused.173 Consequently, by a majority of 4 to 1, the conviction and 
sentence passed was also maintained against the accused in respect of charges 1, 2, 3 and 5.174  
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The appeal was a milestone in the history of international law and international criminal law. The 
observation of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh attracted the interest of 
the international community, particularly on the question of the application of customary 
international law at a domestic level. In determining the applicability of customary international 
law, the Apex Court held that the domestic tribunals could not apply customary international law 
if that law was not consistent with an Act of Parliament or precedent of the courts.175 In this respect, 
the Appellate Division observed that:  
The domestic courts have to make sure that what they are doing is consonant with the conditions 
of internal competence under which they must work. Thus, the rule of international law shall not 
be applied if it is contrary to a statute. There is no rule of customary international law that 
prohibits our domestic tribunal to proceed with the trial as per our domestic legislation, and as 
such, it can be safely said that rules of public international law allow the domestic tribunal to 
proceed with the trial as per The ICT-BD Act. Therefore, the rules of international law whether 
applicable or not, our domestic tribunal has the jurisdiction to continue with the trial in any 
manner acting in derogation of the rules of public international law. Besides, there is nothing 
repugnant to customary international law in the Act, 1973, which is consonant with the provisions 
of customary international law.176 
In Chief Prosecutor v ATM Azharul Islam, the accused was charged with six charges.177 As the 
accused was a leader of ICS and the Al-Badr, he played a notorious role in the planning of atrocities 
committed by the anti-liberation forces during the Liberation War.178 It was alleged that he aided 
Pakistani troops in committing offences constituting crimes against humanity as defined in The 
ICT-BD Act.179 It was further alleged that Azharul Islam, along with other armed members of the 
JEI, ICS and Pakistani army abducted AY Mahfuz Ali Zorres Mia and 10 others. Other allegations 
included that Azharul Islam, with others, looted and torched many houses and shot dead 14 
unarmed civilians, abducted four professors of Carmichael College and their wives and shot them 
dead near Damdam Bridge, and tortured Shawkat Hossain Ranga for chanting the ‘Joy Bangla’ 
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slogan in Rangpur town. The Tribunal sentenced Azharul Islam to death and rigorous 
imprisonment under section 20(2) of The ICT-BD Act. Subsequently, the convicted filed an appeal 
against the decision of the Tribunal. In ATM Azharul Islam v Bangladesh,180 the Appellate Division 
dismissed the appeal and handed down capital punishment to Azharul Islam. The appeal was heard 
by a four-member bench of the Appellate Division, headed by Chief Justice Syed Mahmud 
Hossain. While handing down the capital punishment, the Appellate Court upheld four charges 
against Azharul Islam, but acquitted him of another. On the release of the verdict on 15 March 
2020, the Appellate Court cleared the way for Azharul Islam to move a further review petition 
under Article 105 of the Constitution.181  
The provision for appeal was introduced to bring the law into conformity with international human 
rights law, such as article 14(5) of the ICCPR, which enjoins the states that have undertaken such 
treaty obligations to organise their systems of criminal procedure in a manner to allow those 
convicted of a criminal offence to have recourse to a higher tribunal for the purposes of appellate 
review. It also resonates with the norms and approaches by which the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC 
bound themselves in respect of their appellate proceedings. Bangladesh’s trial system has gone 
one step further by allowing the appellate parties to seek and receive a review of an appeal 
judgment in the Apex Court. This generous right to appeal and review is intended to fulfil the 
obligations of Bangladesh under international human rights law and international criminal law. 
V.D Rules for Review of Judgment 
In addition to the right to appeal to the Supreme Court, convicted war criminals are also entitled 
to the right to review by the Appellate Division under Article 105 of the Constitution. Article 105 
of the Constitution of Bangladesh states that: 
The Appellate Division shall have power, subject to the provisions of any Act of Parliament and 
of any rules made by that division to review any judgment pronounced or order made by it.182 
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The issue of the right to a review by the Appellate Division in cases of international crimes is a 
complex question in Bangladesh. It became an issue in the judgment of the Appellate Division in 
Abdul Quader Molla v Chief Prosecutor, International Crimes Tribunal, Dhaka, when Molla was 
allowed to file a review petition, not based on either constitutional provisions or Supreme Court 
rules,183 but on the inherent power of the Supreme Court.184 It is important to note that provisions 
on review do not confer a right to the litigants, and the Supreme Court can only use its inherent 
power to review.185 Rule 1 of Order 26 of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh (Appellate Division) 
Rules 1998 provides that, in a criminal proceeding, the review may be done ‘only on the ground 
of an error apparent on the face of the record’.186 In this respect, the rule states that:  
Subject to the law and the practice of the Court, the Court may, either of its own motion or on 
the application of a party to a proceeding, review its judgment or order in a Civil proceeding on 
grounds similar to those mentioned in Order XL VII, rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure and 
in a Criminal proceeding on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record.187 
It therefore appears from the above discussion that, although the petitioner may be entitled to have 
a door open for review, this right is available only in the case of material errors having occurred 
in the previous judgment. Given this restricted nature of the right to review under the Constitution, 
only eight criminal review petitions have been filed against decisions, all of which have been in 
connection with death sentences passed by the tribunals. In the criminal review petition of 
Muhamad Kamaruzzaman, Muhamad Kamaruzzaman v Government of Bangladesh, the Appellate 
Division held that: 
We unequivocally expressed that it is now well settled that a review of an earlier Order is not 
permissible unless the Court is satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of the Order, 
undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. We observed that a review of 
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judgment is a serious step and the Courts are reluctant to invoke their power except where a 
glaring omission or patent mistake or grave error have crept in earlier by judicial fallibility.188 
The issue of the right to review also arose in Government of Bangladesh v Allama Delwar Hossain 
Sayedee; Allama Delwar Hossain Sayedee v Chief Prosecution (ICT).189 The review was pertinent 
to the petitioner’s conviction in respect of charges 7, 10, 16 and 19 and part of charge 8 with 
modification of conviction. However, the Court clarified its position at the review stage, claiming 
that it could not reassess the evidence afresh and was incapable of rehearing.190 The argument 
forwarded on behalf of Allama Sayedee was that the Appellate Division had committed an error 
of law in believing part of charge 8, which relied on the evidence of prosecution witnesses 1, 2, 6, 
7, 10, 11 and 12. However, the Court clarified that such matters go beyond the pale of the Appellate 
Division at the review stage.191 With respect to all the charges, the Court found no scope to move 
from the position it took at the appellate stage. The Appellate Division held that: 
The points raised by the learned counsel are reiteration of the points agitated at the time of hearing 
of the appeal. There is hardly any scope of rehearing of the matter afresh as a court of appeal in 
a review petition … all the review petitions merit no consideration and accordingly they are 
dismissed.192  
A question as to the rehearing at the review also arose in Chief Prosecutor v Mir Quasem Ali.193 
This review petition was filed against the conviction and sentence maintained at the appellate stage 
by this court in respect of charges 2, 3, 7, 9, 10, 11 and 14. The defence counsel pressed the leave 
petition, mainly for charge 11, although the other charges were not excluded from the purview of 
the Division.194 The main contention concerned the murder of Jasim Uddin and the relation of the 
petition to that. The Court concluded at the review stage that the killing of Jasim Uddin along with 
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four or five others had been perpetrated with the direct participation of the petitioner.195 The 
decision of the Court at the review stage did not change since the petitioner’s claim went beyond 
the purview of the review jurisdiction. The Court in this regard observed that: 
A review is not a rehearing of the matter afresh. It is only a clerical mistake or mistake apparent 
on the face of the record that can be corrected but does not include the correction of any erroneous 
view of law taken by the court.196 
The Appellate Division was concerned with the application for commutation. In its view, 
commutation is mainly executed by the executive. The defence argued for commutation on the 
ground that the petitioner had contributed significantly to the economic development of 
Bangladesh, since he had established a business conglomerate employing thousands of 
Bangladeshi.197 However, the Court rejected that argument by observing that it is ‘not a legal 
ground to commute the sentence’.198 The Court is endowed with the task of determining the 
culpability of the accused; it is not its task to be concerned with the law regulating the sentencing 
principles.199 
In Motiur Rahman Nizami v Chief Prosecutor, International Crimes Tribunal, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 
the Appellate Division dismissed the review application on summary hearing.200 In this case, the 
review petition was brought for the judgment and order dated 6 January 2016, passed by the 
Appellate Division in Criminal Appeal No. 143 of 2014. The Appellate Division maintained 
Motiur Rahman Nizami’s conviction and sentence on five counts; namely, charges 2, 6, 7, 8 and 
16. However, the counsel on behalf of the petitioner sought review in respect of three counts; 
namely, charges 2, 6 and 16.201 The Apex Court did not find any merit to justify modifying or 
standing away from its finding as the appellate body. The petitioner’s involvement and complicity 
in the perpetration of offences of crimes against humanity and genocide had been impliedly 
 
195 Ibid [20]. 
196 Ibid [26].  
197 Ibid. 
198 Ibid. 
199 Ibid [27]. 
200 Motiur Rahman Nizami v Chief Prosecutor, International Crimes Tribunal, Dhaka, Bangladesh, Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, Criminal Review Petition 42/2016. 
201 Ibid [1]–[2]. 
 
156 
admitted by the accused. Moreover, in light of the counsel’s submission regarding the 
commutation of the sentence, the petitioner could not dispute his involvement in those offences. 
Therefore, the Appellate Division dismissed the application summarily.202 
In Ali Ahsan Muhammad Mujahid v Chief Prosecutor, International Crimes Tribunal, Dhaka, 
Bangladesh, the review application was dismissed.203 The review petition was brought against the 
judgment and order passed by Tribunal-2.204 The petitioner brought multiple grounds on different 
charges, but the counsel limited the submission to only the allegation made in charge 6.205 The 
counsel argued on the vagueness and lack of specificity in the contents of charge 6.206 It also argued 
that the prosecution had failed to prove elements of conspiracy against the petitioner.207 The Court 
analysed the role of the accused and the gravity of the crimes committed. Finally, it did not find 
any difference with the findings at the appellate stage. It was held that: 
We do not find any wrong in the ultimate conclusion of the Tribunal which has been affirmed by 
the Appellate judgment. We do not find any illegality in our Appellate judgment. Hence, the 
review petition is dismissed.208 
In Salauddin Qader Chowdhury v Chief Prosecutor, International Crimes Tribunal, Dhaka, 
Bangladesh, the review application was also dismissed.209 This review petition was brought for 
the judgment and order dated 29 July 2015, passed by the Appellate Division in Criminal Appeal 
No. 122 of 2013. The petitioner brought 16 grounds in the original review petition. However, in 
the course of the hearing, the learned counsel did not argue the merits of the case nor press any 
grounds, but rather put forward a plea of alibi. The Appellate Division rejected the plea and found 
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that the counsel had failed to show any error in their decision.210 Finally, the Appellate Division 
concluded that: 
The learned Counsel having not argued on merit pointing any error in the impugned judgment, it 
is apparent that there is no error of law in the impugned judgment for our interference. We find 
no cogent ground to review our judgment. The review petition is accordingly dismissed.211 
Similarly, the review application was dismissed in Muhammad Kamaruzzaman v Government of 
Bangladesh.212 The review petition was presented against the judgment and order of 3 November 
2014, passed by the Appellate Division in Criminal Appeal No. 62 of 2013. According to the 
petitioner, the Appellate Division failed to determine and evaluate the elements of crimes against 
humanity, which included an attack directed against a civilian population, which was widespread 
and systematic and based on one of the discriminatory grounds listed in section 3(2)(a) of The ICT-
BD Act, with nexus between the attack and the acts of the accused, within the accused’s knowledge, 
as part of a state policy or plan.213 However, the arguments were not convincing to the Appellate 
Division. Moreover, the Division was of the view that the review petition had limitations in terms 
of its scope. Finally, the Court dismissed the review petition.214 
The Appellate Division also dismissed the review application in the case of Abdul Quader Molla 
v Chief Prosecutor, International Crimes Tribunal, Dhaka.215 Significantly, as a major part of this 
review petition, the Court engaged in an in-depth analysis of the rationale for the existence of the 
death penalty, capital punishment’s international status and the extent to which it is justified or 
proportionate to have this kind of punishment. The Division analysed the jurisprudence of major 
legal systems,216 with the Apex Court holding that: 
It is axiomatic that in affirming death sentence, we followed ICPR guidelines, doctrine of just 
desert having proportionality and commensurability as its touch stone and the predicament the 
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victims, their families and the country as a whole suffered, and, of course also looked at the 
presumed intention of the legislators.217 
The guidelines provided in the Molla review judgment are:  
1. there needs to be a real, material ground on the face of the case that require the interference 
of the Court; 
2. the error must be so obvious that keeping it on the record would be legally wrong; 
3. divergent views is not a valid ground for review, nor are minor mistakes, clerical mistakes, 
etc; and 
4. review is not a rehearing of any matter afresh and the litigations cannot claim to seek a 
review of judgment as a matter of rehearing or seeking a fresh decision from the Court.218  
The Apex Court observed that review jurisdiction should not be invoked for the rehearing of a 
whole case nor treated as an appeal against a judgment.219 It therefore opined for the restricted 
exercise of judicial power in reviewing a decision on the ground that any departure from the 
opinion is justified only when it is necessary in compelling circumstances. It concluded by 
observing that, insofar as the Court’s reasoning and statutory interpretation must be taken as the 
finality of decisions, the power of the review is restricted by the above guidelines.220 
V.E Conclusion 
The rules for the post-trial process under The ICT-BD Act meet the requirements of the basic 
principles of the criminal justice mechanism. The analysis of the cases in this chapter demonstrates 
that the rules for judgment, appeal and review are consistent with the rules of criminal law 
jurisprudence. The adoption, interpretation and application of both The ICT-BD Act and 
international criminal law and the precedents in these judgments have developed the domestic 
criminal law in Bangladesh considerably. These judgments have increased the capacity of 
Bangladesh’s domestic criminal justice system and the ability of its domestic tribunals to 
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220 Ibid [46]–[47]; see also Islam (n 8) 381–2. 
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adjudicate serious crimes under international criminal law. This is quite a significant achievement 
for the administration of the criminal justice system nationally and internationally. 
Although The ICT-BD Act excludes the applicability of domestic criminal law and evidence law, 
the rules for trial (leading to judgments and convictions), appeal and review are consistent with 
the Rules of Procedure and the jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals. The tribunals 
and the Appellate Division have been vigilant in managing the proceedings and delivering the 
verdict within the rules of criminal law jurisprudence. The findings of the tribunals were not 
substantially modified at the appeal stage; rather, in most of the cases, the Appellate Division 
upheld the original findings of the tribunals. The same applies to the review jurisdiction: rarely 
was there any change in the findings of the Appellate Court at the review stage.  
Some significant challenges have been dealt with by the tribunals at the initial stage, before fixing 
the liability of the accused for their alleged crimes. These challenges have included establishing 
judgment in absentia, dismissing the requirement for the definition of crimes against humanity to 
have a ‘widespread and systematic’ component, and balancing consideration of mitigating factors 
and aggravating factors. Bangladesh also provides those accused and convicted of international 
crimes with the right to appeal and review with the highest court of the land, with the scope of 
appeal and review jurisdiction having been delineated by the Appellate Division of the Supreme 
Court in the cases Abdul Quader Molla v Chief Prosecutor, International Crimes Tribunal, Dhaka 
and Chief Prosecutor v Mir Quasem Ali. It has been determined that if a point raised by the defence 
is rejected by the Appellate Division, the same point cannot be raised in review, because appeal 
jurisdiction, as observed by the Appellate Division, is not a rehearsal stage of the review 
proceedings. 
Given that a question remains as to the relation of the rules and strategies under the ICT-BD Act 
to international standards, the next chapter compares the rules and strategies under the ICT-BD Act 
to international standards. 
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VI INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND TRIALS UNDER THE ICT-BD ACT 
VI.A Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the rules and procedures for judgment, appeals, review, conviction 
and sentencing under The ICT-BD Act and the Rules of Procedures. This chapter now evaluates 
these rules and procedures to explore their consistency and standard in relation to international 
criminal law. This will address the research question: To what extent are Bangladesh’s domestic 
trials of international crimes rendered complementary to those under the ICC? The dynamics of 
international criminal law are the domestic mechanism is forming part or conforming to the 
international system.1 Some claim that the basic unity of all law can be viewed as a single building, 
rising from the lowest levels of society, up through the state-level stratum to reach its highest level 
in the community of states.2 This highest strata is important in the complementary jurisdiction of 
international criminal law. Here lies the significance of the domestic system; the domestic tribunal 
is established, followed by international rules and norms. International criminal law is thus directly 
enhanced by both the international and domestic courts.3 It can be seen as two sides of the same 
coin, involving both forums.  
The complementary system integrates domestic systems under the ICC, requiring compliance with 
the rules and procedures under The Rome Statute.4 However, the ICC was never intended as a 
supranational legal institution and is not seen or treated as such by the states. Rather, it was devised 
as a last resort, treaty-based international legal institution to maintain the importance of the 
national legal systems of contracting parties.5 The ICT-BD Act is a domestic mechanism, whose 
distinction has attracted global attention. It has been argued that the tribunals under The ICT-BD 
Act face the issue of the relationship between The Rome Statute and The ICT-BD Act in all cases.6 
 
1 Carsten Stahn, A Critical Introduction to International Criminal Law (Cambridge University Press, 2018) 58. 
22 JHW Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective (AW Sijthoff-Leyden, 1968) 91.  
3 Gerhard Werle and Floria Jessberger, Principles of International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2014) 
91.  
4 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (adopted 25 May 1993), art 9(2); 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (adopted 8 November 1994), art 8(2).  
5 M Cherif Bassiouni, ‘The ICC: Quo Vadis’ (July 2006) 4(3) Journal of International Criminal Justice 422. 
6 See Chapter Five of this thesis. 
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This chapter aims to offer a critical appraisal of Bangladesh’s tribunal trials under The ICT-BD 
Act, especially in terms of their international standards and compliance with the ICC. 
VI.B International Standard of The ICT-BD Act 
The benchmark of success is dependent upon a number of key considerations. These include cost, 
productivity and overall contribution to the development of principles of international criminal 
justice.7 An official willingness to revise the ICT-BD framework to learn from international 
experiences, as well as broad-based public debate on a range of accountability options, could help 
to address these concerns and satisfy the need for justice.8 The development of international 
criminal law cannot be described without relating it to domestic systems, which play a significant 
role in ensuring justice while ending the culture of impunity. Since World War II, global 
investigations and prosecutions have had parallel domestic prosecuting mechanisms. As such, 
international criminal law adopted the system of complementary jurisdiction, in which 
international and domestic systems continue in parallel. Although the ICT-BD is solely a domestic 
tribunal, its trials are regarded as based on rules and procedures consistent with international 
criminal law and international human rights law.9 In respect of The ICT-BD Act, it has been 
recognised that: 
The 1973 Bangladesh Act represents an important recognition and implementation of 
international due process guarantees for these accused of international crimes. This act goes 
beyond the Nuremberg guarantees.10 
 
7 Toby M Cadmann, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Complementarity and National 




8 Caitlin Reiger, ‘Fighting Past Impunity in Bangladesh: A National Tribunal for the Crimes of 1971’ (2010) 
International Center for Transitional Justice 1, 6. 
9 For instance, international human rights law appreciates the abolition of the death penalty; however, as of now, 
under the ICT-BD Act six death sentences have been executed.  
10 Jordan Paust and Albert Blaustein, ‘War Crimes Jurisdiction and Due Process: The Bangladesh Experience,’ 
(1978) 11(1) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 38. 
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The ICT-BD follows international norms and rules that do not necessarily apply to the domestic 
tribunals. These norms and rules help to maintain international standards and consistency when 
prosecuting international crimes.  
VI.B.1 Compliance with the Rules of International Criminal Law 
A key aspect of international criminal law is the similarity of its rules and procedures for 
investigation, trial and judgment.11 This means that many important questions dealt with by the 
tribunals also apply to international criminal law. To respond, the Tribunal has to shed light on 
issues of international criminal law to comply with international standards. To assess the 
compliance of ICT-BD in terms of its coherence with international standards or rules of 
international law, the views and approaches of the tribunals must be evaluated. In its judgments, 
the ICT-BD has relied heavily on the international court and tribunal jurisprudence. In Chief 
Prosecutor v Md Reaz Uddin Fakir, the Tribunal says that The ICT-BD Act has the merit and 
means of ensuring the standard of universally recognised safeguards, and that this is maintained 
duly at all stages of proceedings before the Tribunal.12 In terms of standards, in Chief Prosecutor 
v Motiur Rahman Nizami, Tribunal-1 held that: 
Many have expressed their concern by the degree to which the above definition of ‘Crimes 
against Humanity’ under the Act differs from international standards. It may be stated that 
‘international standard’ itself is a fluid concept, it changes with time and requirement through a 
mechanism of progressive development of law. Therefore, one can look at the concept of 
‘standard’ from entirely a technical perspective, whereas, others can see it as a matter of inherent 
spirit.13 
In Chief Prosecutor v Abdul Quader Molla, Tribunal-2 mentions the issue of the rules of 
international criminal law. Concerning the legality of The ICT-BD Act’s retrospectivity, the 
Tribunal justified its retrospective nature by referring to the jurisprudence of the ICTY, ICTR and 
SCSL.14 In many cases, the Tribunal has laid the charge of violating customary international law 
 
11 Werle and Jessberger (n 3) 91.  
12 Chief Prosecutor v Md Reaz Uddin Fakir, ICT-BD 04 of 2013 [7]. 
13 Chief Prosecutor v Motiur Rahman Nizami, ICT-BD 03 of 2011 [11]. 
14 Chief Prosecutor v Abdul Quader Molla, ICT-BD 02 of 2012 [3].  
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during the Liberation War. The ICT-BD has held that the Tribunal is not precluded from seeking 
guidance from international reference and relevant jurisprudence if necessary to resolve charges 
and the culpability of the accused.15 The Tribunal further connected the jurisprudence and 
principles of international law to the judiciary of Bangladesh, stating: 
In trying the offences under the general law, the court of law in our country does not rely on our 
own standards only; it considers settled and recognised jurisprudence from around the world.16  
The Tribunal again pointed out the relevance of developments happening in the international 
criminal justice system. It felt that even in the absence of any explicit provisions, the Tribunal is 
morally obliged to examine what was done in similar situations in other courts and tribunals, and 
to take those decisions into account.17 Regarding the determination of international crimes, the 
Tribunal expressed its limitations and requested contributions from international criminal law. The 
Tribunal also detailed its dependency on other tribunals set up to investigate and prosecute 
international crimes. It argued that they should rely on sources like the jurisprudence that grew out 
of these matters in the ad hoc tribunals.18  
Regarding the limitation and time bar, international standards have been used to measure the 
compliance of the ICT-BD, which has referred to the jurisprudence of international courts and 
tribunals including the Genocide Convention, Geneva Conventions, Convention on the Non-
Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, the Nazi war 
crime trials, the trial of Maurice Papon in France, the trials of the Pol Pot regime of Cambodia, 
Slobodan Milošević’s trial, the trial of Charles Tylor of Liberia and the prosecution of Augusto 
Pinochet.19 The Tribunal held that the obligation of the UDHR was both indispensable and 
inescapable and therefore not a bar to bringing perpetrators to justice. Moreover, the violation of 
customary international law is open to trial and prosecution, and no bar of limitation applies.20  
 
15 Ibid [33], [77]. 
16 Ibid [40]. 
17 Motiur Rahman Nizami (n 13) [40]. 
18 Ibid [69]. 
19 Ibid [83]–[84].  




Regarding the retrospectivity of The ICT-BD Act, international standards must be observed.21 A 
submission was brought before the Tribunal that the retrospective nature of the Act was a bar to 
the prosecution according to The Rome Statute. The Tribunal held that, apart from The Rome 
Statute, all international and hybrid tribunals are retrospective. Thus, in Chief Prosecutor v Abdul 
Quader Molla  ̧the legality of retrospectivity was justified by citing the jurisprudence of the ICTY, 
ICTR and SCSL: 
There should be no ambiguity that even under retrospective legislation (Act XIX enacted in 1973) 
initiation to prosecute crimes against humanity, genocide and system crimes committed in 
violation of customary international law is fairly permitted. It is to be noted that the ICTY, ICTR 
and SCSL the judicial bodies backed by the United Nations (UN) have been constituted under 
their respective retrospective Statutes. Only the International Criminal Court (ICC) is founded 
on prospective Statute.22 
In Chief Prosecutor v Abdul Quader Molla, the key issue was whether the two victims were 
freedom fighters. If they were, they would have been party to the conflict and so not civilians. The 
Tribunal noted the specific status of the victims at the time of the commission of the crime (ie, 
when they were attacked), rather than their general status.23 In assessing the status of the victim, 
because the crime involved section 3(2) of The ICT-BD Act, the Tribunal adopted the jurisprudence 
of the ICTY.24 
It was further argued that the accused was only an aider or abettor and so should not be tried while 
ignoring the trial of those committing the actual crime. In response, the Tribunal examined the 
relevant international jurisprudence to find any examples of trying the aider or abettor alone. The 
Tribunal used the example of the SCSL, in which Charles Tylor was tried only as an aider or 
abettor. The tribunal accepted this aspect as law and concluded that an aider or abettor can be 
tried.25 
 
21 ICT-BD Act, art 3 provides the application of offences committed before the commencement of the Act.  
22 Abdul Quader Molla (n 14) [3]. 
23 Ibid [290]–[291]. 
24 Ibid [291]–[292]. 
25 Ibid [119]. 
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To further the proof of compliance with international criminal law, Tribunal-2, in Chief Prosecutor 
v Abdul Quader Molla, ruled that a ‘plan’ or ‘policy’ is not a precondition or constitutive element 
of crimes against humanity, stating: 
Tribunal notes that ‘policy’ and ‘plan’ are not the elements to constitute the offence of crimes 
against humanity. It is true that the common denominator of a systematic attack is that it is carried 
out pursuant to a preconceived policy or plan. But these may be considered as factors only and 
not as elements.26  
This was supported by the judgment of the ICTY in the case of Prosecutor v Dragoljub Kunarac. 
In this case, it was held that as the attack was directed against a civilian population and was 
widespread or systematic, these were legal elements to the crime rendering it unnecessary to show 
that they were the result of the existence of a policy or plan.27 The Tribunal held that in the case 
of the Pallab murder, single or limited acts of the accused could be treated as crimes against 
humanity unless they were isolated or random acts.28 
Concerning hearsay evidence admissibility, the Tribunal found it relevant first under the discretion 
conferred upon the Tribunal under The ICT-BD Act and the Rules of Procedure (rule 56, sub-rule 
2). Second, admissibility was found in the decision of the ICTR Trial Chamber in the case of 
Prosecutor v Kajelijeti,29 decided on 1 December 2003. Equal weight is placed by the Tribunal on 
the ICTR’s jurisprudence and the domestic Act.30 
VI.B.2 Compliance with the Rules of the International Law of Human Rights 
Human Rights Watch has argued that substantial changes have been made to the Act, including in 
terms of the rights of accused persons to be presumed innocent, the right to a fair and public hearing 
 
26 Ibid [123]. 
27 Prosecutor v Dragoljub Kunarac (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeal 
Chamber, Case No IT-96-23-A, 12 June 2002). 
28 Abdul Quader Molla (n 14) [200]. 
29 Prosecutor v Juvénal Kajelijeti (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Trial Chamber, Case No ICTR-
98-44A-T, 1 December 2003). 
30 Ibid [177]–[178]. 
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with the counsel of their choice and the right to apply for and be granted bail.31 The changes also 
prohibit double jeopardy, do not require the accused to confess guilt, and place the burden solely 
upon the prosecution to prove beyond every reasonable doubt the commission of a crime by the 
accused.32 The broad compliance of the trial process with the ICCPR has been explained in 
Chapter IV.  
Here, the ICCPR is referred to only in so far as it demonstrates the fair trial aspect of the 
Bangladesh trial process. The tribunals allowed appeal to the Appellate Division of the Supreme 
Court against the order of the Tribunal, challenging it on several grounds. These included failures 
to comply with the substantive procedural safeguards provided in the ICCPR, to which Bangladesh 
is bound. The general rule of international jurisprudence is that a state must not violate the rights 
guaranteed under the ICCPR, unless doing so is in accordance with the law. The provision of 
Article 14 of the ICCPR clearly allows that everyone is equal before the courts and tribunals. In 
the laying of criminal charges against them, and their rights and obligations in a suit, they are 
entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal as 
established by law. Any judgment made in a criminal case or in a suit at law should be made public 
unless doing so would negatively affect juvenile persons or the proceedings concern domestic 
disputes or the guardianship of minors.33 These rights can only be violated if necessary for public 
interest and security.  
The press and the public may be kept out of all or part of a trial for reasons of morals, public order 
or national security in a democratic society. They may also be excluded if the private lives of the 
parties require it, at least as far as is strictly necessary in the court’s opinion, or for example where 
 
31 Human Rights Watch, Bangladesh: Guarantee Fair Trials for Independence-Era Crimes, Amendments to 
Tribunal’s Rules Fall Short of International Standards (Web Page, 11 July 2011) 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/07/11/bangladesh-guarantee-fair-trials-independence-era-crimes. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, represented by the Chief Prosecutor, International 
Crimes Tribunal, Dhaka, Bangladesh (Appellant) v Abdul Quader Molla (Respondent), Appellate Division of 
the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, Criminal Appeal No 24 of 2013; Abdul Quader Molla (Appellant) v 
Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, represented by the Chief Prosecutor, International Crimes 
Tribunal, Dhaka, Bangladesh (Respondent), Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, Criminal 




publicity might bias the interests of justice. M Amir-Ul Islam, as amicus curie, presented before 
the Appellate Division that: 
The ICT-BD Act 1973 included important fair-trial and due-process rights enshrined in the 
International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which was not yet in force when 
The ICT-BD Act 1973 was enacted. Bangladesh has an obligation under the ICCPR to protect 
and preserve the accused person’s right to fair trial and the Constitution of Bangladesh itself 
contains the right to fair trial.34 
Bangladesh is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR) 
and its First Optional Protocol.35 Therefore, Bangladesh is under an obligation to follow the 
provision of article 6(2) of the ICCPR. The Tribunal complied with this provision of the ICCPR. 
The Tribunal held that article 6(2) of the ICCPR, which has by now assumed the status of 
customary international law, affirms that in states that retain capital punishment, the death penalty 
may only be imposed for the ‘most serious crimes’.36 However, capital punishment cannot be 
imposed on pregnant women or children under any circumstances. The judgment of Justice 
Surendra Kumar Sinha, which has been agreed by Chief Justice Md Muzammel Hossain, is 
pertinent here. Justice Sinha pointed out that Bangladesh considers that the perpetrators of crimes 
against humanity, crimes against peace, genocide and war crimes should be tried.37 The state has 
an obligation to remedy serious violations of human rights, as stated by Article 8 of the UDHR 
and Article 2(3) of the ICCPR, which ensure the right to an effective remedy for violations of 
human rights, and to which Bangladesh has subscribed.38 Bangladesh considers that the right to 
remedy should also be given to the victims of crimes against humanity.39 
The same issue came before the Tribunal in Chief Prosecutor v Moulana Abul Kalam Azad.40 
Tribunal-2 held that the provisions of The ICT-BD Act and its RoP were sufficiently compatible 
 
34 Ibid [546]. 
35 Ibid [553].  
36 Ibid [780].  
37 Ibid [76] 
38 Ibid.  
39 Chief Prosecutor v (1) Ashrafuzzaman Khan @ Naeb Ali Khan [absconded] and (2) Chowdhury Mueen Uddin 
[absconded], ICT-BD 01 of 2013 [148]–[149]. 
40 Chief Prosecutor v Moulana Abdul Kalam Azad, ICT-BD 05 of 2012. 
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with the accused’s rights, which are embodied in Article 14 of the ICCPR. The ICT-BD Act has 
both the merit of and mechanism for guaranteeing that universal safeguard standards are given to 
persons accused of crimes against humanity.41  
The Tribunal referred to article 9(2) of the ICCPR and compared it with rule (3) of the Rules of 
Procedure under The ICT-BD Act, noting that this provision of the Rules of Procedure is 
compatible with the ICCPR.42 It noted that this Tribunal could hold trials in absentia without 
violating human rights, as guaranteed by the ICCPR and other agreements.43 The Tribunal 
concluded in this regard that the right to disclosure and adequate opportunity to prepare a defence 
were sufficiently guaranteed so that the appointed state counsel could defend the interest of the 
absconded accused, in this case Moulana Abul Kalam Azad, while maintaining with article 9(2) 
and 14(3)(a) of the ICCPR.44 It was further held by the Tribunal that the jurisprudence of both the 
ICCPR and the ICESCR rules that a trial in absentia does not violate the accused’s right to be 
present if they have clearly declined to exercise this right.45 
From the above, there are clear points of similarity between international standards and the rules 
and procedures for investigation, trial and judgment under The ICT-BD Act. Moreover, 
international standards are not fixed; they are flexible, have various levels and depths, and vary 
from case to case. The War Crimes Committee of the International Bar Association has claimed 
that the amended Bangladeshi legislation provides a system that is broadly compatible with current 
international standards. However, the War Crimes Committee recommended 17 changes be made 
to trial procedures and rules, especially in reference to the rights of the accused.46 
 
41 Ibid [4]. 
42 Ibid [25]. 
43 Ibid [26]. 
44 Ibid [27]. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR), art 9(2), which provides 
that: ‘Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be 
promptly informed of any charges against him’. Article 14(3)(a) of ICPPR provides that ‘in the determination 
of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full 
equality: To be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he understands of the nature and cause of 
the charge against him’. 
45 Moulana Abdul Kalam Azad (n 40) [53].  
46 See International Bar Association, Analysis of Overcrowded and Under-Examined Areas (13 February 2019), 
which reports on the organisations’ work on ameliorating domestic capacity to try serious international crimes.  
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VI.B.3 Consistency with the Rules of Other International Crimes Tribunals  
Bangladesh was confident in promising justice to the victims of the War of Liberation during the 
immediate postwar period. The government forcefully adopted The ICT-BD Act in 1973, at a time 
when there were few examples of prosecution of international crimes. Other than the trials for the 
atrocities committed during World War II, there were no examples for Bangladesh to follow. The 
major developments relating to adjudicating international crimes have only occurred since the last 
decade of the 20th century. The crimes defined under The ICT-BD Act were first, in general, 
adopted from the IMT Charter (Nuremberg), the Statute of the IMT (Tokyo) and Control Council 
Law No 10. The exclusion clause to apply the Evidence Act 1872 and the Code of Criminal 
Procedure 1898 shows that procedure under this law was intended to be internationally available. 
However, below, this chapter examines the challenges and criticisms levelled at the international 
criminal courts and tribunals, helping to frame the argument that no particular institution functions 
perfectly without criticism. The same is true of the ICT-BD, which is also not perfect. 
The ICC is the main judicial organ of the international criminal justice system. As such, it can 
cause long delays and uncertainty. No time limit is required for completing preliminary 
examinations before the ICC.47 The situation of Afghanistan is worth noting here. The country 
became party to The Rome Statute in 2003. The preliminary examination was only made public in 
2007. Over 10 years later, it remains at the preliminary examination stage (ie, at admissibility 
status).48  
Similarly, while the ECCC commenced functioning in 2006, the death in 2013 of prime target Ieng 
Sary threw into question the seriousness on the part of the ECCC team to ensure justice for the 
 
47 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examination (November 2013) https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-
Policy_Paper_Preliminary_Examinations_2013-ENG.pdf [21]. 
48 Afghanistan deposited its instrument of accession to the Rome Statute on 10 February 2003. Since the 
preliminary examination made 10 years earlier, the Office of the Prosecutor has received numerous 
communications under article 15 of the Rome Statute related to this situation. At the preliminary stage, the focus 
is on crimes listed in the Rome Statute allegedly committed in the context of the armed conflict between pro-
government forces and anti-government forces, including the ‘crimes against humanity’ of murder, 
imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty; and the ‘war crimes’ of murder, cruel treatment, 
outrages upon personal dignity, the passing of sentences and carrying out of executions without proper judicial 
authority, intentional attacks against civilians, civilian objects and humanitarian assistance missions, and 
treacherously killing or wounding an enemy combatant. For further information on the situation in Afghanistan, 
see Situation of Afghanistan (Web Page) https://www.icc-cpi.int/afghanistan.  
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people. Clearly they failed to complete his trial process in time.49 Again, the death of President 
Slobodan Milošević after four years of trial, and the marathon trial of Vojislav Seselj, which took 
more than a decade before failing to reach a judgment, raise serious concerns about the design of 
the ICTY.50 Another difficulty with the international body is its method of implementation. 
Sovereignty and territorial integrity, the basis of international law, present difficulties for the 
implementation of ICC requirements. This is not a problem when proceedings are conducted at 
the domestic level. The ICC is established by a multilateral treaty and ratified by the majority of 
states, to guarantee prosecution of the most serious crimes and to provide uniform standards for 
international criminal law. However, the lack of cooperation from sovereign states poses a key 
challenge.  
When the ICC adopted Sudan’s case,51 after referral from the Security Council, Sudan acted on its 
own sovereignty and capacity to prosecute its own nationals. However, this was called into 
question by the ICC on the grounds of the lack of an independent judiciary and the immunity of 
the accused in Sudan.52 Omar al-Bashir fell from power in a people’s uprising and is currently in 
custody. Whether he will be handed over to the ICC remains uncertain. Most African States 
ignored the arrest warrant for President Bashir issued by the ICC,53 failing to hand him over to the 
ICC despite his visits to various African States while under the ICC arrest warrant.  
 
49 M Rafiqul Islam, National Trials of International Crimes in Bangladesh: Transitional Justice as Reflected in 
Judgments (University Press, 2019) 60. 
50 Zorana Suvakovic, ‘The Politics of Justice in The Hague: The ICTY was meant to be a beacon of international 
justice but now its credibility is on the line’, Aljazeera (28 January 2014). 
51 Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (International Criminal Court, Case No ICC-2/05-01/09).  
52 Prosecutor v Ahmad Muhammad Harun and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (International Criminal 
Court, Case No ICC-02/05-01/07); Islam (n 49) 53, supra note 15. 
53 In 2015, Omar al-Bashir travelled to South Africa but he was not denied although domestic court of South 
Africa issued an arrest warrant in compliance with the ICC. For details, see Justice Malala, ‘By Letting Omar 
Al-Bashir Escape, South Africa Has Sided With Tyrants’, Guardian (Online, 16 June 2015) 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/16/omar-al-bashir-escape-south-africa-african-union. 
On 28 October 2015, Bashir visited India to join the India Africa Forum Summit in New Delhi. In May 2016, 
he visited Uganda and Djibouti, which are ICC state members of the Rome Statute. For details, see ‘Sudan’s 




In Prosecutor v Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah al-Sensussi,54 the Libyan government wanted 
to prosecute and try the case itself, but was denied by the ICC at both the Pre-Trial55 and Appeals 
Chambers.56 The Libyan government did not transfer Saif Al Gaddafi to the ICC and began 
proceedings against him and others in Libya.57 Saif Gaddafi was in the custody of a Libyan rebel 
group beyond the control of the Tripoli government. The rebel group did eventually let him go; he 
is now free, his whereabouts apparently unknown. Notwithstanding the fact that Saif Gaddafi was 
beyond the reach of the Tripoli government and that the alleged accused has been freed, the ICC 
continued calling on the Tripoli government to hand him over to the ICC, which they could not 
do. The ICC finally notified the UN Security Council about the situation pertaining to the non-
fulfilment of the responsibility of Libya to arrest and hand over Saif Gaddafi to the ICC. This case 
demonstrates that ICC state members may not cooperate for a variety of reasons. 
The lack of cooperation was a deciding factor in East Timor in the UN-established Panels of Judges 
in collaboration with the government of East Timor, for the serious crimes committed in 1999. It 
was unable to prosecute many of the accused because of politics or lack of cooperation from 
Indonesia. In fact, Indonesia denied even sending alleged perpetrators to Deli.58 The result was 
that 514 outstanding cases were investigated, while 50 cases remained uninvestigated. Moreover, 
large-scale prisoner releases in the second half of 2000 led the people of East Timor to feel 
betrayed by the trials. Several appeals remained unfinished.59 This lack of cooperation does not 
apply when the prosecution is conducted at the domestic level. 
Another challenge for the treaty-based institution is its dependence on the ratified states. The ICC, 
as a multilateral treaty-based institution, has a limited scope of jurisdiction to try international 
 
54 Prosecutor v Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah al-Sensussi (International Criminal Court, Case No ICC-
01/11-01/11). 
55 Ibid. 
56 Prosecutor v Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah al-Sensussi (ICC-01/11-01-11), Appeals Decision on the 
Request for Suspensive Effect and Related Matters (International Criminal Court, Case No ICC-01/11-01/11 
OA4). 
57 Islam (n 49) 54. 
58 Ibid 60. 
59 Report to the Secretary General of the Commission of Experts to Review the Prosecution of Serious Violations 
of Human Rights in Timor-Leste in 1999 (26 May 2005) 107; Report of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in East Timor, UN Doc E/CN 4/2001/37 (2001) [13]. 
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crimes. Countries, if they wish, can withdraw from the Statute.60 Another difficulty is that major 
powers are not party to the ICC, so global consensus has not been attained and controversy 
persists.61 Considering the challenges and difficulties faced by international forums and bodies, 
the advantage of a domestic prosecution system is clear. Domestic prosecution is conducted 
without interference from outsiders. Both investigation and prosecution can be conducted 
uninterruptedly within the established authority. Enforcement of the ensuing judgment avoids 
difficulties and uncertainty and can be implemented promptly.62  
Another advantage of domestic tribunals is their capacity for standing up to international 
influences and withstanding pressure from more powerful nations. These are very real challenges 
for any international organisation. Libya’s case was adopted by the Security Council and referred 
to the ICC, but in the case of Syria, the Security Council did not refer the situation to the ICC 
despite requests from 57 nations.63  
The establishment of a national tribunal in Bangladesh has exploited these advantages by providing 
many provisions that are not common in contemporary international crime trial statutes or charters. 
However, in doing so it has not deviated from the well-established norms and principles that were 
already developed in the jurisprudence of the previous trials of international crimes by different 
tribunals. A comparative analysis reveals that The ICT-BD Act is consistent with many important 
features of similar international crimes and tribunals laws, notably the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL. 
For example, The ICT-BD Act’s definition of crimes is largely drawn from the conventional and 
judicial exposition of these crimes available in the Nuremberg Charter (articles 17–25), the 
Genocide Convention (article 2), the ICTY Statute (articles 2–5), the ICTR Statute (articles 2–5), 
the SCSL Statute (articles 1 and 8), the Law on the Establishment of the ECCC (article 4) and the 
ICC Statute (articles 5–8). Likewise, The ICT-BD Act’s bestowing of wide-ranging powers on the 
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tribunals in conducting the trials resonates with similar powers available in the statutes of the ICTY 
(articles 8–10 and 20) and ICTR (articles 7–9 and 19). Moreover, the provisions regarding the trial 
proceedings and rules of evidence bear similarity with the corresponding provisions of the ICTY 
and ICTR statutes. More importantly, the Act recognises certain rights of the accused such as the 
right to offer any explanation pertinent to the charge made against them, to conduct their own 
defence or resort to the assistance of counsel, and to appeal against any conviction and sentence, 
which is compatible with the rights conferred under the statutes of the ICTY (article 21), ICTR 
(article 20), SCSL (article 17), and the Law on the Establishment of the ECCC (article 13). It is 
therefore clear that The ICT-BD Act has adopted a great deal of its principles from those developed 
by various international crimes tribunals.  
From this research on the exclusive domestic trials of international crimes in Bangladesh, it seems 
such trials may be inescapable in the future, particularly in non-Western jurisdictions. This is 
because existing international criminal law and institutions suffer from excessive Eurocentrism, 
ineffectiveness and a crisis of enforcement. Many non-Western states consider the international 
criminal justice system unreliable for seeking and receiving justice, and inappropriate for 
application to their domestic jurisdictions because of local uniqueness and dissimilar requirements. 
They prefer to conduct such trials using their national courts or tribunals under domestic law and 
resist the domestic application of international criminal law and institutions, which many states 
regard as an interference in their sovereignty and internal affairs. The international legal system 
remains dysfunctional and is dominated by sovereign and independent states pursuing their 
domestic matters in self-interest. This trend is set to persist so long as the underlying tension 
between internationalism and nationalism remains. As a result, those states desirous of ending the 
impunity of their national perpetrators of international crimes will increasingly resort to the 
Bangladesh trial model, being the only trial of its kind, as a useful national experience and lawful 
alternative pathway to bringing national perpetrators to justice. It would be difficult to undermine 
this significance and legacy of the Bangladesh trials for any similar trials in the future. 
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VI.B.4 Complementarity Between The Rome Statute and the ICT-BD 
In the English language, the term ‘complementarity’ means ‘a complementary relationship 
situation’64 or ‘a state or system that involves complementary components’.65 Components are 
complementary if they complete each other. The word ‘complementary’ is the adjective of the verb 
‘to complement’. For anything to complement another, it has to ‘add in a way that … completes’66 
the other and makes it perfect; that is, it must be ‘one of two parts that make up a whole or complete 
each other’.67 The understanding of complementarity has been enhanced by El Zeidy, who says 
that the principle of complementarity in international criminal law needs the existence of both 
national and international criminal justice systems, working as subsidiaries of one another to 
reduce crimes of international law. When one type of law fails to exercise its jurisdiction, the other 
intervenes to ensure perpetrators are punished.68 In sum, complementarity is a principle of priority 
among several bodies able to exercise jurisdiction.69 
Although the term complementarity in international criminal law emerges only at the beginning of 
1990s, its basis and methods can be traced to the early part of the 20th century.70 In creating the 
Treaty of Versailles 1919, Germany pleaded not to surrender its citizens to foreign tribunals, 
instead claiming permission to try the alleged war criminals before its domestic courts.71 The Allies 
agreed on the proviso that it would suspend these proceedings under article 228 of the Treaty if 
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the results were unsatisfactory. The concept of complementarity is apparent in the Allied Powers’ 
commitment to try and punish the accused person if Germany failed to do so.72  
The subsequent development was shaped in several ways. First, in the League of Nations 
Convention 1937, drafters stressed the significant role of national courts and the exceptional nature 
of the proposed ICC. This was the first official treaty to introduce a complementary relation 
between international and domestic justice, in offering freedom of choice of the forum 
conveniens.73 Second, under Nuremberg Statute, only 22 offenders were tried by the IMT. The 
remainder were tried under national jurisdictions.74 These national jurisdictions were established 
in the places in which the crimes were committed and by the occupying powers themselves, each 
within their own zone, with their own set of courts, applying their own scheme of law.75 Another 
model evolved from the ILC’s approach put forward by the 1994 working group. Here, James 
Crawford proposed that the ICC should have power to stay a prosecution on the ground of the 
existence of an adequate national tribunal already having jurisdiction over the offence.76  
Many international instruments contain complementary systems.77 However, these differ from the 
ICC. Under the statutes of the ICTY (article 9) and ICTR (article 8), national courts and the 
international tribunals were granted jurisdiction concurrently to prosecute international crimes; 
however, where there was contradiction, the international tribunals were primary.78 The concept 
of complementarity is also found in article 6 of the Genocide Convention as: 
Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be tried by 
a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such 
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international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties 
which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.79 
The recognition of complementary jurisdiction in the Preamble and article 1 of the Convention, 
detailing the ways of granting preference to domestic systems in article 17 of The Rome Statute, 
shows the significance of domestic prosecution.80 As part of the practice of the ICC, domestic 
prosecution has been well regarded by the Office of the Prosecutor. The success of the ICC relied 
on the successful domestic prosecution of international crimes. The informal group of experts 
recalled the philosophy on which complementarity rests, stating that ‘the establishment of an 
international order wherein national institutions respond effectively to international crimes, 
thereby obviating the need for trials before the ICC, would indeed be a major success for the Court 
and the international community as a whole’.81  
Bangladesh signed The Rome Statute on 16 September 1999 and deposited its instrument of 
ratification on 23 March 2010. One of the basic features of the ICC is its jurisdiction ratione 
temporis. This is reflected in article 11 of the Statute; however, article 4 provides the basis. Article 
4 prescribes that the Court may exercise its functions and powers, as provided in this Statute, on 
the territory of any state party and, by special agreement, on the territory of any other state.82 This 
specifies the application of the Statute upon states parties. The point of contention is that the ICT-
BD has been trying individuals for the offences committed during the Liberation War of 1971. In 
this regard, article 11 of The Rome Statute provides that: 
1. The Court has jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of 
this Statute. 2. If a state becomes a Party to this Statute after its entry into force, the Court may 
exercise its jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of this 
Statute for that State, unless that State has made a declaration under article 12, paragraph 3. 
The section is mandatory in nature in applying the Statute. Bangladesh ratified the instrument on 
23 March 2010. According to article 11 of the Statute, it applies to cases in Bangladesh if ICC 
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crimes are committed after the date of ratification, not before. Further, article 24 of The Rome 
Statute provides that no person shall be criminally responsible under this Statute for conduct prior 
to the entry into force of the Statute. This article contains the principle of non-retroactivity ratione 
personae.  
Article 17 of the Rome Statute provides provisions as to the jurisdiction of the ICC relating to any 
international crimes. The Rome Statute authorises the ICC to entertain an international crime only 
if the concerned state is unable or unwilling to do so. Article 17 of The Rome Statute provides that: 
Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article 1, the Court shall determine that a case 
is inadmissible where: (a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has 
jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation 
or prosecution. (b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and 
the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from 
the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute. 
The article also provides that if a person concerned has already been tried for conduct that is the 
subject of the complaint, a trial by the Court is not permitted under The Rome Statute. To determine 
unwillingness in a particular case, the Court shall consider, having regard to the principles of due 
process recognised by international law, whether one or more of the following exist, as applicable:  
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was made for the 
purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court referred to in article 5; (b) There has been an unjustified delay in the 
proceedings which in the circumstances is inconsistent with intent to bring the person concerned 
to justice; (c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or impartially, 
and they were or are being conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent 
with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.83  
To determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall consider whether, because of a total or 
substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the state is unable to obtain 
the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its 
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proceedings.84 The Statute makes it clear that if a case is tried domestically, the case is not 
admissible under The Rome Statute. This is reflected in various Statute provisions. The Preamble 
of the Statute is clear in emphasising that the ICC established under this Statute shall be 
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.85 
The then Chief Prosecutor of the ICC, Luis Marino Ocampo, observed that as a consequence of 
complementarity, the number of cases that reach the Court should not be a measure of its 
efficiency. On the contrary, the absence of trials before the Court, as a consequence of the regular 
functioning of national institutions, would be a major success.86 
Complementarity comprises partnership and vigilance.87 Vigilance refers to the strict legal aspect 
of complementarity as shown in Article 17 of the Statute. It is the main provision related to this 
issue. The interpretation of this article can lead to problems, including giving power to the ICC to 
ascertain the ‘unwillingness’ and ‘inability’ of a state. Scholars have varied, often conflicting 
views regarding the problems of article 17, such as regards pardon, reprieves, amnesty and other 
clemency measures,88 which further complicates the issue. This research examines amnesty as a 
key issue, and the consensus of scholars shows that amnesty is the single greatest lacuna of the 
Statute. However, in interpreting article 17, where the complementarity loop is designed, the 
diversity of opinion needs to be examined. El Zeidy suggests that if the Court adopts a literal 
reading of article 17, amnesties could stop courts from declaring a case admissible, as the criteria 
for establishing unwillingness under article 17(2) are confined to when the prosecution or 
investigation has started. An amnesty granted before investigation would not then constitute 
unwillingness.89 This literal interpretation cannot be sustained because, as Kleffner argues, such 
an interpretation would undermine the entire Statute and the Court itself.90  
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Partnership is outside the loop of complementarity granted under Article 17 of the Statute.91 This 
is a different and independent aspect of complementarity. It refers to all activities or actions 
whereby national jurisdictions are strengthened and enabled to conduct genuine national 
investigations and trials of crimes included in The Rome Statute, without involving the Court in 
capacity building, financial support and technical assistance, but instead leaving these actions and 
activities for states, to assist each other on a voluntary basis.92 Complementarity must achieve three 
common objectives: 
5. to ensure that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community do not go 
unpunished; 
6. to encourage effective measures at the national level and enhance international 
cooperation; and 
7. to put an end to ‘impunity’ and contribute to the prevention of such crimes.93 
It is worth noting that even though complementarity favours the domestic system, the power to 
determine if a state is ‘unwilling’ or ‘unable’ is given to the ICC. This causes problems. 
Complementarity, then, although favourable to the domestic system, creates questions about 
determinations of ‘unwillingness’ and ‘inability’, which stay with the ICC. More doubts emerged 
in Kenya’s case.94 When Kenya’s case was accepted by the ICC, Kenya claimed that it had already 
launched investigations into the incidents, which had been rejected by the Pre-trial Chamber of the 
ICC. They claimed that the same conduct and same persons were not being dealt with by the ICC 
and Kenya.95 Kenya has an established, recognised and effective judicial system that should have 
been allowed to proceed,96 but was denied the opportunity. As a result, the case could not proceed 
for lack of witnesses. The ICC prosecutor asked for time to gather witnesses but was unsuccessful 
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because of the absolute non-cooperation of the Kenyan government. In the end, the prosecutor 
asked the ICC to discontinue the proceedings.97  
Regarding the ICT-BD’s contribution, one can take comfort in Linton’s admission that 
Bangladesh does seem to be taking effective steps to comply with basic international criminal law 
standards.98 Bangladesh has promised to meet international standards in these trials, but it has some 
way to go to meet this commitment. Now is the time for one last demonstration of political will to 
make this happen. Bangladesh could set the standard for other nations that have suffered 
unspeakable abuses at the hands of its own people.99 The ICT-BD in general complies with 
international standards as laid out. The Tribunal attracts the same criticisms faced by international 
bodies and tribunals. To achieve greater compatibility, then, the ICT-BD can be further changed 
to improve its standards. Some areas do need further consideration, such as the issues of the death 
penalty and witness protection.  
The horrendous massacres during the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971 clearly indicate the 
commission of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and violations of customary 
international law. However, in the post-war period, the people’s hopes of charging the relevant 
military leaders for their alleged war crimes, the country was compelled to grant clemency to those 
officials who were free. This is the fact that prosecution against its own nationals, who aided, 
abetted or participated in the commission of serious war crimes, is ongoing. Had there been an 
ICC-type institution, the people of Bangladesh might have seen justice prevail. History shows that 
the need for a permanent international body was strongly felt after World War II. This was echoed 
immediately after the Liberation War in 1973 when, while hosting an international conference in 
Dhaka, the government of Bangladesh proposed to establish a permanent international court for 
investigating and prosecuting crimes committed during the Liberation War. Within the domestic 
sphere, the inauguration of The ICT-BD Act, during the ‘half century of silence’, is praiseworthy. 
It clearly shows the country’s determination to end impunity, despite facing its own economic and 
infrastructural challenges. This was in response to a worldwide movement to end the culture of 
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impunity for perpetrators of international crimes and shows determination to try the war criminals 
and give justice to the victims. 
The Rome Statute came into force in July 2002 and the ICC was set up.100 Bangladesh was the 
third Asian country, and the first in South Asia, to take ICC membership. This demonstrates 
Bangladesh’s commitment to the rule of law and international justice, and shows its intention to 
end impunity for genocide, and to prosecute crimes against humanity as well as all levels of war 
crimes.101 Moreover, Bangladesh was proactive during the proceedings for the establishment of 
the permanent ICC. Bangladesh’s representatives understood that the ICC should have inherent 
jurisdiction over core crimes and also enjoy a wide measure of acceptance and support.102 
The relationship between The ICT-BD Act and The Rome Statute is significant. The domestic Act 
has mechanisms for investigation and prosecution of all international crimes, including those listed 
in The Rome Statute. This demonstrates how far domestic law had come in relation to The Rome 
Statute. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh held that ‘there are 
distinguishing features between The Rome Statute and The ICT-BD Act’.103 During the preparatory 
stages, the country shared its concern and commented on the substantive and procedural aspects 
of The Rome Statute.  
First and foremost, The ICT-BD Act was established long before The Rome Statute. The distinction 
of the domestic tribunals is evident in the Preamble of The Rome Statute, which states the 
‘international criminal court shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdiction’. According 
to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, The Rome Statute is subject to state 
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party acceptance. Therefore, it is not perpetual in nature. It was delivered by the Appellate Division 
that: 
The crimes mentioned in The Rome Statute and the Statute itself has a lifespan of only seven 
years. Any State party may propose amendments after the expiry of the period from the entry 
into force of the Statute shall enter into force for all ‘states parties which have accepted the 
amendment one year after the deposit of their instruments of ratification or acceptance’. 
Therefore, The Rome Statute is a temporary legislation.104 
In judging, ascertaining or determining the relationship between The ICT-BD Act and The Rome 
Statute, this chapter has demonstrated that The ICT-BD Act contains all the crimes of The Rome 
Statute and all crimes under international criminal law. Therefore, the Act is broader than the 
Statute in terms of its application to crimes. The key issue is that The ICT-BD Act is part of the 
complementary jurisdiction of The Rome Statute. The prospective application of the Act under 
section 3 and the ratification of the Statute by Bangladesh connects the Act with Article 17 of the 
Statute. However, regarding the ongoing trials of alleged perpetrators of atrocities committed 
during the 1971 Liberation War, the Appellate Division states that under The Rome Statute, 
inconsistent domestic laws are not applicable. Therefore, The Rome Statute has primacy over 
national law.105 Succinctly, as of now, the tribunals under The ICT-BD Act define their relationship 
with The Rome Statute as: 
Our Tribunal (ICT-BD) which is a domestic judicial body constituted under a legislation enacted 
by our Parliament is not obliged by the provisions contained in The Rome Statute. The Rome 
Statute is not binding upon this Tribunal for resolving the issue of elements requirement to 
constitute the offence of crimes against humanity.106 
After becoming a party to The Rome Statute, Bangladesh laid several changes under The ICT-BD 
Act. Section 21 of The ICT-BD Act was again amended in 2013 after the Shahbag Movement, 
which shook the country. In brief, the movement started after the Tribunal’s verdict sentencing the 
accused, Abdul Quader Molla, to life imprisonment. People gathered at Shahbag, in Dhaka, 
demanding the death penalty for the accused. The legal complexity arose because the government 
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could not appeal in this case since the accused had not been acquitted by the Tribunal (as required 
by section 21 of the Act). Therefore, the Amendment of 2013 granted the government the right to 
prefer appeal even against the order of sentence. The Amendment was made retrospective with 
effect from 14 July 2009.  
The duration of preferring appeal was reduced from 60 to 30 days. Moreover, the duration of 
disposal of the appeal was fixed at 60 days. The amended section 21(2) reads: 
Apart from the government, the complainant or the informant, are also bestowed power to appeal, 
as of right, to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh against an order of 
acquittal or an order of sentence.  
Along similar lines, section 21(4) of the Act states that the appeal shall be disposed of within 60 
days from the date of its filing, except for those absconding. This arrangement for speedy trial 
seems to be a significant feature of compliance with the standards of international criminal law, as 
it prescribes and ensures the requirement of expeditious resolution by the Appellate Court, as 
enumerated in article 82 of the Rome Statute, which prescribes that ‘the appeal shall be heard on 
an expedited basis’.107 
VI.C Conclusion 
The Bangladesh tribunals have not applied international law, practice or precedents completely 
but have fashioned them to suit the unique local, legal and cultural traditions. In other words, 
Bangladesh has applied international criminal law and justice in a manner not inconsistent with 
nor explicitly repugnant to the national legal system, thereby fulfilling local expectations of justice. 
It is naïve to expect atrocity crimes committed in non-Western developing countries to be tried by 
Eurocentric international criminal law, practice and principles. This is especially the case when 
these conflict with local culture, traditions and values. Clearly, then, the blending of national and 
international criminal law and justice as seen in the Bangladesh trials has not only enriched the 
national criminal law of Bangladesh, but also assisted in the implementation of international 
criminal law.  
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As Bangladesh has been trying individuals for alleged crimes committed in 1971, the question of 
the compliance and complementarity of The Rome Statute is not always appropriate. However, if 
any crime articulated in The Rome Statute is alleged to have been committed after the date of its 
ratification to the Statute, the test of complementarity will be applied. In such cases, The ICT-BD 
Act is relevant, and the tribunals shall have jurisdiction for any crimes mentioned there if 
committed before or after the commencement of the Act. The ICT-BD Act is the initial law for 
such situations. If Bangladesh is unwilling or unable to conduct such an investigation and 
prosecution, the ICC may in principle begin to exercise its jurisdiction. However, this provision 
does not apply to Bangladesh because the atrocity crimes were committed in 1971 and the ICC has 
no retrospective jurisdiction. Thus, without the Bangladesh domestic trials, the perpetrators of the 
1971 crimes would most likely have gone unpunished, and impunity would again have won over 
justice. These trials are therefore a reflection of the accountability for mass atrocities that ‘is one 
of the key tools in the struggle to prevent immunity and to enhance potential for respect for human 
rights, particularly during times of conflict’.108  
Bangladesh, as a member of the ICC, discharged its responsibility by organising trials for 
perpetrators of international crimes tried under The ICT-BD Act. Significantly, these crimes, their 
perpetrators and victims are all Bangladeshi nationals under Bangladeshi national law. It is naïve 
to expect that Bangladesh, as a sovereign state with a well-established legal and justice system, 
would hold these trials under any foreign or international law, which is largely Eurocentric and 
not necessarily suitable for Bangladesh in all circumstances. This dissimilarity requires the ICT-
BD and the Appellate Division to tailor international law to suit the special needs and 
circumstances of Bangladesh. However, in every judgment, judges borrowed relevant foreign 
judgments and made use of international laws and precedents appropriate to the Bangladesh 
situation.  
The ICC’s complementarity did not work in the Kenyan and Libyan cases for want of cooperation 
and control, and as a consequence the impunity of the perpetrators prevailed over justice for the 
victims. Given the lacklustre performance of the ICC’s complementarity as it stands now, the 
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prosecution and punishment of the perpetrators of international crimes by domestic tribunals and 
courts is paramount in the interest of justice. Viewed from this perspective, in its domestic trials 
of the perpetrators of the crimes committed during the Liberation War of 1971, Bangladesh is 
contributing to the administration of international criminal justice. Dismissing such trials by 
highlighting their gaps and inadequacies would only perpetuate the impunity of war criminals at 
the expense of justice. Given that the ICC’s complementarity may again fail in the future for any 
of a number of reasons, the role of and reliance on the domestic criminal justice systems of ICC 
members remains important in delivering justice. In such situations, the ICC and the international 
criminal justice system should cooperate and support each other to address any gaps and 
inadequacies to strengthen the domestic trials of international crimes. After all, both national and 
international criminal justice systems have a common goal: the maximisation of justice to the 
victims and minimisation of impunity for the perpetrators of serious international crimes.  
Indeed, the experiences of failed complementarity in the Kenyan and Libyan cases and the 
success of the exclusively domestic experience of Bangladesh may trigger a move for 
reform in the complementary provisions of The Rome Statute of the ICC. This is because 
the existing complementary provision under article 17 can work only when the states 
involved extend their full cooperation to the ICC. However, in the current state-centric, 
decentralised, international legal system, sovereign states usually cooperate only when 
such cooperation is in their own interest. In other words, no cooperation would be 
forthcoming when it goes against their interest. It was this self-interest expediency that 
complicated the Kenyan and Libyan cases. Moreover, certain powerful states, notably the 
US, Russia and China, are not members of the ICC and therefore are beyond the reach of 
the complementary provision. Under these circumstances, instances of defiance of the 
ICC’s complementarity are likely to be plentiful, allowing impunity to prevail over justice. 
International criminal law and the ICC lack any mandatory centralised enforcement 
mechanism. Since the Bangladesh experience has successfully shown an alternative for 
the enforcement of international criminal law mandatory in its domestic trials, there is a 
strong potential for this experience to trigger a reformist move at the next ICC reform 
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conference (to be held every 10 years), which has its aim to revise the text of ICC article 17 
for its improved implementation. One option for the ICC may be to actively cooperate with 
the domestic trials of ICC crimes in member states for the effective implementation of 
complementarity, which may find expression in the text of article 17 
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VII CONCLUSION 
Historically, The ICT-BD Act arose in response to the horrendous nature of the atrocities 
committed against Bengalis during the Liberation War of 1971. The judicial response to the 
commission of these international crimes, rather than developing into investigation and 
prosecution, fell victim to national and international politics, with the assassination of the founding 
father of the nation, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, bringing the process to a halt. 
However, even in its war-broken condition, Bangladesh had made the investigation and 
prosecution of these international crimes a priority. The courage of this newly independent nation 
and its commitment to ensuring justice for the victims during the era of silence reflects the nation’s 
promise to ending the culture of impunity. Therefore, the idea of the national obligation to 
prosecute these crimes has been an ideal attempt from Bangladesh to the international community. 
The exclusively domestic trials of the international crimes committed during the Liberation War 
have been reasonably effective in bringing the perpetrators of major atrocity crimes to justice. The 
Tribunal is ending the cycle of entrenched impunity, during which the perpetrators were beyond 
the reach of law and justice. The resolve of Bangladesh should be viewed against near 
insurmountable national and international opposition, particularly from Pakistan and its allies, 
including the US, China and almost all Muslim and African States at the UN. Despite mounting 
pressure from domestic opposition and international factors, Bangladesh finally brought to 
completion in 2009 the task started during the immediate post-independence period. 
The Bangladesh tribunals have been prosecuting those international crimes that are embodied and 
defined in The ICT-BD Act, which has incorporated and internalised international criminal law 
into the domestic criminal law of Bangladesh. The ICT-BD Act has drawn heavily from the 
Nuremberg Charter, Nuremberg precedents and Nuremberg Principles of international criminal 
law adopted by the UN in 1950. Being a dualist state, Bangladesh has incorporated international 
criminal law and policy standards in a tailored manner to make them consistent with its local legal 
values, culture, traditions and uniqueness, or at least in a manner not overtly repugnant to its 
domestic criminal justice system. There is nothing in international criminal law and policy that 
prevents the national trying of international crimes. To the contrary, The Rome Statute of the ICC 
repeatedly imposes a positive duty upon ICC member states to establish national trials to 
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complement the international criminal justice system. Indeed, the primacy of the national trials of 
international crimes by sovereign member states was duly recognised at the Rome Conference in 
July 1998, where the ICC’s jurisdiction was not considered a substitute for domestic criminal 
jurisdiction.  
The crimes articulated in The ICT-BD Act are all international crimes; namely, genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, crimes against peace, violations of the Geneva Conventions and 
any other crimes under international law. The ICT-BD Act, being purely domestic legislation, 
contains all components of crimes articulated in different international instruments. However, 
there are several points on which the component of international crimes under The ICT-BD Act is 
different. For instance, the issue of ‘political group’ within the definition of genocide has not been 
accepted at the international level, although proposals were made during the Genocide 
Convention’s adoption as well as during the opening of The Rome Statute. The issue is that the 
inclusion of ‘political group’ creates the potential for its misapplication for political purposes or 
motivates, such as against opposition parties. Further complexity arises in section 3 of The ICT-
BD Act, in which the Tribunal has been given jurisdiction over any crime committed either before 
or after the commencement of this Act. The inclusion of ‘before or after the commencement of 
this Act’ means any offence committed even after the commencement of this Act may also be tried 
under this Act. However, the tribunals have held in several cases that their jurisdiction is limited 
to the prosecution, trial and punishment of the atrocity crimes committed during the Liberation 
War of 1971 only. 
The complementary jurisdiction under The Rome Statute confers priority to the domestic system, 
whose failure in terms of being ‘unwilling’ or ‘unable’ to investigate and prosecute will lead the 
ICC to exercise its jurisdiction. Bangladesh is a party to the Statute and domestic prosecution is a 
requirement of the ICC. However, as the present tribunals are dealing with the crimes committed 
during the Bangladesh Liberation War, an ICC-led continuation of the process would be 
impossible. Nonetheless, the obligations as enshrined in the Preamble of the Rome Statute—to end 
the culture of impunity—are complemented by Bangladesh. There was an issue in this regard from 
the perspective of the defence counsel, who argued that The Rome Statute is a prospective 
instrument providing no death penalty, whereas The ICT-BD Act is a retrospective one. This aspect 
has been addressed by the tribunals on the point that the application of The Rome Statute is limited 
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for the purpose of the Statute only and cannot be extended. Broadly, despite some contentious 
differences in the elements and aspects of the crimes and procedures, The ICT-BD Act complies 
with the complementary principle of The Rome Statute. The ICT-BD Act satisfies the ICC’s 
requirement for a complementary domestic jurisdiction.   
The substantive law and procedural rules enacted in 2010 have been evolving ever since, dictated 
by the need of expeditious yet fair trial standards. In several judgments, the judges have undertaken 
a comparative study on the rights of the accused in the ICCPR and The ICT-BD Act and Rules of 
Procedures and found that they are by and large similar and compatible. Moreover, in doing so, 
the judges have attempted to strike a balance between procedural justice to the accused and 
substantive justice to the victims in a bid to prove fair trial to both parties. This has not been easy 
or free from criticism, but the judges can be seen to have used the best of their judicious minds 
and impartiality. 
Viewed from these legal perspectives, it can be argued that the Bangladesh tribunals have been 
administering criminal justice according to international criminal law and policy as adopted in The 
ICT-BD Act, the substantive law of the trial. The harmonisation of national and international 
criminal law in The ICT-BD Act has enriched the national criminal law of Bangladesh, and its 
mandatary application and enforcement has improved the effectiveness of international criminal 
law, which lacks a centralised and dedicated enforcement mechanism.  
The domestic trial of international crimes has been appraised and prioritised under the principle of 
complementarity, which remains the most fundamental principle of the ICC. The primary aim of 
developing international criminal law is to ensure the ending of the culture of impunity, to bring 
justice for the victims. To implement this idea in reality requires the participation of relevant 
stakeholders at different levels.  
The issue of trial in absentia has also been responded to with several examples, and also 
determining the status of Bangladesh with respect to the ICCPR in making reservation to the 
relevant clause. The execution of several death sentences and arrests of accused were confirmed, 
although the death penalty remains a strongly debated issue at the international level. On the issue 
of the death penalty, some countries have chosen to no longer use the death penalty. However, 
international human rights law does not expressly prohibit capital punishment. Death sentences 
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may not be morally supportable, but legally this is yet to be outlawed. In Bangladesh, the legal 
system permits the death penalty for serious crimes, and Bangladesh’s Apex Court stands by and 
provides the death penalty. Further, the majority of the nation’s people urge the death penalty for 
atrocity crime perpetrators. In time, as the nation becomes more advanced, there may be 
opportunity for deciding the matter. Subsequeently, the findings of the tribunals have not been 
substantially modified at the appellate stage, with the Appellate Division mostly continuing the 
findings of the tribunals. The same is true for the review jurisdiction. 
The mechanism of review by the Appellate Division has further been added to ensure the rights of 
the parties after appeal. The modus operandi of the rules of procedure under The ICT-BD Act has 
been developed through the process of amendments. Some of the procedural aspects that were 
added later include the right of accused persons to be presumed innocent, their right to a fair and 
public hearing with counsel of their choice, and the right to apply for and be granted bail. The 
amendments also prohibit double jeopardy, make it such that there is no requirement for the 
accused to confess guilt, and place on the prosecution the burden of proof regarding the 
commission of the crime by the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. The rules relating to the 
procedural aspects under The ICT-BD Act overlap with and assimilate the rules and standards 
articulated in the procedures of the ICC and other international tribunals. The ordinary domestic 
procedural bodies are not accepted under The ICT-BD Act; that is, the Criminal Procedure Code 
1898 and Evidence Act 1872 are excluded. 
Since the international crimes are tried by a domestic tribunal, none can be claimed to be perfect. 
Rather, they suffer from inadequacies and shortcomings in one form or another. The Bangladesh 
trial is also not free from inadequacies and shortcomings. It endured some initial teething problems 
and has matured with the passage of time and experience. The deficiencies of The ICT-BD Act are 
placed on four grounds: delayed trial; inconsistency in the definition of crimes against humanity; 
double jeopardy such that the accused were tried under the Collaborations Order of 1972; and that 
the Act was only intended to bring for prosecution the 195 Pakistani war criminals given clemency 
under the Tripartite Agreement. The discussions of these grounds made in Chapter VI are 
summarised in turn below. In certain circumstances, the defence has strongly emphasised the 
standards provided in The Rome Statute and Bangladesh’s status as party to the ICC. 
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Regarding the issue of delayed trial, in Afghanistan, the preliminary examination was made public 
only in 2007, and after a continuation of more than 10 years suddenly the whole process was halted. 
The same type of delay was experienced in the ECCC. The death of President Slobodan Milošević 
after four years of trial, and the marathon trial of Vojislav Seselj, which took more than a decade 
before failing to reach a judgment, have raised serious concerns on the part of victims regarding 
the design of the ICTY. Thus, compared against the situations and experiences above, the system 
in Bangladesh should be applauded, particularly for the completion of cases within the shortest 
possible time while following the Rules of Procedure. The question of a long delay for the 
prosecution, the issuance of amnesty by the Tripartite Agreement to the Pakistani army officials, 
the retrospective application of the Act, the regulation of the Collaborators Order, the use of trial 
in absentia in some cases, the application of customary international law and the diverse standards 
available at the international level are all issues of priority, as the tribunals have observed.  
This study has argued that the question of delay regarding the Bangladesh trials cannot be a ground 
for denying the process. The delay was caused by domestic and international political opposition 
(such as from China, the US and Pakistan itself) and the unwillingness of the powers inside the 
country, particularly the post-Bangabandhu regimes, which continued until Awami League’s 
return to power in 2008. Moreover, the law does not create or provide any avenue whereby a delay 
in criminal issues can be a ground of obstructing the proceedings. The long delay in the case of 
international crimes is not even a concern since the obligation to ensure justice to the victims is a 
duty upon the State.  
Second, on the question of inconsistency, the analysis suggests that no definition of crimes against 
humanity under international instruments are identical to each other; however, broadly all are 
similar. For example, the definitions in the Nuremberg Charter do not match those in other 
international instruments. Third, the question of double jeopardy does not apply to the Bangladesh 
trials, as The ICT-BD Act targets individuals accused of committing, aiding or abetting 
international crimes, whereas the Collaborator’s Order is for crimes committed under the Penal 
Code. Finally, the Act nowhere mentions that it does not apply to persons other than the 195 
Pakistani officials. The norms of jus cogens prohibition of heinous international crimes under The 
ICT-BD Act are the highest norms of universal value from which no derogation is permissible. 
Therefore, the prosecution of these crimes and their perpetrators is obligatory for Bangladesh.  
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Given the lacklustre effectiveness, non-universal jurisdiction and demonstrated limitations of the 
international criminal justice system, particularly the ICC and the hybrid tribunals with UN 
involvement (eg, in East Timor and Cambodia), the role and success of national criminal 
jurisdictions like that in Bangladesh should not be underestimated. Such national trials should not 
be discouraged by highlighting their deficiencies. Rather, they should be supported and promoted 
by the international community and the UN. One must bear foremost in mind that no trial is perfect 
and free from criticism; all past and existing trials have their limitations. Independent member 
states of the ICC have the primacy of jurisdiction to try and punish the perpetrators of heinous 
atrocity crimes, often committed in developing states. The ICC must help these trials held in 
‘willing and able’ domestic criminal jurisdictions to end impunity; otherwise, a blanket denial of 
such jurisdiction in preference of the ICC jurisdiction may emerge, which would be fraught with 
the potential for impunity to prevail over justice, as seen in Kenya and Libya. Since the purpose 
of the national and international criminal jurisdictions is the same—that is, ending the impunity of 
the perpetrators of international crimes—both jurisdictions must cooperate with and complement 
each other to accomplish their goal in a joint venture.  
Regarding how the crimes are defined under The ICT-BD Act, the absence of the components of 
‘widespread’ and ‘systematic’ in the definition of crimes against humanity has been an important 
issue. The tribunals and the Appellate Division have successfully managed the proceedings to 
deliver the verdict within the shortest possible time. Such timely justice at the international level 
is often absent. The tribunals and Appellate Division have followed several fundamental principles 
of international law. In dealing with the status of the Tripartite Agreement, both forums have 
opined from the perspective of peremptory norms under international law. 
Although The ICT-BD Act does not expressly provide for the protection of victims and witnesses, 
the Rules of Procedures contain such protection provisions in detail. There have been a few violent 
attacks on witnesses, which prompted the authority to prove the effective protection to witnesses 
and victims. This protection is provided by law enforcement agencies. However, neither the 
tribunals or authority have yet to establish a designated protection cell for victims and witnesses. 
As a result, the effectiveness of the protection regime is far from satisfactory. 
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Chapter I of this research provided a brief historical background and literature review, while 
Chapter II analysed the substantive part of The ICT-BD Act to address the research question: What 
are the substantive laws of The ICT-BD Act and its applications? Chapter III then examined the 
rules and procedures followed by the ICT-BD in conducting its trials, addressing the research 
question: What procedural laws are followed by the ICT-BD? Next, Chapter IV examined the legal 
points claimed by the prosecution and thereby encountered by the defence. This chapter addressed 
the research question: What measures and strategies under the substantive and procedural laws 
have been adopted for prosecution and defence under The ICT-BD Act? Chapter V discussed the 
trials, appeal, review judgments, conviction and sentencing under The ICT-BD Act, to address the 
research question: What are the Rules of Procedure for the post-trial process under The ICT-BD 
Act? Chapter VI addressed the final research question: To what extent are Bangladesh’s domestic 
trials of international crimes rendered complementary to those under the ICC? Finally, this 
concluding chapter, Chapter VII, will now discuss the main research question, identifying the 
findings as regards the achievements, optimism and caution arising out of the domestic trials of 
international crimes in Bangladesh.  
First, The ICT-BD Act, as the main operative law in the investigation and prosecution of crimes 
committed during the Bangladesh Liberation War, was the first major effort to define international 
crimes and form appropriate tribunals to deliver justice since the Nuremberg Principles, adopted 
by the International Law Commission in 1950.1 This gap in international instruments posed a 
challenge for ending the culture of impunity. The ICT-BD Act was thus a significant example for 
the nations that had experienced conflict and atrocities. Substantively, the Act offered examples 
for the jurisdiction of the tribunals; definitions of the designated international crimes under trial; 
and the legal regime of criminal responsibility, both individual and joint criminal enterprise.  
Second, while adjudicating the trials under this Act, the tribunals have adhered to the basic 
principles of international criminal law, developed from the jurisprudence of the trials of 
international crimes in Nuremberg and the ICTY and ICTR. This commitment to comply with the 
substantive and procedural norms of international criminal law is reflected in the interpretations 
 
1 Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of 
the Tribunal (adopted at the second session of the International Law Commission of the United Nations, 1950) 
https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/7_1_1950.pdf. 
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of the tribunals and the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court on relevant rules of domestic 
legislation.  
Third, the trials in Bangladesh have by and large been a success in terms of arranging the 
investigation and prosecution of international crimes. In many instances, countries have not been 
willing to investigate and prosecute international crimes, instead issuing blanket or conditional 
amnesty the perpetrators. The Bangladesh example will be important in helping the international 
community, particularly developing nations, to commit to investigating and prosecuting such 
crimes in the medium term.  
Nevertheless, the complex situations encountered by the Bangladesh tribunals must be dealt with 
to assist other nations to engage in the domestic prosecution of international crimes. As mentioned, 
there have been some challenges that have affected the performance of the ICT-BD in adjudicating 
the trials of international crimes in Bangladesh. One crucial point has been the absence of amicus 
curie, which helps the court by providing invaluable opinion on legal matters. The ICT-BD has 
dealt with several questions in which the involvement of amicus curie would have further 
enhanced the mechanism. However, amicus curie has been appointed in Chief Prosecutor v Abdul 
Qader Molla, where the Appellate Division sought the opinion of prominent legal minds on the 
complex questions of the definition of crimes against humanity under customary international law 
and the extent to which that has been applicable for Bangladesh. Despite this, similar arrangements 
for several other complex issues have not been made, and the tribunals have been criticised for not 
allowing foreign lawyers and judges despite having provisions allowing the appearance of any 
foreign legal counsel for either party. In view of this, rethinking whether the Tribunal should allow 
the appearance of foreign legal counsels seems warranted, to improve prosecutorial strategies and 
defence performance, and thus maintain international standards.  
Of course, allowing foreign lawyers to appear before the Tribunal is not solely a matter for the 
Tribunal. The process involves government approval of these lawyers’ entry visas and the 
Bangladesh Bar Council allowing them to register and practice in Bangladesh’s domestic courts. 
Moreover, there is no guarantee that the participation of foreign lawyers will improve the quality 
and standard of the trial. The experience in East Timur and Cambodia of such hybrid trials does 
not conclusively support this.  
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The completion of the ICT-BD process will be a significant contribution to the development of 
international criminal law and its application to domestic jurisdictions. The present research has 
highlighted the contemporary international debates regarding the complementary jurisdiction and 
principle between national and international criminal justice systems. It is undeniable that The 
ICT-BD Act is distinctive in the post-Nuremberg period for being part of a domestic system 
containing international criminal law, as visible in the name of the Act and the Tribunal.  
By way of further improvement, the following issues are important to address for the quality 
administration of future judgments:  
• Research cooperation and collaboration on this issue, if expanded globally, would help 
immensely. Critical engagement with the international legal community will help to 
develop the culture of quality of the ICT-BD. 
• The authorities should give urgent attention and resources for the better protection of 
victims and witnesses. The existing system of protection is inadequate. A special ICT-BD 
victim and witnesses’ cell should be established.  
• Investigations, prosecutorial strategies and defence performance need to be revisited with 
a view to improving preparation and their receiving of adequate attention. 
• The ICT-BD needs to establish a mean of conducting outreach activities regarding its 
administration of international criminal justice, preferably through its in-house publicity 
outlet, for the better understanding and appreciation of the common people of Bangladesh. 
• Providing for the involvement of amicus curie would help the ICT-BD immensely in 
adjudicating complex and difficult cases.  
• The strict prohibition of torture and other human rights violations against alleged accused 
in custody should be included in the process.  
To conclude, the contribution of the Bangladesh experience lies in the fact that it has worked as, 
in the words of Kirsten Sellars, a ‘laboratory’, in which international crimes have been tried in a 
domestic forum with appreciable success. Thus, in addition to providing justice for the victims of 
crimes committed during the Bangladesh Liberation War, the ICT-BD goes beyond the Nuremberg 
and World War II framework to serve as a highly relevant example for nations around the world 
that have or will experience crimes of atrocity for which they seek to ensure justice. Further, the 
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principles and procedures under The ICT-BD Act are broadly compliant with the Nuremberg 
Principles and those subsequently developed in the arena of international criminal law.  
In evaluating the success of the ICT-BD, its achievements must be considered rather than only its 
challenges. It has accomplished trials, which for decades could not be achieved by the international 
community and UN. As at the year 2020, the contribution of the ICT-BD cannot be summarised 
or finalised. Many more investigations and prosecutions remain lodged with the investigation 
agency and tribunals. The completion of all these cases is the final threshold beyond which 
concluding remarks may be made about the contribution of the ICT-BD.  
Many lessons can be learned from the Bangladesh trials, and their presence will be felt in every 
future national trial of international crimes, in which judges and prosecutors will look to the 
precedents established in the judgments of the ICT-BD. Obviously, neither The ICT-BD Act nor 
the tribunals are perfect, and there is room for further reform and improvement. Drawing 
appropriate lessons from similar trials and new developments worldwide will go a long way in 
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